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Abstract 
The construction industry is plagued by occupational risky situations and poor working conditions. Risk 
Assessment for Occupational Safety (RAOS) is the first and key step to achieve adequate safety levels, 
particularly to support decision-making in safety programs.  
Most construction safety efforts are applied informally under the premise that simply allocating more 
resources to safety management will improve safety on site. Moreover, there are many traditional methods 
to address RAOS, but few have been adapted and validated for use in the construction industry, thus 
producing poor results.  
The contribution of this dissertation is a qualitative fuzzy RAOS model, tailored for the construction 
industry, named QRAM (Qualitative Risk Assessment Model). QRAM is based on four dimensions: 
Safety Climate Adequacy, (work accidents) Severity Factors, (work accidents) Possibility Factors and 
Safety Barriers Effectiveness. 
The risk assessment is based on real data collected by observation of reality, interviews with workers, 
foreman and engineers and consultation of site documents (working procedures, reports of work accident 
investigation, etc.), avoiding the use of data obtained by statistical tecnhiques. 
To rating each parameter it was defined qualitative evaluators - linguistic variables - which allow to 
perform a user-friendly knowledge elicitation. 
QRAM was, firstly evaluated by “peer” review, with 12 safety experts from Brazil (2), Bulgaria (1), 
Greece (3), Turkey (3) and Portugal (3), and then, evaluated by comparing QRAM with other RAOS 
tecnhiques and methods. 
The safety experts , concluded that: a) QRAM is a versatile tool for occupational safety risk assessment on 
construction sites; b) the specific checklists for knowledge elicitation are a good decision aid and, c) the 
use of linguistic variables is a better way to make the risk assessments process more objective and reliable.  
 
Keywords: Risk assessment, construction industry, occupational safety, fuzzy sets.
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Resumo 
A indústria da construção, devido às más condições de trabalho, regista maiores índices de sinistralidade 
laboral que os restantes sectores de actividade. A Avaliação de Riscos para a Segurança Ocupacional 
(ARSO) é o primeiro e fundamental passo para alcançar níveis de segurança adequados, especialmente 
para definir programas de segurança. 
A maioria das medidas de segurança implementadas nos estaleiros de construção são determinadas de 
forma informal sob a premissa de que, simplesmente, afectar mais recursos vai melhorar a segurança 
ocupacional. 
Embora existam vários métodos de ARSO, poucos foram adaptados e validados para uso na indústria da 
construção, pelo que raramente os resultados são adequados. 
A contribuição do trabalho apresentado nesta dissertação é um modelo qualitativo difuso de ARSO para a 
indústria da construção, denominado QRAM. 
O QRAM é baseado em quatro dimensões: clima de segurança adequado, fatores de gravidade (expectável 
em consequência de acidentes de trabalho), factores de possibilidade (de ocorrência de acidentes de 
trabalho) e, eficácia das medidas de segurança. 
A avaliação dos riscos é baseada em dados reais recolhidos por observação directa da realidade, 
entrevistas com trabalhadores, encarregados e engenheiros e consulta de documentos do estaleiro 
(procedimentos de trabalho, relatórios de investigação de acidentes, etc.). 
A classificação dos factores de risco é efectuada por variáveis linguísticas, o que facilita a obtenção do 
conhecimento empírico. 
O QRAM foi avalidado por um grupo de 12 especialistas em segurança laboral do Brasil (2), Bulgária (1). 
Grécia (3), Turquia (3) e Portugal (3). Foi igualmente avaliado por comparação com outros métodos e 
técnicas de avaliação de riscos. 
De acordo com a opinião dos especialistas, o QRAM provou ser uma boa ferramenta de ARSO em 
estaleiros de construção. As listas de verificação e as variáveis linguísticas permitem a recolha de 
informação de uma forma fácil e sistemática. 
 
Palavras chave: Avaliação do risco, indústria da construção, segurança ocupacional, 
conjuntos difusos. 
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1. Introduction 
Safety is an essential feature to be taken into account in the construction industry, and a robust Risk 
Assessment for Occupational Safety (RAOS) is the key to achieve it, particularly to support decision-
making in safety programs (Ringdahl, 2001).  
In general, risk assessment is a complex process that entails the consideration of many qualitative or 
subjective parameters and, particularly in the construction industry. Due the specific nature of the sector, it 
must deal with ill-defined and imprecise data and information (Dedobbeleer and Beland, 1991; Ringen 
and Seegal, 1995; Gillen et al., 1997; Laitinen et al., 1999; Loosemore and Lee, 2001 and Tam et al., 
2004). So far, traditional approaches do not seem to provide adequate answers to deal with these issues 
(Ringen et al., 1995). Moreover, using probability (classical or Bayesian) may mask other aspects of 
incomplete and imprecise knowledge, thus leading to a false sense of accuracy and precision and 
consequently to inadequate and/or inefficient decisions.  
Furthermore, as pointed by some authors (Karwowski and Mital, 1986; Cornell, 1996; Wang and Ruxton, 
1997; Pender, 2001; Sii et al., 2001; Tixier et al., 2002; Faber and Stewart, 2003 and Nilsen and Aven, 
2003), most of the traditional RAOS methods present some limitations, such as:  
• Inherent imprecision in human-centred systems; 
• Difficult to generate mathematical models due to intrinsic uncertainty in this type of problems. 
For instance, it is difficult to represent and describe unsafe behaviours, caused by human errors;  
• Difficult to quantify the effects and consequences of many hazards because they involve several 
factors with a high level of uncertainty, even when the physical processes are clearly understood; 
• Large number of assumptions, judgments and opinions are involved in a risk quantification 
process, hence, it requires considerable skills from a safety analyst to interpret the results; 
• Construction projects are unique by definition. This reduces the relevance and reliability of 
statistical aggregates derived from probability-based analysis; 
• Humans are limited in their ability to encompass and process the full range of information 
required for holistic decisions; 
• Uncertainty and ignorance may be found in many temporal aspects of the flow of knowledge, 
which are important in construction planning; 
• Construction safety parameters and possible outcomes (of unsafety ones) must be communicated 
to workers and the imprecision of our language does not express these very well. 
Considering all the above statements, it is apparent that RAOS in the construction industry is rampant with 
inadequate data and/or imprecise, ill-defined, and incomplete information, particularly at the design stage, 
for which traditional quantitative approaches do not give adequate answers. To overcome some of the 
mentioned problems in assessing occupational safety risks, this work propose a qualitative model for risk 
assessment, hereafter denoted QRAM (Qualitative Risk Assessment Model), which is based on elicited 
data and uses a Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) approach, which was proposed by Zadeh (1965). FST provides a 
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natural way of modeling the intrinsic vagueness and imprecision of subjective assessments, while also 
allows the inclusion of human creativity and intuition, which is an essential ingredient for successful risk 
analysis (Ru and Eloff, 1996). The final goal of this work is to contribute to work safely by improving risk 
assessment in construction sites. 
The main contributions to innovation reached by this work will be presented in the next section.  
1.1. Contribution to innovation 
The majority of quantitative traditional methods use probabilistic and/or statistic techniques to deal with 
the intrinsic uncertainty and imprecision of the data and information required. This entails some difficult 
tasks, such as requiring analysts to estimate parameters, to ensure a sufficiently representative domain or 
make comparisons with other sites (which in the construction industry is rather difficult due to the 
uniqueness of each site).  
Recently, there are some qualitative approaches using fuzzy sets, proposed in the literature (see for 
example: Azadeh et al., 2008; Gurcanli and Mungen, 2009), but they having lack a systematic survey of 
all parameters included in the major four dimensions that should be taken into consideration when 
performing a RAOS on construction sites, namely: safety climate adequacy, severity factors (expected 
severity of work accidents consequences), possibility factors (possibility of work accident´s occurrence) 
and safety barriers effectiveness. Besides, the way to eliciting the required information is a quite 
subjective, the use of check-lists contributes to produce more objective results. 
The inclusion of this four dimensions and respective parameters, plus the fuzzy approach used, are the 
main ingredients of the proposed QRAM model. In general, the main contributions of the proposed 
QRAM are:  
• to provide a framework for assess and rating factors that need to be evaluated in construction sites 
RAOS;  
• to propose a model for expressing the relationships between the parameters (risk factors), 
considering the four dimensions: safety climate adequacy, safety barriers effectiveness, severity 
factors and possibility factors which, in construction industry, are never considered together,  
• to use a simple semantic scale and aggregation operators that facilitate the elicitation of 
information about the parameters to obtain the occupational safety risk levels.  
The final aim of QRAM is to obtain the estimate of occupational risk level for the construction sites, by 
accident mode, as well as to obtain partial classifications for each dimension and rating the factors, 
included in the risks estimate. 
QRAM will focus on elicited data, thus avoiding coarse estimates, to allow the assessment of actual risks 
on construction sites. The data and information will be obtained by direct observation, interviews with 
workers and foremen and also from consultation and review of relevant site documentation (health and 
safety plan, reporting accidents and incidents, records of safety training and meetings, work procedures...), 
among others. After this elicitation process, QRAM transforms and aggregates the collected data, using 
fuzzy concepts and techniques to rating the risk levels, by accident modes. 
The core of the aforementioned contributions was published in the following journal articles and book 
chapters. Parts of the thesis were presented in various seminars and conferences both Portuguese and 
international. 
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International journals 
• Pinto, Abel; Ribeiro, Rita A. and Nunes, Isabel L. (in press) Ensuring the Quality of Occupational 
Safety Risk Assessment, in edition on Risk Analysis an International Journal (ISI - Impact 
Factor: 2.366). 
• Pinto, Abel; Nunes, Isabel L; Ribeiro, Rita A. and Paschoarelli, Luis Carlos (in press) Aplicação 
preliminar do método QRAM para avaliação de riscos para a segurança ocupacional na 
construção civil, in Revista Produção, ISSN 0103-6513 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0103-
65132012005000039) (Scopus). 
• Pinto, Abel; Ribeiro, Rita A. and Nunes, Isabel L. (2012) Fuzzy approach for reducing 
subjectivity in estimating occupational accident severity, in Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 
45, (March), pg. 281-290, ISSN 0001-4575, (DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2011.07.015) (ISI 5-Year Impact 
Factor: 2.367; Q1). 
• Pinto, Abel; Nunes, Isabel L. and Ribeiro, Rita A. (2011) Occupational risk assessment in 
construction industry – Overview and reflection, in Safety Science, Vol. 49, No 5, pg. 616-624 
(DOI 10.1016/j.ssci.2011.01.003) (ISI 5-Year Impact Factor: 1.578; Q1).  
International conferences 
• Pinto, Abel; Nunes, Isabel L. and Ribeiro, Rita A. (2012) Qualitative Occupational Risk 
Assessment Model: A Fuzzy Approach, in abstracts of the World Congress on Risk 2012 – Risk 
and Development in a Changing World, 17-20 Jul, Sydney-Australia, pg 63-64. 
• Pinto, Abel; Ribeiro, Rita A. and Nunes, Isabel L. (2012) Qualitative Occupational Risk 
Assessment model – an overview, in Proceedings of International Symposium on Occupational 
Safety and Hygiene (SHO12), Feb 9-10, Arezes, P., Baptista, J.S., Barroso, M.P., Carneiro, P., 
Cordeiro, P., Costa, N., Melo, R., Miguel, A.S., Perestrelo, G.P. (Eds), Publisher SPOSHO, 
Guimarães (ISBN 978-972-99504-9-0), pg. 460-465. 
• Pinto, Abel; Nunes, Isabel L. and Ribeiro, Rita A. (2010) Qualitative Model for Risk Assessment 
in Construction Industry: A Fuzzy Logic Approach, in Emerging Trends in Technological 
Innovation (First IFIP WG 5.5/SOCOLNET Doctoral Conference on Computing, Electrical and 
Industrial Systems, DoCEIS 2010), L. M. Camarinha-Matos, P. Pereira, L. Ribeiro (ed.s), 22-24 
Feb, Costa de Caparica-Portugal, Springer, ISSN 1868-4238, pg. 105-111 (ISI Conference 
Proceedings) WoS ID 000277119500011. 
• Pinto, Abel; Nunes, Isabel L. and Ribeiro, Rita A. (2009) Framework for Ensuring Risk 
Assessment Completeness in Construction Industry, in 17th World Congress on Ergonomics, 9-14 
Aug, Beijing-Rep Pop. China, CdRom. 
Portuguese journals and conferences 
• Pinto, Abel; Nunes, Isabel L. and Ribeiro, Rita A. (2011) Método de Avaliação de Riscos para a 
Segurança Ocupacional na Indústria da Construção, in Revista Territorium, 18, pg 55-72, ISBN 
0872-8941. 
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• Pinto, Abel; Nunes, Isabel L. and Ribeiro, Rita A. (2010) Integração de novos Parâmetros na 
Avaliação de Riscos para a Segurança Ocupacional na Indústria da Construção, II Congresso 
Internacional e VI Encontro Nacional de Riscos, Universidade de Coimbra, 22 a 25 de Maio de 
2010. 
• Pinto, Abel; Ribeiro, Rita A. and Nunes, Isabel L. (2010) Parâmetros Comportamentais a 
Incorporar na Análise e Avaliação de Riscos na Indústria da Construção, in Revista de Segurança 
Comportamental, (ISBN 9771647597000), Ano 1, Nº 1, pg 4-6. 
• Pinto, Abel; Ribeiro, Rita A. and Nunes, Isabel L. (2009) Parâmetros qualitativos para a 
Avaliação dos Riscos na Indústria da Construção, inRiscos Industriais e Emergentes (III Encontro 
Nacional de Riscos, Segurança e Fiabilidade), C. Guedes Soares, C. Jacinto, A.P. Teixeira, P. 
Antão (Eds), Edições Salamandra, Lisboa (ISBN 9789726892335), Vol. 2, pg. 845-860. 
The main motivations to develop this work will be presented in the next section.  
1.2. Motivation for develop a new risk assessment for occupational 
safety model to construction industry 
RAOS is a complex process that entails the consideration of many parameters, which are, more often than 
not, difficult to quantify. 
The vagueness of some related concepts, the lack of detailed data on occupational accidents rates and 
accurate causes, the imprecision in available safety data and the uncertainties in occupational accidents 
severity may lead to a large uncertainty in results, that could biased RAOS results by underestimated or 
overestimated the occupational safety risk levels. It should be noted that the quality of those analyses is 
extremely important for major hazard industries, such as construction industry. 
Limitations of RAOS methods, which are pointed and discussed on section 3.2, make clear the need of a 
new RAOS method, which must use the available information, which is insufficient, imperfect, difuse and 
notoriously difficult to collect, towards a better RAOS results quality. 
My experience of 15 as safety expert gives me the perception and the knowledge that the existing methods 
based on probabilistic and statistic don’t produce good results when applied to construction industry. In 
fact, RAOS results always produce discussion or unconcern. I want to try to change this plight trying new 
ways and I heard about fuzzy sets theory. I started to study it and seem a good way to try. 
So, my base question to research was: It is possible to produce a more realible RAOS method to 
construction industry, using fuzzy sets theory to deal with incomplete and imprecise information? 
The new method must be able to use insufficient, imprecise and inaccurate information as inputs in RAOS 
process (such as linguistic terms) and, it is of paramount importance to assess risk factors related to safety 
climate and safety barriers which, usually, are not take into account on the RAOS process in the 
construction industry. Also, as pointed and discussed on section 5.4, the calculation of an absolute value to 
rank safety risks is unnecessary when RAOS aim is to decide about risks acceptability and select risk-
reduction barriers.  
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So, the general features of the new method should be: a) use of imperfect and difuse information to 
overcome the lack of detailed one, in order to obtain a more accurate safety risk results, b) assess risk 
factors related to the possibility of work accidents occurrence, c) assess risk factors related to the expected 
severity of work accidents, d) assess risk factors related to the safety barriers effectiveness, e) assess risk 
factors related to safety climate on the construction site and, f) present the results in a way that do not 
distract safety practitioners from the main aim of the RAOS process, that is: to decide about occupational 
risk acceptability and guiding the design of adequate barriers for risk reduction and control. 
The main objectives of this work will be pointed in the next section.  
1.3. Objectives 
The work presented in this thesis aims to develop and evaluate a model for assessing the risk of 
occupational accidents, on construction sites, using a fuzzy approach, which can subsequently be 
implemented in an expert system. 
The target of the QRAM (Qualitative Risk Assessment Model) is the construction industry, and within this 
domain it is applicable to a wide range of organizations and/or enterprises in the sector, regardless of size, 
complexity, construction type and construction processes used. 
QRAM aids to identify, evaluate and rating the main risk factors regarding safety climate adequacy, 
barriers effectiveness, possibility of occupational accidents occurance and expected severity of 
occupational accidents. QRAM results provide the necessary information to support safety expert’s 
decisions about preventive measures or more protections to be adopted to improve work safety on 
construction sites. 
This work covers two specific objectives: 
a) Model development; 
QRAM will be developed based on legislation, standards and the best available knowledge, whether in the 
literature or from experts; using fuzzy logic for data representation and processing, to ratingthe 
occupational safety risks and highlight the “bad” factors (i.e the ones that most contribute to high risk 
levels) in order to support decisions about the necessary barriers to prevent and/or protect the workers.  
b) Model evaluation 
QRAM evaluation was carried out by real test and elicitation of occupational safety experts’ opinions.  
The methodology that was followed in this work will be described in the next section.  
1.4. Thesis methodology 
This study started with literature review by searching in several data bases, namely: the B.on, the Sirius, 
the NIOSHTIC and the CIS-IL0. Data bases were searched during the period 2008 to 2011. The search 
included the key descriptors: safety risk assessment; risk assessment on construction; risk assessment 
quality; risk assessment reliability; work accidents severity; work accidents possibility; safety barriers, 
safety measures; safety culture; safety climate; risk tolerance; risk acceptance; 
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management/supervisory/safety; worker attitudes and safety monitoring. It was focused on studies that 
emphasized the relationship between factors that may influence occupational safety risks and safety 
performance. 
Regarding to elicitate empirical knowledge from safety experts, interviews were carried out with a 
purposive sample of 16 Portuguese safety experts The aim was to understand the experts strategies for 
decision making during the RAOS process and to understand the way they used to rating the risk factors 
(which depends on they experiences and perceptions). The free interviews lasted between 30 and 90 min, 
To evaluate the model, QRAM has been tested at 12 sites in 5 different countries: Brezil (2), Bulgaria (1), 
Greece (3), Portugal (3), and Turkey (3). On each site, the safety experts were asked about QRAM 
capability and accuracy to assess the occupational safety risks on construction sites.  
The evalution was carried out on construction sites and began with a meeting with the safety expert that 
was responsible for the safety in the site. During the meting, the safety expert was briefed with the 
objectives of the research and the explanation of the QRAM features and the methodology to apply it. 
After, the safety expert performed the RAOS using the QRAM and, in the end, the results were analised 
and discussed (between me and the safety expert) and the questionnaire depicted in the annex II.1 was 
filled. 
This thesis organization will be presented in the next section.  
1.5. Thesis organization 
This dissertation, in addition to this introductory chapter, has 6 more chapters. 
Chapter 2 presents the background on hazards in the construction industry, discussing the main causes of 
the poor safety performance and its costs.  
The following, chapter 3 presents an overview on risk assessment occupational methods both in general 
and on construction industry and explore its limitaions pointed out by some authors. Discuss the 
importance of RAOS quality and give some criteria to evaluate it. Ends describing the two RAOS tools 
more used in Portugal on construction sites. 
Chapter 4, introduce the main concepts and techniques of Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) used in this work, 
pointed out the main advantages of using FST on RAOS and presents, briefly, some related works. 
The foremost chapters are the chapter 5 and chapter 6, which, respectively, describe the various stages of 
development of the system model and present the four QRAM dimensions and present the results of 
applying the model to real work situations to evaluate it.  
The chapter 7 presents the conclusions and pointed some suggestions for future work.  
This dissertation ends with the compilation of the references used and 34 annexes, related to chapters 5 
(annex I) and 6 (annex II) 
Annexes I.1 to I.10 contains the questions to safety climate assess, annex I.11 contains the questions to 
assess possibility factors affecting falls accident mode, annex I.12 contains the questions to assess 
possibility factors affecting contact with electricity accident mode, annex I.13 contains the questions to 
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assess possibility factors affecting struck by moving vehicle accident mode, annex I.14 contains the 
questions to assess possibility factors affecting injured by falling/swinging objects accident mode, annex 
I.15 contains the questions to assess possibility factors affecting cave-ins accident mode, annex I.16 
contains the questions to assess possibility factors affecting hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including 
awkward or sudden movement) accident mode, annex I.17 contains the questions to assess possibility 
factors affecting contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between objects) 
accident mode, annex I.18 contains the questions to assess possibility factors affecting lost buoyancy in 
water due to the activity accident mode and annex I.19 contains the questions to assess possibility factors 
affecting fire or explosion (including confined spaces) accident mode  
Annex II.1 is the questionnaire used to elicitate expert opinions, annex II.2 shows the results from case 1 
safety climate assess, annexII .3 shows the results from case 1 falls work accidents possibility assess, 
annex II.4 shows the results from case 1 contact with electricity work accidents possibility assess, annex 
II.5 shows the results from case 1 injured by falling/swinging objects work accidents possibility assess, 
annex II.6 shows the results from case 1 hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden 
movement) work accidents possibility assess, annex II.7 shows the results from case 1 contact with 
machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between objects) work accidents possibility assess, 
annex II.8 shows the results from case 1 fire or explosion work accidents possibility assess, annex II.9 
shows the results from case 2 safety climate assess, annex II.10 shows the results from case 2 falls work 
accidents possibility assess, annex II.11 shows the results from case 2 contact with electricity work 
accidents possibility assess, annex II.12 shows the results from case 2 struck by moving vehicle work 
accidents possibility assess, annex II.13 shows the results from case 2 injured by falling/swinging objects 
work accidents possibility assess, annex II.14 shows the results from case 2 cave-ins work accidents 
possibility assess, annex II.15 shows the results from case 2 hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including 
awkward or sudden movement) work accidents possibility assess and annex II.16 shows the results from 
case 2 contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between objects) work 
accidents possibility assess 
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2. Background on hazards in the construction 
industry  
Construction industry is a very hazardous industry in which fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries 
occurs frequently (Ringen and Seegal, 1995; Hyoung et al., 2009) due to its unique nature (Tam et al., 
2004). It is characterized by continual changes to the environment, use of many different resources, poor 
working conditions, no steady employment, tough environment (e.g. noise, vibration, dust, handling of 
cargo and direct exposure to weather agents) and so forth. Furthermore, many times it requires 
coordination of different interdependent contractors, sub-contractors and operations that may result in 
increased risk of injury.  
Construction occupational accidents arise from a failure in the interaction between the work team, 
workplace, equipment and materials. These immediate accident factors are affected by shaping factors, 
whereby the actions, behavior, capabilities and communication of the work team which are affected by 
their attitudes, motivations, knowledge, skills, supervision, health and fatigue, work scheduling and 
housekeeping. Insufficient working experience, by temporary workers and new employees, and 
employment in a company with less than 10 employees are also associated with a more possibility to 
undergo an occupational accident (Cheng et al, 2010). 
It should be noted that task’s safety is determined long before the people, procedures, and equipment 
come together at the work site. The features of the permanent facility can affect (both positively and 
negatively) the construction workers’ safety. For example, when roof perimeters do not contain 
permanently designed-in fall protection features (e.g. guardrails or anchorage points), workers’ safety 
could be compromised. 
Concerning the exposure by building trades, a study made by Baradan et al. (2006) indicated that 
ironworkers and roofers rank the highest risk in terms of both nonfatal and fatal injuries. Electricians, 
brick masons, stonemasons and block masons, painters and paperhangers, carpenters, and insulation 
workers were exposed to high risks, while plasterers and stucco masons, glaziers, tile setters and marble 
setters, cement masons, and concrete finishers showed the lowest risk levels. Intermediate risk levels were 
found for drywall installers, construction equipment workers, and carpet, floor, and tile installers. 
Occupational injuries and illnesses impacts not only on safety and health, but also on economics, due to 
the high costs related with work injuries. Hinze et al. (2006) stated that construction safety has gained 
attention because of the increasing workers’ compensation insurance premiums that resulted from a great 
increase in work injuries medical costs and convalescent care. In fact, studies across industries suggest 
that injury rates and costs are higher than average in the construction industry (Dong et al., 2007). 
According to Silverstein et al. (1998), using workers’ compensation data from Washington State (USA), 
the estimated workers’ compensation costs for medical treatment and indemnity in construction is four 
times higher than in other industries. 
The causes influencing safety in construction will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  
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2.1. Main causes of poor safety performance  
Design professionals (i.e. architects and project engineers) are in decision-making position to impelling to 
improve construction safety by addressing safety issues during the design process. By construction design, 
hazards can be eliminated or reduced during construction stage, thus improving safety. However, these 
professionals continue to discard this intervention as part of their standard practice and, in Portugal, there 
is no motivating forces, such as: legal, contractual, economic (by increase insurance) or regulatory, which 
would induce these professionals to adopt safety as their concern and standard practices (Behm, 2005). 
Many authors have been addressing the main causes/factors for poor safety performance (Dedobbeleer and 
Beland, 1991; Ringen and Seegal, 1995; Gillen et al., 1997; Laitinen et al., 1999; Liebing, 2001; 
Loosemore and Lee, 2001; Tam et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 2010; Sertyesilisik et al., 2010 and Tam and 
Fung, 2011). Summarizing those works, the most relevant causes for low safety performance in the 
construction industry are:  
• Poor work and safety organization - safety should begin on the planning and definition of detailed 
procedures to be effectively implemented in the field. Therefore, safety professionals need to be 
involved during a project’s procurement and pre-construction phases; 
• Company size – most construction companies are small enterprises, hence it is difficult to ensure 
internal know-how about safety maters and they also have limited budgets for health and safety 
measures implementation; 
• Lack of coordination - construction industry is an aggregate of many specialized groups working 
together in the same space. Construction projects typically involve multiple employers and a 
variety of trades (e.g. roofers, carpenters, electricians, plumbers, painters, etc.), which carry on a 
diversity of tasks on project sites; 
• Economic and time pressure – which may result in relaxing rules and procedures, e.g. reckless 
operations to ensure finishing on time; 
• Lack of data standardization - resulting in lack of information about hazards, risks, accidents 
causes and so forth; 
• Poor communications both internal and external - for example, in many countries a high 
proportion of the workforce does not speak the native (site location) language, hence it is difficult 
for safety managers to communicate the potential hazards that may occur; 
• Poor involvement of workers in safety matters - workers’ involvement should include 
participation in the development of safety programs and identification of best solutions; 
• Constantly changing worksite has marked effects on safety and health - unlike other industrial 
sites, where tasks are often repetitive and controlled through the workplaces safety design, the 
construction site allows, and requires, extensive movement of workers from place to place; 
• Workers´ specialization- often workers are trained in a single, narrowly specialized construction 
application, hence they are not familiarized with other materials and equipment’s that exist in the 
workplace; 
• Workers responsibilities – comparing with others industries workers are much more responsible 
for their own protection and organization of their workplace, because site environment changes 
daily; 
• Inadequate training and fatigue of practitioners – this can be particularly serious in the case of 
operators of heavy machinery because it can affect pedestrian and neighbours (cranes operators, 
for example); 
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• Bad equipment selection, use or inspection - selection of appropriate equipment, its correct use 
and periodic inspection are important factors to ensure efficiency, productivity and safety 
standards on site; 
• Poor safety awareness by top management and project managers – many times there is lack of 
supervision and regular meetings about safety procedures, either because management is not 
committed to safety maters or because they are not knowledgeable about these issues; 
• Lack of prevention/protection equipment’s - due to either small budgets for health and safety 
measures implementation and lack of safety culture; 
• Construction jobs can be far apart - construction workers may have to travel very long distances to 
find work, uprooting families and increasing the adoption of risk behaviours: alcohol, drugs, 
prostitutes; 
• Construction workers face long-term health risks from the stress of on-and off-again employment 
and the fear of not having a periodic pay check - due to precarious contracts and sometimes lack 
of seriousness of some employers. 
The lack of management commitment, communication, workers’ involvement, attitudes, competence, as 
well as supportive and supervisory environments, has been pointed out by several authors, as a drawback 
to achieve a positive safety climate (Rundmo, 2000; Varonen and Mattila, 2000; Glendon and Litherland, 
2001; Mohamed, 2002; Haslam et al., 2005; Zohar and Luria, 2005; Meliá et al., 2008; Kouabenan, 2009 
and Mohamed and Tam, 2009). To ensure an adequate safety climate, within any organization, is another 
key aspect to prevent accidents and illnesses. So, the path to improve health and safety on construction 
sites should include the following influences: a) company culture, b) health and safety management, c) 
health and safety culture, d) management/supervision e) competence, f) situational awareness, g) 
communication/participation, h) advice and information and i) design for safe construction. 
Haslam et al. (2005) and Brace et al. (2009) highlighted that should be pay more attention to the 
underlying causal factors in order to sustain improvement in health and safety (H&S). This need is 
reinforced by the fact that the underlying accident factors emerge from the preconstruction stage of project 
procurement where project participants have an enormous ability to influence H&S through their decisions 
and H&S planning (Szymberski, 1997; Brabazon et al., 2000). 
Construction project features (CPFs) being organizational, physical and operational attributes of 
construction projects, fall in this category of underlying causal factors as they emanate from 
preconstruction decisions by clients, designers and project managers/planners and contribute to accident 
causation. 
Specifically, Carter and Smith (2006) research pointed that existing hazard identification procedures in 
construction projects are far from ideal. These authors identified several significant obstructions to 
improving hazard identification such as: failure to share information across projects, lack of resources in 
smaller projects, subjective hazard identification and risk assessment, reliance upon tacit knowledge, lack 
of a standardized approach and undefined structures for tasks and hazards. 
Most contractors see their health and safety plans, which must include complete risk assessment, as 
merely a burdensome requirement that they must fulfill in order to avoid government fines and, 
consequently, they neglect the suitable implementation of these important plans (Wang et al., 2006; Saurin 
et al., 2008). 
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2.2. Costs of injuries and illnesses  
Occupational accidents are associated with high economic and social costs. Economic costs are not only 
borne on the injured workers, but also on the companies concerned and the governments Costs can be both 
direct (such as material damages, down-time, financial losses through related insurance premium and a 
share of the medical expenses) as well as indirect (such as overtime work made necessary by accidents, 
retraining expenses and intangible factors such as loss of company prestige and deteriorating industrial 
relations, that could have a substantial impact on the quality and profitability of production). Studies about 
the social costs, such as: changes in future work activity, impact on family members of injured worker, 
and impact on (following) quality of life, are very few, so much of such costs remain unknown leading 
employers to underestimate the cost of occupational injuries Some authors estimate these indire.ct costs 
for companies at several times the direct costs (Andreoni, 1986; Boden,1999). 
Historically, construction has been one of the highest risk industries for fatal and nonfatal injuries, and 
worldwide remains one of the most hazardous occupations. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011) gives a 
bleak account about USA construction industry where more than a thousand fatal injuries have been 
recorded every year in the United States between 1995 and 2008. In Portugal, according to Portuguese 
Statistics National Institute, since 2000 till 2006 almost half of the mortal work accidents occurred in the 
construction industry (INE, 2011).  
Obviously, construction accidents have huge cost implications (Lee et al., 2006). Costs of injuries are very 
varied, depending on the profession and part of the body injured. For instance, Leigh and Miller (1997) 
reported that hodman and carpenters are two occupations with high costs of occupational injury and 
illness. Dement and Lipscomb (1999) found that roofers and carpenters had higher medical costs than the 
average, by reviewing more than 30,000 workers’ compensation claims among North Carolina 
Homebuilders Association members for the period 1986 to 1994. Waehrer et al. (2007) found that 
Construction laborers recorded most fatalities (299) resulting in the highest average annual fatality costs at 
$1200 million. Using more than 20,000 workers’ compensation claims by Oregon construction employees 
between 1990 and 1997, Lipscomb et al. (2003, 2006) report that falls represent the highest costs per 
workers’ compensation claim for residential carpenters, and 14% of claims resulted in 83% of the costs 
and accounted for 25% of workers’ compensation payments on more than $10 million. Shah et al. (2003) 
estimated that the direct costs of injuries and illnesses from wood framing in residential construction were 
over $197 million in Washington State based on workers’ compensation claims data from 1993 to 1997.  
As pointed by Ringdahl (2001) - citing a 1997 study of Bearson and Coleman concerning nine selected 
European countries which estimates the aggregate economic costs of occupational injury and diseased by 
country - they showed that the costs are in the range of 2.5% to 6% of the countries Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  
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3. Risk assessment for occupational safety methods  
In general, RAOS methods usually combine a hierarchical representation of how events may develop, 
where event and fault trees are characteristic examples, with procedures for estimating and/or calculating 
the probability that a specific event or combination of events can occur as well as the severity of potential 
consequences. RAOS methods impose patterns on the accident causations and influence both data 
collected and factors identified as causative (Ringdahl, 2004). But, they may act as a filter and biased the 
results by considering only certain events and conditions (Levenson, 2004). 
Moreover hazards are real, risk is a socially constructed concept and consequently, RAOS is inherently 
subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment of important psychological, social, cultural, 
and political factors (Slovic, 1999; Slovic et al., 2004). In fact, when a RAOS is performed, it is important 
to realise that decision-making about accepting certain risks is a complex task, not only due to technical 
aspects but also to others such as economical, environmental, comfort related, political, psychological and 
societal acceptance (Suddle, 2009).  
RAOS provides procedures for the systematic use of available information to identify hazards and to 
estimate risks to individuals or populations, property or environment (IEC, 1995; Christensen et al., 2003; 
ISO 31000:2009; OHSAS 18001:2007). Ringdahl (2001) prefers the term “safety analysis”, instead of 
“risk assessment” due its use in a broader sense, and suggests the following definition: “Safety analysis is 
a systematic procedure for analyzing systems to identify and evaluate hazards and safety characteristics. 
The pursuit of safety through the elimination of risks also required that the specific risk source actually 
can be removed from the system without impeding or changing the system’s functioning”. This is also the 
main aim of RAOS in the construction industry. 
In any industry, the risks of a tasks derives from the hazards associated with the tasks - due to materials, 
equipment’s, work organization and other workplace conditions - that a worker has to face, when he or she 
performs the job. For instance, a mason has to climb ladders, work on scaffolds, carry bricks, use tools or 
be in the neighborhood of cranes. However, knowing/identifying the main potential hazards is not 
sufficient to derive risk reduction strategies later on. Whether or not a particular activity – such as using a 
chain saw – is particularly dangerous does not make it a high priority item in itself. The diverse 
contributions to the overall risk of a task is also determined by the worker´ exposure to the whole set of 
hazards (Ale et al., 2008). A large number of different RAOS methods are available for industrial 
processes (see descriptions on Rouvroye and Bliek, 2002 and Tixier et al., 2002). Usually three main steps 
are identified when performing a RAOS study: 1) identification of potential hazards; 2) assessment of the 
risks and; 3) hierarchy of risks. RAOS methods can be ranked from simple, comprising only one step, to 
more complex methods when they involve all the three steps. Moreover, their output data can be 
qualitative, such as recommendations, or quantitative in the form of an index of risk level.  
An interesting taxonomy with 6 categories for RAOS methods is based on its main features (Ringdahl, 
2001): 
• Technically oriented methods (e.g. EA, HAZOP, FTA, FMEA, Event tree analysis, Deviation 
analysis, Cause-consequence diagram, Reaction matrix, Consequence analysis models); 
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• Human oriented methods (e.g. Human reliability assessment, Human error identification, THERP, 
CREAM); 
• Task analysis (e.g. Operator action event tree, Decision/Action flow diagram, Operational 
sequence diagram, Signal-flow graph analysis); 
• Management oriented methods (e.g. MORT, ISRS, SHE, SCHAZOP); 
• Accident investigations (e.g. AEB, Change analysis, Multilinear events sequencing, STEP); 
• Coarse analysis (e.g. PHA, Check-lists, What-if). 
All the above methods are discussed in detail in the relevant literature (Lawley, 1974; Sevcik, 1981; Khan. 
and Abassi, 1997; Kliem and Ludin, 1997; Hollnagel, 1999; Hammer and Price, 2001; Ringdahl, 2001; 
Aven, 2003; Cooper et al., 2004 and Loosemore et al., 2006).  
Another taxonomy for traditional RAOS methods was presented by Tixier et al. (2002) by considering two 
main groups: qualitative and quantitative. The second group can be sub-divided into three categories: 
deterministic, probabilistic, and a combination of deterministic and probabilistic approaches. The 
deterministic methods take into consideration the products, the equipment’s and the quantification of the 
consequences for various targets such as people, environment and equipment. The probabilistic methods 
are based on the probability or frequency of hazardous situation occurrences or on the occurrence of 
potential accidents. Probabilistic methods are mainly focused on the probability of failures on equipment’s 
or components hence they are mostly used for analyzing limited parts of a plant. Deterministic and 
combined deterministic and probabilistic methods are mainly used to review the whole industrial site. 
3.1. Risk assessment occupational safety on the construction 
industry 
In practice, the construction industry performs coarse RAOS using mainly PHA and Checklists (Pinto, 
2002; Navon and Kolton, 2006). 
PHA is a qualitative technique (is not a really methodology), which involves a disciplined analysis of the 
event sequences, which could transform a hazard into an accident. A hazard is considered anything having 
the potential to cause harm to workers, property, the public or the environment; this includes energy 
sources, hazardous materials, bad postures and similar environments (Christensen et al., 2003). The 
possible undesirable events are identified and analyzed separately. The results provide a basis for 
determining which categories of hazard should be looked into more closely and which analysis methods 
are more suitable to deal with them (Brereton et al., 1997); not produce a really risk level. 
Checklists can be a valid, reliable, usable, and practicable tool; however, it is not easy to develop a well-
designed checklist. Each checklist is restricted to specific contexts, tasks and users (analysts). In certain 
operating conditions, existing checklists may not be sufficient to reflect the potential safety problems (Jou 
et al., 2009). 
A substantial aspect of safety literature and research focuses on identifying and describing the various 
methods of improving occupational safety on site (i.e. safety program elements, including RAOS). It was 
identified 10 main contributions in the literature for RAOS in the constuction industry:  
1. Hinze (1997) and Hill (2004) identified the essential elements of effective safety 
programs. 
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2. Jannadi and Almishari (2003) developed a study concerning the assessment of risk for 
major construction activities. These authors defined risk as a measure of probability, severity, 
and exposure to all hazards of an activity. A risk assessment model was developed and 
computerized to determine the risk associated with a particular activity and as a justification 
factor for a proposed remedy. Knowing the value of risk helps contractors identifying the high 
risk of major construction activities and enables them to allocate safety measures in a more 
efficient manner. 
3. Rajendran (2006) evaluates the relative ability of safety program elements to improve site 
safety. 
4. Baradan and Usmen (2006) developed an approach for occupational injury and fatality 
risk analysis in building trades, based on defining risk as the product of probability (frequency) 
and severity, and using the risk plans concept to evaluate and rank the trades in terms of nonfatal 
injury rates. 
5. Hallowell (2008) developed, populated and validated a formal method to evaluate 
construction safety risk and strategically match safety program elements to construction 
processes. The decision scheme, based on the application of Newton’s third law, assumes that 
every construction activity is associated with specific safety risks and that each safety program 
element is capable of mitigating a portion of such risks. The results include the quantification of 
probability and severity values for ten mutually-exclusive and all-inclusive safety risks 
associated with thirteen worker activities required to construct concrete formwork, and 
quantified the probability and severity reduction values resulting from the implementation of 
thirteen safety program elements. 
6. Gurcanli and Mungen (2009) described a method for assessment of the risks at 
construction sites using a fuzzy rule-based safety analysis to deal with uncertain and insufficient 
data, using historical accident data, subjective experts judgment’s and the current safety level of 
a construction site, which are combined to derive three parameters namely: the accident 
likelihood, current safety level and accident expected severity. 
7. Aneziris et al. (2010) proposed a technique for quantification of occupational risk of the 
construction of a highway tunnel, based on the Workgroup Occupational Risk Model (WORM) 
to assess occupational risk at hazard level, activity level, job level and overall company risk. 
They applied the model on a highway tunnel construction, located in Northern Greece, in two 
construction phases, namely: a) the excavation and primary support and, b) the final lining and 
support of the tunnel, to the total of seventeen job positions, such as operators of a drilling 
machine, a loader, an excavator, a spraying machine, a crane operator, a blaster, a welder, the 
supervisor of the project, truck drivers and various other workers participating in these 
construction phases. 
8. Rozenfeld et al. (2010) using a lean approach to safety management in construction, 
developed a structured method for hazard analysis and assessment for construction activities, 
called “Construction Job Safety Analysis”, which required the ability to predict fluctuating 
safety risk levels in order to support safety conscious planning and pulling of safety 
management efforts to the places and times where they are most effective. 
9. Benjaoran and Bhokha (2010) developed an integrated system for safety and construction 
management in which safety is integrated with the construction management process by risk 
analysis throughout design, planning and control phases. 
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10. Wu et al. (2010) developed a systematic mechanism to interrupt and prevent precursors 
and immediate accident factors (PaIFs) on construction sites. These PaIFs are occupational risk 
factors. 
11. Albert and Hallowell (2012) enumerate hazard recognition strategies that may be 
implemented in Construction and Infrastructure projects. 
3.2. Limitations of risk assessment for occupational safety methods  
Many authors (Karwowski and Mital, 1986; Cornell, 1996; Wang and Ruxton, 1997; Pender, 2001; Sii et 
al., 2001; Apeland et al., 2002; Tixier et al., 2002; Faber and Stewart, 2003; Nilsen and Aven, 2003; 
Kentel and Aral, 2004) have discussed the limitations of RAOS methods. Most of the methods typically 
rely on uncertain, imprecise or just incomplete information. Some sources of imprecision that may lead to 
uncertainty include scarce or incomplete data, measurement errors or biased expert judgments (due to 
subjective interpretation of the available information). These kinds of uncertainties cannot be treated 
solely by traditional statistical or probabilistic methods.  
RAOS approaches using probabilistic and statistic techniques have been widely used, but often fall short 
in their ability to allow the incorporation of subjective and/or vague terms and they rely heavily on 
statistical information that may not be available. This is particularly evident in the construction industry, 
because there is no systematic recording of relevant safety information.  
The main limitations of the probabilistic and statistical approaches, as acknowledged by some authors 
(Andersson, 1986; Kuchta, 2001; Faber and Stewart, 2003; Nilsen and Aven, 2003), are: 
• Probability theory is based on the assumption of randomness, whereas projects deal with 
consciously planned human actions that are generally not random; 
• Construction projects are inherently unique by definition. This reduces the relevance and 
reliability of statistical aggregates derived from probability-based analysis; 
• Probability theory assumes future states can be defined. However, uncertainty and ignorance are 
inevitable on construction projects, particularly with regard to human actions; 
• Humans are limited in their ability to encompass and process the full range of information 
required for holistic decisions; 
• Because uncertainty and ignorance exist, temporal aspects of the flow of knowledge are important 
in project planning. Probability theory is based on a two-period model that ignores the flow of 
knowledge over time; 
• Project parameters and outcomes must be communicated to interested parties and the imprecision 
of natural language is difficult to express with probability theory. 
Other order of reasons related with technological changes and increased complexity of work systems 
(which are not accompanied by the development of RAOS methods), are pointed out by Levenson (2004) 
namely: 
• Technology is changing faster than the engineering techniques to cope with the new technology 
that are being created; 
• Digital technology has created a quiet revolution in most fields of engineering and system safety 
engineering that are changing the nature of the accidents; 
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• Common accident models are based on an underlying assumption that accidents are the result of 
an uncontrolled and undesired release of energy or interference in the normal flow of energy but 
dependence on information systems creating the potential so that a loss of information or incorrect 
information can lead to risky situations; 
• Losses stemming from accidents are increasing with the cost and potential destructiveness of the 
systems, i., e., new scientific and technological discoveries have not only created new or 
increased hazards (such as radiation exposure and chemical pollution) but have provided the 
means to harm increasing numbers of people; 
• Complexity has many facets, most of which are increasing in the systems we are building, 
particularly interactive complexity, i.e., systems with potential interactions among the 
components that cannot be thoroughly planned, understood, anticipated, or guarded against; 
• Humans are increasingly sharing control of systems with automation and moving into positions of 
higher-level decision making with automation implementing the decisions, what are leading to 
new types and a new distribution of human error; 
• Regulatory and public views of safety are changing. 
In addition, it should be pointed that in the construction industry, the main work accidents occur due to 
(Sawacha et al., 1999; Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000): a) management reckless; b) companies safety 
policy, c) lack of awareness or training, d) lack of supervision; e) lack of communication; f) lack of means 
to accomplish the task safely, g) workers lack of knowledge (which potentiates misjudgements, neglect, 
apathy); h) workers risk perception; i) workers motivation; j) workers recklessness.  
Moreover, the term “safety climate” was used (Zohar, 1980) to describe a construct that captures 
employees’ perceptions of the role that safety plays within the organization. Employees continuously 
observe their work environment and the actions of their fellow co-workers and their supervisors and such 
observations are used as a basis for the creation of cognitive models associated with safety, i.e. they 
regulate their actions in the workplace and influence safety (Varonen and Mattila, 2000). 
All above factors promote the erosion and degradation of safety work conditions. Hence, to assess factors 
related with safety climate is also of paramount importance in order to guarantee the reliability of safety 
management (DeJoy et al., 2004). New RAOS approaches are needed (Levenson, 2004), because actual 
methods have limited notions of causality—usually linear causality relationships are emphasized—and it 
is difficult to incorporate non-linear relationships, as for instance, management commitment to safety and 
safety culture in the organization, which are key factors for assuring an adequate safety climate on 
construction sites. 
Other factors that could have adverse effects in the construction sites were pointed by some authors 
(Akintoye and MacLeond, 1997; Tam et al., 2004). 
• Lack of familiarity and doubts about RAOS methods applicability (the operational application of 
some methods is difficult because of the lack of their description);  
• Time–consuming activity plus lack of information and know-how (the complexity of the methods 
require specific training for their implementation). Notice that there is a great disconnection 
between risk analysis technical methods and human factors; 
• Most construction projects are seldom large enough to warrant the use of these methods; 
• Require availability of sound data to ensure confidence (a large number of assumptions, 
judgments and opinions are involved subjectively in a risk quantification process, and require a 
considerable skill for a safety analyst to interpret the results produced); 
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• Some risks on construction are fairly subjective, hence they are determined based on experience 
from previous contracts undertaken by the firm (due to a lack of appropriate RAOS methods); 
• It is difficult to assess the benefits (it is extremely difficult to quantify the effects and 
consequences of hazards because they involve many factors with a high level of uncertainty, even 
when the physical processes are clearly understood); 
• RAOS on construction projects is seldom formally requested by clients (i.e., clients expect project 
management practice to set up risk-free projects); 
• RAOS is about people (real work) not scientific models. There are many instances where causes 
of an accident involved human error and bad decisions taken by designer and management; in 
such cases it is extremely difficult to generate a mathematical model to represent and describe the 
required safety behaviour. RAOS in construction industry usually only comprises technical 
factors and is accomplished, in an intuitive way, to fit the theoretical background and available 
resources of the person who elaborates its. Safety climate factors are rarely explicitly taken into 
account. 
In addition, important limitations of organizational and human factors in RAOS are the lack of consensus 
on the set of practical factors related to the safety culture, safety organization, work organization, 
supervision, leadership, communication and consultation and how these affect the performance of safety, 
especially in "turbulent" environments such as construction industry. Moreover, most evaluation criteria 
proposed in the literature (Mearns and Flin, 1999; Guldenmund, 2000) are not easily assessed by using 
statistical and probabilistic techniques. In this work we assume that most limiting factors are not 
insurmountable and should be effectively addressed to encourage a broader use of RAOS initiatives in the 
construction industry. 
From all described limitations and inadequacies of RAOS methods, it also seems that the use of fuzzy sets 
theory may help produce more realistic representations and solutions, as shown by many authors 
(Andersson, 1986; Maglaras, 1995; Herrera and Viedma, 2000; Nunes, 2003; Liu et al., 2004, Soltani and 
Fernando, 2004 and Mure et al., 2006). The next chapter discusses in more detail the potential of using a 
fuzzy sets approach for RAOS, particularly in the construction industry. 
3.3. Risk assessment occupational safety quality 
Models used in RAOS have to represent highly complicated phenomena, which are not always fully 
understood beause they contain empirical elements that require calibration. Often, the models are used 
well beyond the range (extrapolate) in which they have been validated. 
In many parts of the world (for example, European Union and Australia) RAOS is compulsory in work 
organizations as a mean of ensuring the implementation of safety programs to avoid work accidents and 
health injuries (e.g. Europeen Directive 89/391/CEE from the Council, 1989). However, many companies 
just undertake a superficial analysis of their hazards making RAOS a mere paper exercise without 
practical interest (only to comply with legal requirements). 
An important question that this work addresses is: what constitutes a good RAOS? Authors (Suokas and 
Kakko, 1989; Suokas and Rouhiainen, 1989; Rouhiainen, 1993; Adamski and Westrum, 2003) pointed 
that the RAOS quality results depend on several factors such as analysts’ qualification, documentation 
completeness (sufficiency of data), coverage of hazard identification and accuracy of consequences 
estimation. These factors can affect the results and the analysis’ cost-effectiveness. Results may vary 
depending on: a) initial assumptions, b) simplifications made in the system description and accidents 
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modeling, c) confidentiality (or others) constraints of the object, d) inaccuracy of consequence models, 
and, e) ill-defined data employed. 
Inappropriate results have been leading to criticism of RAOS. Cox (1982) pointed five main causes of 
criticism: a) inaccuracy of some of the models used, b) incompleteness in the analyses, c) difficulty of 
checking the final result, d) inadequacy of criteria of acceptability, and, e) complexity and laboriousness 
of the technique. Suokas and Kakko (1989) pointed to two main causes for biased results: 1) 
incompleteness in the identification of accident contributors and the accidents models, and 2) inaccuracy 
of the quantification of risk in terms of frequency and consequences. 
An ideal RAOS should identify every hazard present in a workplace, and for each hazard it should identify 
with accuracy “what might go wrong?”, “how can it happen?”, “how likely is it that this will happen?”, 
“what are the possible consequences?” and “how to control it?” (Kirchsteiger, 1999 and Ringdahl, 2001, 
2004).  
In the real world, it is almost impossible to prevent all risks, as there is evidence of hundreds of accidents 
and occupational diseases that occur daily around the world, even in industries with high safety standards 
(Hamalainen, 2009). Subjectivity permeates RAOS at every stage of the process, from the initial 
structuring of a risk problem until the decision which endpoints or consequences to include in the analysis, 
this is particularly true in identifying and estimating exposures, identifying cause-harm relationships, 
estimating consequences, deciding which safety barrier to use when planning measures to control risks, 
and so on.  
Perform an “ideal” RAOS (it means: achieving absolute reliable and fit to use results) is almost 
impossible, but we must strive for the best approximation (Slovic et al., 2004). The RAOS quality is said 
to be good when the insight of the risk profile and safety barriers (risk controls) reflect an appropriate 
usage of hazard identification and risk evaluation methods. Moreover, an adequate use of the information 
about the system under analysis, as well as their background should be clear and accurate (Slovic et al., 
2004). The evaluation of these characteristics implies establishing reasonable criteria for assessing the 
overall RAOS process (Rouhiainen, 1993).  
According to Cox (1982) there is no method for guaranteeing completeness in any risk assessment 
method. To the best of our knowledge, there is no accepted set of criteria for assuring a complete and 
appropriate in-depth RAOS quality evaluation. Although there is some knowledge dispersed in articles 
and books, the validity of such theoretical knowledge was not subject to a poll by practical experts. Hence, 
practical knowledge, acquired by safety experts through years of experience is an important contribution 
for RAOS.  
Measurement of the RAOS adequacy requires more than a formal audit; it requires the identification of the 
relevant steps of RAOS, as well as knowledge about the importance of each process tasks. According to 
Suokas and Kakko (1989), Suokas and Rouhiainen (1989), (Rouhiainen) (1993), Juran (1998) and 
Adamski and Westrum (2003), RAOS quality evaluation will depend on four main features:  
• Completeness – extent to which RAOS results have all the required characteristics;  
• Accuracy – extent to which RAOS results are correct, and exact;  
• Fidelity – representativeness of the model regarding the workplace system; 
• Fitness for use - extent to which RAOS results satisfy the explicitly formulated objectives and 
requirements concerning the intended use for RAOS.  
20 
Empirically, one can say that RAOS quality depends on the accuracy with which hazards are identified, 
and it is a function of the method adopted and the skills of the analyst. It may also concern the precision 
with which probabilities or consequences can be estimated. Often, for some safety practitioners, the 
crucial question in evaluating RAOS is whether the most appropriate method has been chosen.  
The analyst (team leader) is obviously a key person to identify hazards and influences all stages of the 
analysis, but the skills and attitudes of the other team members are also important. The problems that arise 
in the course of identifying hazards have been examined in several studies (Cox, 1982; Suokas, 1985; 
Suokas and Kakko, 1989; Kirchsteiger, 1999 and Adamski and Westrum, 2003). For example, in the 
Suokas (1985) study, three analyses of the same object were compared and only 26% of the identified 
hazards were covered by all three analyses. 
RAOS quality also depends on the fidelity of the model to characterize the workplace system, in terms of 
occupational risks. Despite being difficult to measure this is a very important feature because the 
workplace is the core of the whole RAOS (Suokas and Rouhiainen, 1993). Several authors such as 
(Suokas and Kakko, 1989 and Suokas and Rouhiainen, 1993)  identified four different ways to evaluate 
RAOS quality: 
1. Carrying out a complete parallel analysis on the same system; 
2. Carrying out a parallel analysis on some parts of the same system; 
3. Comparing the analysis of accidents´ descriptions which have occurred in corresponding systems, 
and with systems own experience; 
4. Examining the process behind the RAOS process analysis. 
The questions associated with this analysis are essential, but usually they are very difficult to answer with 
enough precision. Since there is a large number of different applications and contexts, it is very hard to 
reach a universal measure of RAOS quality (Ringdahl, 2001). However it is possible, useful and critical to 
establish a set of criteria to evaluate the RAOS process quality. 
The fourth approach seems more systematic and useful because it is based on the evaluation of the whole 
process (planning, methodologies, assumptions, decisions, expertise, resources…) and allows 
organizational learning (Suokas and Kakko, 1989). In spit of these characteristics, it is still a rather 
difficult and time-consuming procedure.  
Furthermore, one basis for obtaining a favorable result consists in good safety analysis procedures — i.e., 
well planned and implemented.  
Summarizing, quality assessment methods must be able to identify all the significant elements in the 
RAOS process that affect its fitness for use. It may also provide a basis for anticipating and preventing 
problems when such analyses are planned. A high quality RAOS is the result of a total assessment of the 
system quality through every aspect of the RAOS process. 
3.4. Risk assessment for occupational safety on construction sites 
in Portugal 
The construction sector in Portugal does not usually use existing RAOS methodologies (by some of the 
reasons mentioned before (see 3.3). 
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RAOS on Portuguese construction sites is performed, mainly, by the use of unsystematic techniques 
(Pinto, 2002), such as: PHA and audits by check-list. So, in order to evaluate QRAM, its results were 
compared, with an unsystematic technique procedure and the Workmed® method (Nunes, 2010) which is 
part of an informatics tool to aid safety and health management. Workmed® method assess some risk 
factors (such as: safety barriers) that are considered in the QRAM and display risk level results in 
percentage which facilitates the comparison with QRAM.  
3.4.1. Unsystematic relative ranking technique 
This kind of techniques is not a well-defined RAOS method. It allows comparing the risks of several 
activities to ranking them and support safety managers in deciding if it is necessary to implement further 
safety barriers. The procedure that will be shown below is from a company that does not want to be 
identified. 
In short, after the identification of hazards made by audit, PHA or safety expert empirical knowledge and 
experience, the probability (of work accident occurrence) and the severity (of work accident 
consequences) are estimated based on matrices, that are variations of the appointed by BS 8800:2004, 
which are listed on tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 
A typical procedure is accomplished by the following steps: 
1. Based on experience, the expert identifies hazards related to: a) materials, b) equipment’s, c) 
location, d) construction methods, and e) other features (such as simultaneous tasks). Although 
usually called hazards, what he really identify are the accident modes or the contact modes that 
can occur; 
2. After identify the hazards, the likelihood and the severity (for each of the hazards identified) is 
estimated by criteria shown on the Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
Table 3.1 - Categories for estimate Likelihood (unsystematic technique) 
Likelihood 4 3 2 1 
Typical 
occurrence 
Experienced at 
least once every 
six months on 
site 
Experienced at 
least once every 
year on site. 
Are occurred 
more than once 
in other sites 
No records of 
occurring. 
Table 3.2 - Categories for estimate Severity (unsystematic technique) 
Severity 1 2 3 
Health Nuisance and irritation 
(e.g. headaches); 
temporary ill health 
leading to discomfort 
(e.g. diarrhoea). 
Partial hearing loss; 
dermatitis; asthma; work 
related upper limb 
disorders; ill health leading 
to permanent minor 
disability. 
Acute fatal diseases; severe 
life shortening diseases; 
permanent substantial 
disability. 
Safety Superficial injuries; 
minor cuts and bruises; 
eye irritation from dust. 
Lacerations; burns; 
concussion; serious sprains; 
minor fractures. 
Fatal injuries; amputations; 
multiple, injuries; major 
fractures. 
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3. Based on the likelihood and the severity estimated, the risk level was determined by the matrix 
depicted on the table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 – Risk level estimation matrix (unsystematic technique) 
Likelihood Severity 
3 2 1 
4 12 8 4 
3 9 6 3 
2 6 4 2 
1 3 2 1 
4. The tolerability is associated to the risk level by: a) three or below, the risk is acceptable, b) 
between four and seven, the risk is medium and should be reduced so that it is acceptable, and c) 
eight and above, the risk is unacceptable (see table 3). 
The risk assessment results are used to prioritize the order, to devise, maintain or improve risk controls, 
as: a) if the risk is considered acceptable, no further action is necessary other than to ensure that the 
controls are maintained. b) if the risk is considered medium, risk reduction measures should be 
implemented, within a defined time period, and it might be necessary to consider suspending or restricting 
the activity, or to apply interim risk control measures, until this has been completed, particularly if the risk 
levels are associated with extremely harmful consequences and very harmful consequences, and c) if the 
risk is considered unacceptable, the work activity should be halted until risk controls are implemented to 
reduces the risk to an acceptable level so that it is no longer very high. If it is not possible to reduce the 
risk the work should remain prohibited. 
3.4.2. Workmed® method 
Workmed® method (Nunes, 2010) was, initially designed and developed to be incorporating in 
computerized systems for managing safety and health at work. It has the advantage of being configurable 
and so adaptable to perform risk assessment in any activity (Nunes, 2010), including construction sites. 
The method is based on usual classical methods and is been implementing the computerized systems for 
managing safety and health at work. Is being used in Portugal since 2002 in all activity sectors, namely: 
industry (including construction), 8 companies and services (including health and public sector), 15 
companies. This method estimates the risk level, normalized so that the result will always be in a 
percentage scale, regardless of the number of indices considered and the scales and weights adopted, as 
follows: 
log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) 99 1
log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )
F E S D T
F F E E S S D D T T
A F A E A S A D A TR x
A N A N A N A N A N
+ + + +
= +
+ + + +   (eq. 1) 
Where: 
R - The resulting level of risk for the risk factor in the local score (1-100%); 
AI – Weighting factor index I (I = F, E, S, D and T): values from 0 (not considered for the calculation of 
the risk level) to 10 (maximum contribution for the risk level); 
NI – Maximum value of the scale values of the index I (I = F, E, S, D and T); 
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F – Frequency Index of Exposure occurrences to the risk factor (from 1 to 5, see table 3.4); 
E – Exposure Index determined by the duration of exposure to risk factor (from 1 to 5, see table 3.5); 
S – Severity Index resulting from exposure to risk factor (from 1 to 5, see table 3.6); 
D – Deficiency Index of safety conditions in the workplace (from 1 to 5, see table 3.7); 
T – Workers exposed Index (associated to workers exposure on worksite (from 1 to 5, see table 3.8). 
Contrary to the multiplication used in classical methods, the use of logarithm functions allows a more 
uniform distribution of the risk levels. Workmed® method uses the following criteria for the indexes 
mentioned. 
Table 3.4 - Frequency Index of Workmed® method 
F Frequency 
5 One or more times per day. Happens "all the time." 
4 One or more times a week. Everyone remembers this kind of event / situation. 
3 One or more times per month. Some people remember this type of event / situation. 
2 One or more times per year. Does anyone remember this type of event/situation. 
1 Less than once a year. No memory of this type of event / situation. 
Frequency index is of special relevance, being very important in estimating the possibility of occurrence, 
because if it was not able to obtain frequency rates, the available information allows identifying the mode 
of accident/risk involved and helps appeal to the "memory" of safety technicians that know the work 
context. 
Table 3.5 – Exposure Index of Workmed® method 
E Exposure 
5 > 50 % of working hours 
4  50 % ≥ of working hours > 10% 
3  10% ≥ of working hours > 5% 
2  5% ≥ of working hours > 1% 
1  1% ≥ of working hours > 0% 
Exposure index importance lies in the influence on the possibility of exposure occurs. The almost constant 
exposure to specific risk (total occupation of the working hours), does not implies a very significant 
increase in the possibility of exposure occurs. Actually, scheduled tasks can increase safety conditions. 
Yet, this index can achieve more importance in the calculation of the risk level when it is not possible to 
establish values for the frequency index or as a complement to it. 
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Table 3.6 – Severity Index of Workmed® method 
S Severity 
5 Possibility of death, injury or illness with permanent total disability or very severe. 
4 Injury or illness with temporary total disability, permanent partial or severe. 
3 Injury or illness with temporary partial disability, or moderately severe. 
2 Possibility of injury without disability or mild health problems. 
1 Neither injuries nor health problems. 
Severity index importance is due to there is a reasonable uncertainty about the severity of the 
consequences that may occur, although it has to recognize that in some situations it can often be high. 
Table 3.7 – Deficiency Index of Workmed® method 
D Deficiency 
5 Safety barriers non-existent or unknown. 
4 Serious deficiencies in existing safety barriers or does not comply with legislation; needs several improvements. 
3 
Absence and/or some deficiencies in existing safety 
barriers, respecting part of the law, presents some 
problems in situations of abnormal operation. 
2 
Sufficient safety barriers but upgradeable, respecting the 
law, with few requirements below the established 
standards. 
1 Sufficient and well established safety barriers, respecting international standards, above the required by law. 
The deficiency index on construction sites is based only on visualization of work situations, not allowing 
to measure with sufficient accuracy other factors like: 
1. The duration and frequency of tasks, the conditions under which they are developed, the training 
actually received by the workers involved and others who may be affected, facilities, equipment 
and hand tools, distances that materials must be moved manually, size, shape, surface and weight 
of these materials; 
2. The existence of procedures for authorization of work, instructions for operation and maintenance 
of equipment, actual knowledge of legal requirements, regulations and regulatory issues relevant 
and related work, control devices and protection supposedly in operation; 
3. The results of inspections performed on the labor front. 
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Table 3.8 – Index of Workers exposed Workmed® method 
T Workers exposed 
5  > 29 % of workers exposed 
4  > 12 e ≤ 29 % of workers exposed 
3  > 6 e ≤ 12 % of workers exposed 
2  > 3 e ≤ 6 % of workers exposed 
1  ≤ 3 % of workers exposed 
The index of workers exposed is relevant because, in relative terms, it is considered with significant 
influence in the level of risk involved. A large number of workers exposed involve both an increase in the 
severity and an increased likelihood.  
Table 3.9 – Risk Level rating of Workmed® method 
Valuation Type and urgency of Control Actions 
5 
Intolerable 
(92 < RL ≤ 100) 
The work cannot be started or continued while the risk is not reduced. If the 
risk cannot be reduced, the work should be prohibited. 
If the risk can be reduced, should be checked before the work starts and 
during its performance if all control measures are implemented and 
operative. 
4 
Marrowy 
(81 < RL ≤ 92) 
The work cannot be started while the risk is not reduced.  
If the risk is related to a work in progress, urgent action should be taken. 
Risk reduction measures must be implemented.  
Always check before the work starts if control measures are implemented 
and operative. 
3 
Medium 
(67 < RL ≤ 81) 
Safety measures should be implemented to reduce risk within a defined 
period of time, but the costs of implementation should be evaluated and 
limited.  
If the medium risk is associated with very serious injuries, one must 
establish more precisely the likelihood of damage and hence the possible 
need of improve prevention measures.  
Should be check, at appropriate intervals, if all control measures remain 
well implemented and operative. 
2 
Tolerable 
(41 < RL ≤ 67) 
The risk has been reduced to the lowest practicable. Requires no additional 
measure. It can be considered solutions which improve the cost-
effectiveness rate. 
1 
Trivial 
(0 < RL ≤ 41) 
It requires no action. 
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4. Fuzzy Sets Theory 
In the real world, vagueness and ambiguity exist due to the limitations of our language and other factors 
such as context and mood. Human mind allows a certain sloppiness in the descriptions of our environment 
which is, sometimes, at conflict with the rigor of formal analysis (Steimann, 1997). There are situations in 
which the meaning of a word or symbol cannot be captured adequately by a crisp set, for instance: the 
term “cold” denotes the range of cold temperatures, which may vary from context to context but, clearly, 
always lacks a sharp boundary. 
A generalist view of occupational safety risk assumes that risks are characterized by some combination of 
attributes such as probability, severity, intentionality, voluntariness, disorganization, lack of knowledge, 
lack of leadership and so on, but no one of these attributes is absolutely essential. In fact, there is no 
universal set of rules for taking or characterize the risk, e. g., there is no universal set of characteristics for 
describing the occupational safety risk (Aven, 2009). Assessing risks is, essentially, to know them. And 
this means that it is essential to have a complete and systemic understanding of the possible causes of an 
anomaly in the work process, combined with an efficient characterization of the possible consequences 
resulting of the occurrence of that anomaly.  
The degree of complexity of the analysis depends on, among other factors, the availability and reliability 
of the data needed, which are often difficult to obtain.The characterization must depend on which context 
the risk is undertaken. So, RAOS must take into account the context and the scope of the analysis. Thus, 
RAOS deals with uncertain situations, that is, with situations in which it does not have complete and 
accurate knowledge about the state of the system. So, uncertainty exists. 
Uncertainty may be due to: a) incompleteness, when there is lack of information or incomprehensible 
information, b) ambiguity, due to several possible data interpretations, c) imprecision, due to data that are 
not precise or exact, d) fuzziness, when there are concepts that have a meaningless definition (such as: 
safe and confortable) or events unable to be acuratly defined and, e) randomness, when there are events 
whose features are not yet know until it will happen in the future. 
In construction, vague terms are unavoidable, since construction professionals often assess risks in 
qualitative linguistic terms, as a result increases the uncertainty. In addition, when a large number of 
people are involved the magnitude of the fuzziness increases (Pender, 2001). 
Under these circumstances, probabilistic approaches may not be able to model safety for the whole 
construction process as effectively and efficiently as Fuzzy Set Theory (FST), because it is a mathematical 
framework to deal with randomness uncertainty (Zadeh, 1987). RAOS uncertainty in construction are 
more related with information incompleteness, data ambiguity and imprecision and fuziness of concepts 
and work situations (see section 3.2). 
FST was formulated, in 1965, by Lotfi Zadeh and provides a mathematical framework for the systematic 
treatment of vagueness and imprecision. More specifically, may be viewed as an attempt at formalization 
of two remarkable human capabilities: a) the capability to converse, reason and make rational decisions in 
an environment of imprecision, uncertainty, incompleteness of information, conflicting information, 
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partial truth (environments of imperfect information), and b) the capability to perform a wide variety of 
physical and mental tasks without any measurements (at least in a quantitative way). 
FST have the ability to introduce notions of continuity into deductive thinking. In practice, this means that 
the use of fuzzy sets allows a conventional symbolic system (specified in the form of rules, tables, or 
whatever) to adopt continuous behavior, thus to decrease uncertainty. 
Zadeh (1978) argues that fuzzy logic is different in character from probability, and is not a replacement 
for it. There are four main differences between the two techniques (Engelbrecht, 2007): (1) degrees of 
certainty (given by statistical probability) are meaningful only before the event occurs, membership 
degrees are relevant even after the event occurs; (2) probability assumes that events are independent, 
fuzziness is not based on that assumption; (3) probability assumes a closed world model when every data 
are known, fuzziness never assumes that everything could be known, and; (4) probability is based on 
subjective frequency measures, fuzziness is based on descriptive measures (by membership functions) of 
the domain. 
By contrast with classical sets, which present a discrete border, a fuzzy set presents a boundary with a 
gradual contour. Formally, let U be the universe of discourse and u a generic element of U, then a fuzzy 
subset A, defined in U, is a membership function composed by the dual pair: 
A= {(u, µA(u))u∈U}                                                      (eq. 2) 
Where: µA(u) is designated as membership grade of u in A. The membership function A associates to each 
element u, of U, a real number µA(u), in the interval [0,1].  
To perform operations with fuzzy sets there are, in the literature, panoply of operators (Zimmermann, 
1993; Yager and Filev, 1994; Beliakov and Warren, 2001 and Detyniecki, 2001). The most well-known 
are the intersection, union and media operators, with the first two corresponding to multiplication and sum 
operations in arithmetic and to “e” and “or” in logic. Further, intersection and union operators can be 
divided in two classes: a) non-parametric operators – usually known as t-norms and t-conorms and b) the 
class of parametric ones – which allow expressing synergies in the operations (Zimmermann, 1993; 
Ribeiro, 1996; Beliakov and Warren, 2001; Detyniecki, 2001). Averaging operators includes parametric 
and non-parametric operators (Detyniecki, 2001). In general, since most operators objective is to combine 
concepts, these falls under what is usually called aggregation operators (Beliakov and Warren, 2001; 
Detyniecki, 2001). In this thesis this latter designation will be used for joining the factors influencing the 
risk in the construction industry. In section 5 details about the selected aggregation operators will be 
discussed. 
Another important concept in FST is the linguistic variable (Zadeh, 1975, 1978, 1983, 1987). A linguistic 
variable is defined as a variable whose values are words or sentences in a natural or artificial language. 
There are decision situations in which the information cannot be assessed precisely in a quantitative form 
but may be expressed in a qualitative form, and thus, the use of linguistic variables is a good approaach 
(Ru and Eloff, 1996; Herrera and Viedma, 2000 and Cordón et al., 2002; Ruan et al., 2003). 
Formally, a linguistic variable is a variable that admits as values words or sentences in natural language, 
which can be represented as fuzzy sets. 
For example, a linguistic variable “Temperature” (see fig 4.1) could be described by three terms “Cold”, 
“Pleasant”, “Hot”, each represented by a fuzzy set, where Celsisus-degrees are the interval for the x 
variable and m(x) the corresponding membership degree. 
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Figure 4.1 – Linguistic variable “Temperature” 
Or, in a closer example, given by Markowski et al. (2009), a safety risk level scale which universe of 
discourse (U) ranges from10-7 to 100. This scale, it is most suitable for the range of the risks that can be 
encountered in the construction industry (risk=0 is highly improbable). So, the linguistic variable “Safety 
Risk Level” could be described by nine terms: “remote”, “unlikely”, “very low”, “low”, “moderate”, 
“fairly high”, “high”, “very high” and “extremely high” (see fig. 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2 – Linguistic variable “Safety Risk Level” 
In summary, this section introduced the main concepts from FST that will be used in this thesis and the 
next sub-sections presents the motivation for using this theory in RAOS and the main related works, 
respectively.  
4.1. Advantages of the use fuzzy sets theory in risk assessment 
occupational safety 
The concept of risk assessment, in particular when applied to occupational risks, is mentioned in a vast 
scientific, technical and legal bibliography. However, the definition of this concept is vague, varied, and 
often contradictory. Concepts upstream of the concept of risk (e.g. human failure, working conditions, 
physical or chemical risk factors, consequences’ severity, safety climate) are viewed from a 
HOT COLD 
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methodological point of view in several works, but always in a specific and restricted approach, showing 
no consistent interfaces. 
It is important to be noted that a large volume of data is required for RAOS process, using injury, illness, 
and fatality statistics data. However, very few construction companies have the required data in quantity 
and with the quality needed to perform meaningful occupational risk assessemnts. 
Many authors (Karwowski and Mital, 1986; Cornell, 1996; Wang and Ruxton, 1997; Pender, 2001; Sii et 
al., 2001; Tixier et al., 2002; Faber and Stewart, 2003; Nilsen and Aven, 2003; Kentel and Aral, 2004) 
have discussed the limitations of traditional (probabilistic) methods for RAOS and stated that uncertainties 
sources include scarce or incomplete data, measurement error, data obtained from expert judgment, or 
subjective interpretation of available information which cannot be treated solely by traditional statistical or 
probabilistic methods. By this, probabilistic RAOS methods are not objective: it simply fails to 
acknowledge its subjectivity. 
By other hand, human are capable of abstracting, thinking and reasoning, thus, assessing risks without 
having necessarily to experience their consequences. Hollnagel (2008) stated that safety cannot genuinely 
be improved only by looking to the past and taking precautions against the accidents that have happened, 
it must also look to the future. 
When conducting RAOS at construction sites, there is often inadequate data or imprecise information 
available and safety practices encountered at construction sites are as variable as the sites themselves. 
Therefore, the use of quantitative occupational risk assessment models based on probabilistic techniques, 
using data collected at different construction sites and in various types of construction projects, seems that 
can lead to distorted results and do not reflect the reality of the site under analysis. 
Using probability techniques are to assume that risk factors and outcomes fall into well-defined mutually 
exclusive categories (a random process produces events, by chance; i.e., their variability is significantly 
observable) and, classical RAOS methods are discrete in nature (due to the use of probability theory). 
These models of reality are built from enumerable sets of symbols (from factors related to the possibility 
of work accidents and possible work accidents severity), the complexity of these models invariably 
increases with the number of symbols employed so, accuracy and simplicity are almost mutually 
exclusive. 
Uncertainty represented on fuzzy systems is a nonstatistical uncertainty, based on expressing vagueness, 
imprecision and/or ambiguity trough fuzzy membership functions, which is different from statistical 
uncertainty that is based on the laws of probability and is resolved through observations. Carr and Tah 
(2001) cites an example: when a coin is tossed it is certain what the outcome is, while before tossing the 
coin the probability of each outcome is 50%.  
In RAOS vagueness and ambiguity exist, due to the limitations of our language, perceptions, context and 
mood. The large number of people involved (different views, attitudes and beliefs, from diferents 
analysts must be expected), increases the magnitude of its fuzziness.  
Uncertainty, related to RAOS, results on imperfect prediction of future accident scenario risk. Uncertainty 
derives from: a) the nature of the RAOS, b) the availability of data, c) the quality of the information, d) the 
skills and preferences of the analyst, e) the methodology used and, f) the time and resources available. 
According Markowski et al. (2009), there is three major sources of RAOS uncertainty: 1) in inadequacies 
and deficiencies in formulation of accident scenario framework, 2) in the occupational accidents severity 
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assessment and, 3) in the lack of knowledge elicited from experts, which is often incomplete, imprecise 
and fragmentary  
The imprecision and inaccuracies in the parameters which are used as an inputs into RAOS process, are 
called parameter uncertainties, which are inherent because the available data used to understand human-
centered systems, are usually characterized by being diverse, incomplete, imprecise and subjective. So,the 
RAOS inference process needs to be based on incomplete knowledge. As noted before, uncertainty 
presents in RAOS process is a nonstatistical uncertainty, so the ability of probability theory to deal with it 
is questioned (Zadeh, 2002). 
So, the accuracy of the RAOS results depends on (Markowski et al., 2009): 1) the type of hazards that are 
being analyzed, 2) whether all significant contributors to the risk have been analyzed, 3) the realism of the 
models used to estimate probability and severity accidents phenomena, and 4) the uncertainty associated 
with the imprecision of humans centered input data (i.e., the model capability to operate on information 
which is perception-based)). 
To illustrate the paramount contribution of FST to RAOS, Markowski et al. (2009), stated that the use of 
FST in RAOS, allows answering questions like: ‘‘how safe is the construction site?’’, instead of ‘‘is the 
construction site safe?’’. Note that the answers ‘‘no’’ or ‘‘yes’’ are unrealistic in safety maters (and not 
only on construction), due to the set of reasons given before in this section. 
FST allows the treatment of imprecise and incomplete information in a more precise and the simplest way, 
from a mathematical point of view (Dubois, 2006; Siler and Buckley, 2005). In addition, Gentile (2004) 
stated that the safety assessment is a ‘‘fuzzy issue’’ and subsequently the FST can be effectively included 
into RAOS process to substantially reduce knowledge uncertainty. 
Thus, FST presents a natural way of modelling the intrinsic vagueness and imprecision of safety concepts 
by providing a very precise approach for dealing with uncertainty which grows out of the complexity of 
human behaviour. It also allows the inclusion of human creativity and intuition, which is an essential 
ingredient for successful RAOS (Ru and Eloff, 1996). This statement lies in the recognition that while the 
role of facts is to provide an answer to expected value (because facts are the same for everyone), the 
subjective process will produce as many answers as there are people involved. In fact, even when the 
probabilities are know (in occupational safety it is made always by oversimplifications), analysts should 
take into account utility aspects (Bernstein, 1996), such as: risk perception, usefulness or workers 
satisfaction, which are fuzzy concepts. For example, there are people who are terrified by thunderstorms 
even being aware that it is highly unlike that lightning will strike precisely where they are standing.  
These people value in excess the possible consequences, instead of the probability of being hit. RAOS 
analysts should try to elicit this kind of aspects because answer to them can be important to the acceptance 
of RAOS results, effectiveness of risk response measures and workers motivation. 
Besides the reasons given before, aditional motivation for using FST in this work derives from sharing the 
opinion of many authors, as for instance: 
• Andersson (1986) stated that RAOS methods, because they are applied to human-centered 
systems, should be based on possibility and/or fuzzy sets theories, instead of traditional theory of 
probability; 
• Maglaras (1995) notes that fuzzy sets usually require less information than probabilistic methods 
to achieve the same level of results; 
• Liu et al. (2004) refer that a safety model using a fuzzy rule-based inference system can be more 
appropriately used to carry out risk analysis associated with incomplete safety information; 
32 
• Mure (2006) pointed that an effective prevention of accidents and health harms is only possible 
through an in-depth study of their dynamics. For this purpose, it is necessary to have instruments 
available for characterizing harmful events, and that a fuzzy logic approach seems a suitable 
instrument for this kind of application. 
So, FST is not an alternative to, but an enhancement of classical RAOS approaches. By virtue of fuzzy 
sets, models may exhibit continuousbehaviour and thus address safety problems more adequately. 
4.2. Related work using fuzzy sets theory in occupational risk 
assessment 
Moreover, there is extensive literature regarding the usage of fuzzy concepts and methods in RAOS, in 
related fields such as human factors, Ergonomics, risk management and safety. Regarding Ergonomics 
applications we highlight the following works:  
•  Karwowski et al (1987) developed LIFTAN, a fuzzy knowledge base for analysis of manual 
lifting tasks. 
•  McCauley-Bell and Badiru (1994 a,b) developed a fuzzy expert system to quantify the risks of 
upper extremity occupational injuries in manufacturing environments. Specifically, it used the 
AHP method and fuzzy modeling to develop mathematical predictions for risk level in the 
organizational, task and personal categories for an individual. 
•  Wang and McCauley-Bell (1995) used fuzzy modelling to predict risks of cumulative trauma 
disorders using fuzzy regression analysis. 
• Nunes and Ribeiro (2003) developed the Ergo_X Expert System, a multi criteria decision making 
model for identifying, assessing and controlling ergonomic risk factors responsible for the 
development of Work Related Musculoskeletal Disorders. 
•  Hanson et al (2003) used fuzzy logic to model relations between human perception, human 
characteristics and workplace structure applied to car interior design.  
• Karwowski et al (2006) developed a model for measuring the electromyography (EMG) responses 
for 10 trunk muscles in manual-lifting tasks using a fuzzy relational rule network (FRRN).  
Considering risks in project management in construction applications, the following works could be 
highlighted:  
• Kangary and Riggs (1989) developed an approach for project risk assessment in construction, 
which included a linguistic analysis (qualitative).  
• Carr and Tah. (2001) developed a formal model for qualitative risk assessment in construction 
projects. Risk description and their consequences are defined using linguistic variables and by 
using fuzzy approximation and composition, the relationships between risk sources and the 
consequences on project performance measures can be identified and quantified consistently.  
• Soltani and Fernando (2004) developed a fuzzy based multi-objective path planning model for 
movement of materials, plant and site operative from one place to another on construction sites. 
Regarding the literature in safety management systems the following fuzzy approaches are highlighted:   
• Carr and Tah (2001) developed a methodology for evaluating the risk exposure, considering the 
consequences in terms of time, cost, quality, and safety performance measures, for a project based 
on fuzzy estimates of the risk components and using descriptive linguistic variables.  
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• Tam et al (2002) developed a non-structural fuzzy decision support system to evaluate the safety 
management systems and prioritize these measures with the consideration of various decision 
criteria.  
• Gentile (2004) established a novel conceptual framework for the analysis of inherent safety and 
proposes a methodology that addresses several of the limitations of the methodologies available 
for current inherent safety analysis, based on a hierarchical fuzzy model that analyzes the 
interaction of variables relevant for inherent safety and process safety in general.  
• Oke et al (2006) developed a fuzzy safety control model for the prevention of accidents and 
failures in oil and gas production activities on offshore platforms.  
• Dagdeviren and Ihsan (2008) proposed a fuzzy AHP (Analytical Hierarchical Process) method to 
determine the level of faulty behavior risk (FBR) in work systems, using weights and fuzzy 
linguistic variables and applied in a real manufacturing company.  
• Yang et al. (2008) develop a fuzzy rule-based, including Bayesian reasoning for prioritizing 
failures in FMEA - failure mode and effects analysis. The technique is specifically intended to 
deal with some drawbacks concerning the conventional use of fuzzy logic (i.e. rule-based) 
methods in FMEA.  
Regarding literature about risk analysis for work accidents, the following are the most interesting 
approaches that include FST concepts: 
• Lee and Halpin (2003) developed a study for quantifying the effects of accidents by defining one 
of the indirect costs, the productive time lost owing to accidents in utility trenching operations. It 
used fuzzy-logic-based analysis to estimate safety factor´s performance (training, supervision, and 
preplanning) in utility trenching operations and also to quantify the productivity loss due to 
process delays resulting from accidents during excavation and pipe installation. 
• Nunes (2005) developed AR_X, an expert system aimed at supporting risk analysis. The main 
objective of this system is to identify and evaluate exposure to occupational risks and advice on 
measures to implement in order to control risks. The methodology supports the assessment of 
potential factors that contribute for accident occurrence and guides the user on the adoption of 
corrective measures. The AR_X performs an Accident Risk Degree assessment based on the 
evaluation of protection factors and risk factors that are relevant to the situation under analysis.  
• Azadeh et al. (2008) developed a fuzzy expert system for performance assessment of health, 
safety, environment (HSE) and ergonomic factors in a gas refinery with the following objectives: 
1) reduce human error, 2) creation of expert knowledge and 3) interpretation of large amount of 
vague data, using fuzzy rules. 
Finally, two RAOS inspiring works, specifically related with the usage of FST in the construction industry 
are: 
• Gurcanli and Mungen (2009). Proposed a method for assessment of the risks that workers are 
exposed that has been described on 3.2. 
• Aneziris et al. (2010) proposed a technique for quantification of occupational risk that has been 
described on 3.2. 
It should be noted that this two works although using FST to perform OSRA, the methods proposed have 
different features and the assessment is coarser than with QRAM. 
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5. Conceptual Qualitative Occupational Risk 
Assessment model 
The Qualitative Occupational Risk Assessment model (QRAM) is defined by the following four 
dimensions: Safety Climate Adequacy ( ), Severity Factors ( ), Possibility Factors ( ) and Safety 
Barriers Effectiveness ( ). Figure 1 depicts the four dimensions considered in QRAM. 
 
Figure 5.1 QRAM dimensions 
These four dimensions are used to estimate the risk for the following nine accident modes: 
1. Falls; 
2. Contact with electricity; 
3. Struck by moving vehicle (including heavy equipment); 
4. Injured by falling/dropped/collapsing object/person/wall/vehicle/crane which falls under gravity 
(including building or structure collapse and slipping hand held tool); 
5. Cave-ins (while or after excavation); 
6. Hit by rolling/sliding object or person (including stuck against object or equipment and caught in 
or compressed by equipment or objects); 
7. Contact with machinery moving parts (including injured by hand held tools operated by oneself); 
8. Lost buoyancy in water; 
9. Fire and Explosion. 
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This accident list is based on a preliminary list of accident modes, for occupational accident scenarios by 
Ale et al. (2008), which is adapted for the construction industry by the following works (Jeong, 1998; 
Müngen and Gürcanli, 2005 and Hyoung et al., 2009).  
The selection of the four dimensions ( SC , S , AP , SB ) is based on critical risk concepts, namely: 1) risk 
is the uncertainty about the severity of the consequences of an activity with respect to something that 
humans value (Aven and Renn, 2009) and, 2) the probability and severity of an adverse effect/event 
occurring to man or the environment following exposure, under defined conditions, to a risk source(s) 
(EU; 2000). Since in this work it is used fuzzy set theory instead of probability theory, the concept of 
probability is substituted by the concept of possibility. Therefore, the risk associated with the four 
dimensions of QRAM expresses a combination of (Christensen et al, 2003): 
• Possibility of an unwanted outcome (i.e. a work accident in a safety context), including technical, 
organizational and behavioral factors; 
• Severity of the accident; 
• Extending consequences/effects under given specific circumstances (e.g. existence of safety 
barriers). 
The technically oriented RAOS methods referred in 3 do not focus safety climate factors. Human oriented 
methods, task analysis and management oriented methods considered some factors related to safety 
climate (such as: formation and training, safety organization and communication) which are assessed as 
part of the possibility of accident occurrence. However, Mohamed (2002) and Larsson (2005) found, that 
a positive safety climate and supportive psychological climate in construction industry are important for 
occupational safety because it may provide indications of workers safety behavior, originating 
simultaneously from policy and procedural actions of top management and from supervisory actions 
exhibited by frontline supervisors and it can provide a “measure” of the workforce’s perception, and 
attitudes toward safety within the organizational atmosphere (at a given point in time, like the overall risk 
assessment). As described in 5.6, safety climate must be assessed, mainly, by site workers perception so, 
in QRAM, safety climate is a dimension of the model. 
5.1. Qualitative Occupational Risk Assessment model general 
formulation 
The general formulation of QRAM for an accident mode (i =1,..9) is: 
( ) [ , ( ), ( ), ( )]i and i i iR x SC S x AP x SB xθ=                                 (eq. 3) 
Where: 
( )iR x - is the estimated risk for the ith accident mode in the x activity; 
andθ - is the Fuzzy-AND aggregation operator; 
SC - is the safety climate assessment adequacy for the whole site –First dimension; 
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( )iS x - is the expected work accident severity for the ith accident mode in the x activity – Second 
dimension; 
( )iAP x - is the possibility of work accident occurrence for the ith accident mode in the x activity – Third 
dimension; 
( )iSB x - are the safety barriers effectiveness for the ith accident mode in the x activity – Fourth 
dimension. 
Each of the four dimensions is composed by several factors that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Here, we just present a brief introduction about the four dimensions that are included in the QRAM. 
Safety Climate Adequacy – This dimension estimates the adequacy of the site safety climate. Its 
importance lies in facilitating or impeding the maintenance of safety barriers and consequently the 
management of safety risks, i.e., safety climate factors are not direct agents in the occurrence of work 
accidents but create the conditions for accidents happening. Neal et al. (2000) affirm that safety climate is 
a variable between organizational climate and safety performance. QRAM uses a list of 101 factors to 
assess the SC (described later). 
Severity Factors – This dimension estimates the expected occupational accidents severity by assessing 
factors related to the amount of energy dissipated/absorbed by the victim’s body that can be evaluated in 
situ like, heights, speeds, weights, morphology of moving vehicles, etc, and using the biomechanical 
limits of the human body appointed in several studies, such as: Prasad (1999), Eppinger et al. (2000), 
Yang (2002), Chaffin et al. (2006) and Sayed et al. (2008). 
Possibility Factors – This dimension estimates the possibility of work accident occurrence by using a list 
of possible factors. Each accident mode has a specific list (which varies depending on the accident mode, 
for inatance, falls has 76 questions and lost in water has 13).  
Safety Barriers Effectiveness – This dimension estimates the effectiveness of the safety barriers 
implemented on site. To estimate the SB, the safety barriers were divided into four groups, according with 
(Hollnagel, 2008) classification: 1) physical or material, 2) functional, 3) symbolic and, 4) incorporeal. 
Both safety climate and possibility of work accident will be rated with the linguistic variable “adequacy” 
(section 5.3). Safety barriers will be assessed with the linguistic variable “SB-effectiveness” (section 5.3). 
To obtain the final estimated value for QRAM, the composing factors of each dimension will be 
aggregated with specific aggregation operators (see section 5.4). 
Further, QRAM analysis could be performed in two ways: in a faster way by accident mode that can occur 
in workplaces or, more in-depth, listing all activities for each job performed at the site, analysing and 
ranking the risk by the accident modes for each activity. There may be various levels of detail and the 
analysis will depend on what is wanted to do with the results, and some operational factors, including: a) 
type and relevance of available data, b) degree of accuracy required to the obtained results and, c) 
available resources. 
The QRAM method includes the following 14 steps: 
• Step 1 - Identification of the factors affecting the safety climate on site by the use of the 
checklist “Safety Rules and Procedures”, “Workers’ Competence”, “Safe Work Behavior”, 
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“Management Commitment”, “Supervisory Action Towards Safety”, “Communication and 
Participation”, “Supportive Environment”, “Safety planning”, “Work Pressure over Safety” 
and “Safety Management System”. 
• Step 2 – Rating of the identified safety climate factors using the fuzzy linguistic variable 
“adequacy” (see table 5.1). For each factor, the analyst assessment is made by taken the 
semantic term which was more times chosen by the interviewed. 
• Step 3 – Final evaluation of the safety climate on site by using the specialized aggregation 
operator Fuzzy-OR (see eq. 12).  
• Step 4 – Job analysis for identification and listing the activities which are carried on site; 
• Step 5 - For each activity, identification of accident modes possible to occur – from the list 
“accident modes”. This identification should be made by the analyst, based on the site work 
conditions and could be assited by site managers and workers; 
• Step 6 - For each accident mode, identification of the factors affecting the possibility (of 
occurrence) of each accident mode, by the use of the questionnaires that expresses the 
relations between occupational accident scenarios and possibility factors, namely:: 
“Questionnaire about factors affecting Falls”, “Questionnaire about factors affecting contact 
with electricity”, “Questionnaire about factors affecting struck by moving vehicle”, 
“Questionnaire about factors affecting injured by falling/swinging objects”, “Questionnaire 
about factors affecting cave-ins”, “Questionnaire about factors affecting hit by 
rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden movement)”, “Questionnaire about 
factors affecting contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between 
objects)”, “Questionnaire about factors affecting Lost buoyancy in water due to the activity” 
and “Questionnaire about factors affecting fire or explosion (including confined spaces)”.  
• Step 7 – Rating of the possibility factors identified using the fuzzy linguistic variable 
“adequacy” (see table 5.1). 
• Step 8 – Estimation of the possibility of occurrence of the accident mode in a construction site 
by using the specialized aggregation operator Fuzzy-OR (see eq. 12). 
• Step 9 - For each accident mode, estimation of the expected severity, by the use of the 
linguistic variables depicted on figures 5.5 to 5.12 (taken into account the site work 
conditions). 
• Step 10 - For each accident mode, identification of the safety barriers implemented on site, by 
safety barriers type, namely: Physical (or material), Functional, Symbolic and Incorporeal.  
• Step 11 – Rating the safety barriers effectiveness using the fuzzy linguistic variable 
“effectiveness” (see table 5.2). The analyst should check key points, namely: (1) safety 
barriers design – including interfaces and work modifications that were required, (2) 
checking/supervision of construction and installation, (3) human factors for safety barriers 
operation and maintenance – availability, commitment and competence of personnel, (4) 
inspections and maintenance programs, (5) supervision of maintenance tasks, (6) safety 
barriers management – including communication and coordination, conflict resolution and the 
existence of spares (when required) and (7) fullfillment of the apllied regulations. 
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• Step 12 - For each accident mode, estimation of the effectiveness of the safety barriers 
implemented on site, by using the specialized aggregation operator Hammacher-OR (see eq. 
10). 
• Step 13 – For each accident mode, perform the risk level final evaluation on construction site, 
by aggregating the four dimensions using an average aggregation operator Fuzzy-AND (see 
eq. 8). 
• Step 14 –Conclusions& recommendations - For each accident mode, identify the factors to be 
improved firstly which are the ones found to be “inadequate”, then the “low adequate” and so 
on. This is, should be prioritized, by descending order of aggressiveness, the factors 
potentially more aggressive for workers safety (and safety barriers against them must be 
advised). 
5.2.  Linguistic variables for rating risk factors  
To assess the contributing risk factors that are included in each dimension of QRAM, ten linguistic 
variables (Zimmermann 1996) were built. One is “Adequacy”, which allows rating the factors to assess in 
safety climate and in possibility of work accident. The second linguistic variable is “SB-effectiveness” 
which allows rating the factors included in the safety barriers dimension. These two variables provide a 
scale for the analyst to perform the elicitation of the ratings for the risk factors. The other eight are used to 
estimate the expected severity of work accidents, in a graphic way (see figures 5.5 to 5.12). 
To determine the greater or lesser degree of adequacy (in terms of fitness for the intended purpose) of 
each factor that contributes to the safety climate and possibility (of work accident) factors, was defined the 
linguistic variable “Adequacy”. This linguistic variable includes six semantic terms that are represented by 
triangular membership functions, as shown in figure 2. The semantic terms and the respective domain 
intervals for the membership functions are:  
• “inadequate”, domain [0.0, 0.2];  
• “low adequate”, domain [0.0, 0.4];  
• “almost adequate”, domain [0.2, 0.6];  
• “adequate”, domain [0.4, 0.8];  
• “very adequate”, domain [0.6, 1.0];  
• “strongly adequate”, domain [0.8, 1.0].  
The main advantage of using semantic terms is that it allows a more user-friendly elicitation of knowledge 
because the checklists are answered semantically. 
40 
  
Figure 5.2. Linguistic variable “Adequacy” 
As can be observed, it was defined continuous membership functions for each term of the linguistic 
variable “Adequacy”. However, to simplify the rating and calculation process the conversion method 
proposed by Cheng and Hwang (1992), is used to discretize the fuzzy terms of the linguistic variable 
“Adequacy”. Information loss resulting from this discretization does not significantly affect the 
assessment results, as shown in the interesting application of Simões-Marques (1999). This discretization 
process is as follows. First, it consider two fuzzy linear functions, a maximizing one  (eq. 4 - see 
red line on figure 5.2) and a minimizing one  (eq. 5 - see red dotted line on figure 5.2). Second, it is 
determined the values of the intersection of the left side (E) of each linguistic term with the minimizer and 
the right side (D) of each linguistic variable term with the maximizer. 
min( ) sup [ ( ) ( )]E x AA x xµ µ µ= ∧                                                                                   (eq. 4) 
and                      
max( ) sup [ ( ) ( )]D x AA x xµ µ µ= ∧                                                                                (eq. 5) 
And, finally, the membership grade for each semantic term (see table 5.1) is obtained through the 
expression: 
( ) [ ( ) 1 ( )] / 2T D EA A Aµ µ µ= + −                                                                                 (eq. 6) 
From the above discretization process, the set of discrete terms that will be used in the linguistic variable 
“Adequacy”, as well as their meaning and respective membership values, is shown in table 5.1. The 
inverted logic of using low memberships for the most adequate factors is due to the fact that for risks the 
lower the better (e.g. 0 membership means absence of threats to safety). 
 
 
Legend:  
Inadequate 
Low adequate 
Almost adequate 
Adequate 
Very adequate 
Strongly adequate 
41 
Table 5.1 – Linguistic variable “Adequacy” for assess accident´s possibility and 
 safety climate influencing factors  
 
Semantic 
term 
Meaning Membership grade (1-µ) Strongly 
adequate 
All factors are controlled by effective and reliable, in 
any event, safety measures (best practices and/or 
other relevant conditions apply).  
 
0.06 
Very 
adequate 
All factors are controlled by effective and reliable 
safety measures (best practices and/or other relevant 
conditions apply).  
 
0.21 
Adequate Safety measures are sufficient for the requirements. 0.41 
Almost 
adequate 
Some factors are not well controlled. Accidents can 
occur. Safety measures should be improved. 
0.56 
Low adequate Some factors are not controlled. Accidents are likely 
to occur. Safety measures do exist but are not really 
effective. Safety measures are insufficient for the 
requirements. 
 
0.78 
Inadequate Some factors are out of control. Accidents are likely 
to occur frequently (incidents are continuously 
experienced). Safety measures do not fit the 
requirements. 
 
0.94 
The use of negation membership values makes possible to obtain a kind of “direct” estimate for the 
possibility of accidents occurrence, where 0 corresponds to the impossibility of occurring accidents (i.e. 
the factors are strongly adequate) and 1 corresponds to high possibility of occurrence (i.e. factors are 
inadequate). In this fashion, we are able to convey the logic of considering that “strongly adequate” 
implies very low (membership grade = 0.06) possibility of occurring accidents. Conversely, inadequate 
factors (membership grade = 0.94) are the ones that most contribute to the accident occurrence possibility. 
It is important to note if the possibility of occurrence of work accident s or the safety climate adequacy on 
site is “inadequate” it means the risk of accident is high, hence we use the negation values to express how 
the factors affecting negatively the possibility of occurrence (e.g. “low adequate” means “high” possibility 
of occurrence, hence its membership grade is 0.78 –see table 5.1).  
Another linguistic variable defined in this work is “SB-effectiveness”, used for assessing SB. To build this 
linguistic variable, the same discretization process - as for “Adequacy” - was used and the details about 
the SB-effectiveness linguist variable are shown in table 5.2 
Safety barrier types are always related to a hazard and/or an accident sequence, in a preventive and/or 
protective way. Given their diversity and their specific characteristics, their assessment cannot be 
performed based solely on specific and strictly objective criteria but should also include some qualitative 
(subjective) assessments, i.e. SB assessment should also rely on safety expert knowledge and experience 
as well as on the knowledge of the risks´ characteristics. 
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Table 5.2 – Linguistic variable “SB-Effectiveness” for assess safety barriers effectiveness 
Semantic 
term 
Meaning Membership 
grade (1-µ) 
Excellent The safety barrier is adequate, is well built and 
works effectively in a very reliable way (takes into 
account workers expected bad practices) and is 
robust. 
 
0.06 
Very good The safety barrier is adequate, is well built and 
works effectively, in a very reliable way (takes into 
account workers expected bad practices) and is 
robust, but requires umpteen resources to be 
implemented and/or maintained. 
 
 
0.21 
Good The safety barrier is adequate, is well built and 
works effectively (takes into account workers 
expected bad practices) but is intrusive or its 
robustness is not assured in some extreme events 
(e.g., fire). 
 
0.41 
Partial The safety barrier is not effective enough or there 
are doubts about its reliability (e.g. depends on 
humans in order to achieve its purpose). 
 
0.56 
Insufficient The safety barrier did not perform always as 
expected or includes shortcomings that could make 
it unreliable. 
 
0.78 
Bad The safety barrier is ineffective (do not achieve its 
purpose) or could have a counter-effect (increased 
other risks in some way or could creates new risks). 
 
0.94 
The main criteria that should be considered for SB assessment (Hollnagel, 2004 and Taylor, 1988 cited in 
Sklet, 2006) are: fitness to the purpose, fitness for usage, reliability, proper implementation, ease of 
comprehension (for symbolic barriers), knowledge of their applicability (for incorporeal barriers), 
robustness, functionality, response time, etc.  
An interesting definition of SB effectiveness is the ability (of a safety barrier) to perform a safety function 
during a period, in a non-degraded mode and in pre-specified conditions (Andersen et al., 2004). In this 
work the definition of effectiveness applied to SB has a broader scope and includes the adequacy, 
reliability, robustness and specificity in order to produce the intended (or expected) result. Hence, here the 
definition is: “effectiveness” evaluates the ability of a SB to achieve its purpose, when it is needed and 
how well it can withstand the variability of the environment and not lead to other accidents. 
Was followed the criteria and evaluation levels defined by Hollnagel (2008), about how barriers systems 
can achieve their purpose (see table 3). The set of 8 attributes according to Hollnagel (2008) are: 1) 
Efficiency, which means “how well the SB meets its intended purpose”, 2) Resources (cost), which means 
“what is needed to design, develop, implement and maintain a SB”, 3) Robustness (reliability), which 
means “how well a SB can withstand the variability of the (work) environment”, 4) Implementation delay, 
which means “the time interval from conception to implementation of a SB”, 5) Applicable to safety 
critical tasks, which means “is a proper solution to risks on critical tasks”, 6) Availability, which means 
“whether a SB can fulfill its purpose when needed”, 7) Evaluation, which means “how easy it is to 
determine whether a SB works as expected, both during design and actual use”, and 8) Independence on 
humans (during operation), which means: “the extent to which a barrier does not depends on human 
actions to achieve its purpose”. 
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It should be noted that for some types of safety barriers, not all the above criteria are relevant or necessary 
in order to describe the barrier effectiveness. Hollnagel (2008) used a linguistic scale with eleven different 
semantic terms to evaluate the SB types regarding the set of 8 attributes, just described, as shown in table 
5.3. However, it can be observed that some of the terms are similar in terms of attributes classification. 
For example: 1) “high” in criteria Efficiency is similar to both “short” in Implementation-delay and “easy” 
in Evaluation (because they represent the same concept in terms of importance or weight of safety 
barriers), 2) “medium-high” and “low-high” have similar meaning when related with Robustness and 
Availability, respectively, 3) “medium” has no similar terms, 4) “low-medium” and “medium-long” again 
express the same concept in terms of importance for Resource-needs and Implementation-delay, 
respectively and, 5) “low”, ”long” and “difficult” have the same meaning for Efficiency, Implementation-
delay and Evaluation, respectively.  
Due to the described similarity between the semantic terms for evaluating the 8 criteria of Hollnagel 
(2008), regarding the different types of safety barriers, a fuzzy approach is used to simplify the process. 
This fuzzification process implies the creation of a fuzzy membership function (Zimmerman, 1993) to 
represent the importance scale. The defined discrete fuzzy set is:  
IMPORTANCE-SCALE= [high/1, medium-high/0.8, medium/0.6, low-medium/0.4, low/0.2, 
uncertain/0]. 
The numerical values used in the membership function, took in consideration an equal division of the [0-
1] scale for the 5 discriminative linguistic terms of Hollnagel (2008). It should be noted that here it is 
assumed that “uncertain” is outside the fuzzy function (value 0) because there is no knowledge about its 
degree of belonging (i.e. it does not belong with any degree to the defined fuzzy set), while with 
probabilities this value would be 0.5.  
Using the fuzzy set “importance–scale” to evaluate each SB type it allow to determine their final 
importance/weight by using a simple averaging operator, as depicted in table 5.3. The calculation of the 
SB-Importance (i.e. weight of each safety barrier type) is the first step to estimate SB´s effectiveness; the 
remaining steps to determine the SB effectiveness are described in section 5.9. 
Table 5.3 – SB types’ evaluation, according to Hollnagel (2008) and its fuzzification 
Criteria Safety Barriers Types 
Physical 
(Ling term/ 
Membership) 
Functional 
(Ling term/ 
Membership) 
Symbolic 
(Ling term/ 
Membership) 
Incorporeal 
(Ling term/ 
Membership) 
Efficiency 
 
High/1 High/1 Medium/0.6 Low/0.2 
Resource needs Medium–
high/0.8 
Low–
medium/0.4 
Low–
medium/0.4 
Low/0.2 
Robustness Medium–
high/0.8 
Medium–
high/0.8 
Low–
medium/0.4 
Low/0.2 
Implementation delay Long/0.2 Medium–
long/0.4 
Medium/0.6 Short/1 
Applicable to safety 
critical tasks 
Low/0.2 Medium 0.6 Low/0.2 Low/0.2 
Availability High/1 Low–high/0.8 High/1 Uncertain/0 
Evaluation Easy/1 Difficult/0.2 Difficult/0.2 Difficult/0.2 
Independence on humans High/1 High/1 Low/0.2 Low/0.2 
SB-IMPORTANCE 0.75 0.65 0.45 0.27 
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It should be noted that Hollnagel (2008) evaluation included both Personal Protective Equipment’s (PPE) 
and collective protection devices in the physical type. However, these two types of equipment’s have 
significant differences regarding efficiency, availability and independence on humans – hence they should 
not have been included in the same group. The SB-effectiveness linguist variable that was proposed in 
table 5.2, takes into account this aspect (the higher rating for SBs that depends on humans in order to 
achieve its purpose is “partial”. 
5.3.  Estimating risk levels: factors aggregation  
To obtain the final estimate for occupational safety risk, it is needed the aggregation of all risk factors that 
had been rated by the analysts using the linguistic variables. First the factors pertaining to each dimension 
are aggregated - to obtain a dimension estimate - and then the four dimensions are also aggregated to 
obtain the final occupational safety risk estimation. Any aggregation of values implies using an arithmetic 
or logical operator (e.g. sum, average, maximum, multiplication etc.). 
Aggregation operations on fuzzy sets are operations by which several fuzzy sets are combined in some 
way to produce a single representative value, either fuzzy or crisp (Pedrycz and Gomide, 2007). 
However, the choice of the aggregation operator is a difficult task since it is a context-based problem. 
There is no simple rule to choose the adequate operator among the existing variety, but Zimmerman 
(1993) pointed eight important criteria that can be helpful to select the appropriate operator, namely: 
axiomatic strength, empirical fit, adaptability, numerical efficiency, compensation, range of compensation, 
aggregating behavior and required scale level of membership functions. Beliakov and Warren (2001) 
added another criterion: semantic clarity.  
In occupational safety risk assessment little is known about how the factors should be aggregated and 
most of the time a simple average - and many times misleading – is used. Since safety experts usually 
provide their perceptions about the behavior and corresponding empirical data by considering practical 
cases, in this work the aggregation operator was chosen by considering the most adequate qualities for risk 
assessment: 1) empirical fitness, 2) adaptability, and 3) semantic clarity. The reasoning used regarding 
these qualities are: 
1. Empirical fitness - The value 1 (one) corresponds to a very high risky situations (or to a factors 
that may cause these situations) and the value 0 (zero) corresponds to an absence of risk (or to a 
factors that may cause these situations); 
2. Adaptability - The aggregation of the membership degrees of the various factors should generate a 
synergistic effect (positive or negative, according to the case). For instance, for the SB it is needed 
a union operator (positive synergetic effect) to ensure that the more barriers there is less risk 
exists; 
3. Semantic clarity - The result should allow to discriminate the factors that have contributed most 
negatively to the estimated risk level. 
Hence, to choose the operator for aggregating the four risk dimensions, an initial comparative study was 
performed with intersection and union operators (min, max, multiplication and sum), which gave results 
inconsistent with the reality perceived by the experts. After, a more in-depth comparative study was done 
with parametric operators, to assess their suitability. SB dimension, due to the synergistic effect, proved to 
be the most complex. The comparative study uses nine different combinations of evaluations for the four 
types of SB as depicted in Table 5.4.  
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From the comparative study performed, the “Fuzzy-AND” (see equation 7), “Hammacher-OR” (see 
equation 9) and “Fuzzy-OR” (see equation 11) operators, seemed the most appropriate to model the reality 
of safety risk on construction sites. Next, it will be provided a brief background for the parametric 
operators compared and how the tests were performed for selecting the most suitable operators for 
QRAM. 
Next it is explained the selection of operator for aggregating the factors - for the dimension SB 
effectiveness; the other three dimensions followed the same rational. 
For SBs effectiveness, it needs an operator from the class of “Union” (OR) because it want to express a 
synergistic positive effect. A positive synergy allows expressing the added value of having more than 1 
SB type in construction sites, i.e. if we have two SB in a site their “sum/combination” should be bigger 
than their simple arithmetic sum operator. An example is: if we have two “good” SB then their 
combination should be a little better than just “good”. From the most well-known union operators we 
tested the following: “Max”, “Yager”, “Dubois&Prade”, “Hamacher-OR” and “Fuzzy–OR” (Zimmerman, 
1993). In summary, the union operator selection took in consideration the fact that having multiple SB 
behaves like a set of protective layers whose result should always be better than the worst barrier. So, 
observing table 5.4 it is clear that: 
1. The “Yager” operator does not fit because it is not sufficiently discriminative (e.g. only cases 3 
and 6 have aggregated effectiveness levels different from 1); 
2. The “Max” operator does not display any synergetic effect, i.e. it always chooses the highest 
classification achieved for all 9 cases disregarding any compensation for having more than one 
with good classification; 
3. If all the SB is “excellent” the result should be higher than the average. “Yager”, “Dubois&Prade” 
and “Hamacher-OR” operators fit this empirical knowledge (case 1=1); 
4. If all barriers are “bad”, the result should be “insufficient” but should encompass the added value 
(synergetic effect) because a set of four bad SB have a better performance than one single bad SB. 
In this case only the “Hamacher-OR” operator fit this empirical knowledge (case 3=0.22); 
5. If the four barriers are “good”, the result should be “excellent” (though somewhat less excellent 
than four “excellent”). Again only the “Hamacher-OR” operator fit the empirical knowledge (case 
4=0.96);  
6. If it has two barriers “partial” and two barriers “bad”, the result should be “good” due to the 
synergistic effect of this combination of SB working together, resulting in a “good” performance. 
In this case only the “Hamacher-OR” operator fit (case 6 = 0.69), since “Yager” results in 
“excellent” level (0.94) and the others results in “partial” level (0.41); 
7. If it have two barriers “excellent” and two barriers “bad”, the result should continue to be 
“excellent” but with a slight added reward (synergistic effect of two “excellent” SB) . “Yager” 
and “Hamacher-OR” operator fit this requirement (case 8=1); 
8. If we have one barrier “excellent” and three barriers “bad”, the result should still be “excellent” 
but with a lesser degree because the safety level decreases a little, i.e. in this case the result should 
be somewhat less excellent than the previous one (point 7). “Dubois&Prade”, “Hamacher-OR” 
and “Fuzzy-OR” operators fit this empirical knowledge and present an adequate discriminative 
effect (0.94 and 0.95 in case 9). 
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Table 5.4 – Aggregation operators comparative study results 
 SB Effectiveness Aggregation operators 
Case Physical Functional Symbolic Incorporeal Yager Dubois 
&Prade 
Hamacher
-OR 
Fuzzy-
OR 
Max 
1 Excellent 
/0.94 
Excellent 
/0.94 
Excellent 
/0.94 
Excellent 
/0.94 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.94 
2 Very good 
/0.78 
Very good 
/0.78 
Very 
good 
/0.78 
Very good 
/0.78 
1.00 0.98 1.00 0.78 0.78 
3 Bad/0.06 Bad/0.06 Bad/0.06 Bad/0.06 0.24 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.06 
4 Good/0.56 Good/0.56 Good/0.5
6 
Good/0.56 
1.00 0.70 0.96 0.56 
0.56 
5 Partial/0.4
1 
Partial/0.41 Partial/0.
41 
Partial/0.41 
1.00 0.41 0.88 0.41 0.41 
6 Partial/0.4
1 
Partial/0.41 Bad/0.06 Bad/0.06 
0.94 0.41 0.69 0.41 
0.41 
7 Good/0.56 Good/0.56 Bad/0.06 Bad/0.06 1.00 0.61 0.83 0.56 0.56 
8 Excellent 
/0.94 
Excellent 
/0.94 
Bad/0.06 Bad/0.06 
1.00 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.94 
9 Excellent 
/0.94 
Bad/0.06 Bad/0.06 Bad/0.06 
1.00 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 
From the observations made on points 1-8 above, it is clear that Hammacher union operator (Hammacher-
OR) is the one that best answers the quality criteria for SB effectiveness estimation and, consequently, it is 
the one selected for our tool.  
The aggregation operator “Fuzzy-AND” was first suggested by Werners (1984) (in Zimmerman, 1993) is 
a parametric fuzzy operator which results vary between the min operator and the arithmetic mean.  
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In QRAM this operator is used for aggregating the four dimensions, such as 
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Formally, the Hammacher-OR operator is (Zimmerman, 1993):  
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However, since we also need to incorporate the relative importance for each SB type, as described in 
section 5.3, it was selected the version with relative importance weighting, such as: 
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For the safety climate and possibility of work accident occurrence it was also chosen, for the same 
reasons, the “Fuzzy-OR” operator. 
The aggregation operator “Fuzzy-OR” first suggested by Werners (1984) (in Zimmerman, 1993) is a 
parametric fuzzy operator which results vary between the maximum operator and the arithmetic mean. 
This operator produces good results in decision environments, where empirical human decision performs 
well.  
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Or, generalized to n factors 
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This operator allows compensation between the membership values of the aggregated membership values, 
in which the parameter γ indicates the degree of nearness to one of the operators. In the boundaries of this 
operator, when 1γ =  the “Fuzzy-OR” becomes the “max” operator and for 0γ =  becomes the arithmetic 
mean (in Zimmerman, 1993). 
Concluding, in this thesis the Fuzzy-OR operator was chosen, for aggregating the risk factors in the first 
and third dimensions (safety climate and possibility), because it allows (with an appropriateγ ) 
appropriate discrimination of the most inadequate factors.  
By trial and error, with the collaboration of the safety experts were chosen the following parameter (γ ) 
values: 
Fuzzy-OR (eq. 12) - γ =0.4 (to aggregate factors from the first and third dimensions); 
Hammacher-OR (eq. 10) - γ =0.98 (to aggregate factors from the fourth dimension); 
Fuzzy-AND (eq. 8) - γ =0.4 (to aggregate the four dimensions to estimate the risk level); 
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5.4.  Insight about Qualitative Risk Assessment model results  
Usually safety practitioner’s main concern when performing RAOS is to obtain a value for the risk to rank 
the different risks. Usually they do not exploit correlations among risk-reducing opportunities, based on 
risk factors. As a result, they generally make suboptimal risk management recommendations. Cox (2009) 
stated that “priority lists do not generally produce effective risk management decisions”. 
Cox (2009) also stated that the calculation of an absolute value to rank risks is unnecessary, if the RAOS 
aim is to decide about risk acceptability and select risk-reduction measures and can distract safety 
practitioners from the main aim of the RAOS process: to decide about occupational risk acceptability and 
recommend adequate measures for risk control and management. 
So, RAOS methods should have a tool/metric by which the results of a risk analysis can be translated into 
recommendations on the risks tolerability and respective improve actions. 
QRAM follows the rational of the ALARP (As Low a level As Reasonably Practicable) framework 
(Melchers, 2001) for “decoding” the results obtained with QRAM and make them useful for the safety 
practioners to improve their sites’ safety. The ALARP principle is that “the residual risk shall be as low as 
reasonably practicable”, derived from the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, which requires "provision 
and maintenance of plant and systems of work that are, as far as is reasonably practicable, safe and 
without risks to health" (Melchers, 2001). 
The key concept in determining whether a risk is ALARP is the definition of “reasonably practicable”. 
This term was established, in the UK, by a court of law (in 1949, with the case of Edwards vs. National 
Coal Board). This determination meaning is that risks must be averted (avoided, protected or controlled by 
other adequate way) unless there is a gross disproportion between the costs and the benefits of doing so. 
The ALARP approach requires.site safety managers to demonstrate that: 1) the site is fit for its intended 
purposes, 2) the risks associated with its functioning are sufficiently low and, 3) sufficient safety and 
emergency measures have been instituted (or are proposed). At the top of ALARP framework are risks 
that are unacceptable whatever are the benefits associated with the activity. Any legal requirements that 
are not meet are always unacceptable. At the bottom are risks that are broadly acceptable and can be 
regarded as insignificant and adequately controlled. Between these two areas of risk is the tolerable 
(ALARP) region within which risks need to be reduced to “as low as reasonably practicable”.  
The region between the upper bound for tolerability, the basic safety limit (BSL), and the lower target 
level, the basic safety objective (BSO), is the so-called ALARP region (French et al., 2005). When risks 
are in the ALARP area a “dynamics” to identify best practice to decrease risk level should be created, and 
then seek to ensure that it becomes the general practice at site in order to decrease risk level to the 
acceptable region. 
So, an acceptable risk means that it does not be regarded as negligible or something that can be ignored, 
but rather as something that needs to be keeping under review and reduced still further if and when and 
how it is possible. 
ALARP limits are established by empirical knowledge; QRAM results consider 3 regions for the risk 
values obtained: acceptable (below 0.30), ALARP (between 0.30 and 0.70, including these values) and 
unacceptable (above 0.70). These three regions were determined by analysis of the QRAM features and 
expert opinions.  
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Although risk control is out of scope in this thesis (is part of risk management), the aim of risk assessment 
is to determine and implement safety barriers to lower the risk level. Hence, when evaluating existing SBs, 
or considering changes to such controls, consideration should be given to measures that reduce the 
likelihood of harm, or to measures that reduce the severity of harm, or a combination of the two. The 
following hierarchy should be applied (according to BS 8800:2004): 
1. If practicable, eliminate hazards altogether, or combat risks at source, e.g. use a safe substance 
instead of a dangerous one. 
2. If elimination is not practicable, try to reduce the risk at source, e.g. by use of low voltage 
electrical appliances; introduce machinery guards. 
3. Finally, reduce risk via procedures and safe systems of work, adopting PPE only as a last 
resource, after all other safety barriers had been considered. 
As mentioned before, to further discuss measures to reduce the risks and improve site safety is outside the 
scope of this thesis hence no more details are provided here. 
5.5. Safety Climate Adequacy: First dimension 
Budworth (1997) calls the measurement of safety climate as taking the ‘‘safety temperature’’ of a 
company. Safety Climate importance lies in facilitating or impeding the maintenance of safety barriers and 
consequently the management of safety risks, i.e., safety climate factors are not direct agents in the 
occurrence of work accidents but create the conditions for accidents happening. Neal et al. (2000) stated 
that the safety climate is a variable between organizational climate and safety performance.  
In the last dozen years, studies addressed the development of safety climate measures and supported safety 
climate relevance. For instance, Varonen and Matilla (2000) identified a structure for safety climate 
(measured by means of a questionnaire in wood-processing industry), based on: perceptions of workers; 
correlations between the safety climate and the safety practices of the company; safety level of the work 
environment; and occupational accidents. They concluded that the better the safety climate of the 
company was, the lower was the accident rate. In another study, Muniz et al. (2005) demonstrated the key 
role that company manager’s play in the promotion of employees’ safe behavior, both directly through 
their attitudes and behaviors, and indirectly by developing a safety management system. Zohar and Luria 
(2005) developed a multilevel model to appraise the safety climate, based on a multilevel-of-analysis 
which interprets safety climate as a convergent level of adjusted perceptions or appraisals of relevant 
policies, procedures and practices as indicators of desired role behavior, indicating that the organization-
level and group-level climates are globally aligned, and the effect of organization climate on safety 
behavior is fully mediated by group climate level. 
Literature on construction-industry accidents reveals that the factors influencing the incidence of accidents 
are generally similar in many countries and pointed that inadequate safety measures and poor safety 
awareness (by both workers and management) are the major reasons for the high incidence of 
occupational accidents in this industry (McVittie et al., 1997; Sawacha et al., 1999; Abdelhamid and 
Everett, 2000; Tam et al., 2004; Chi et al., 2005; Macedo and Silva, 2005; Aksorn and Hadikusumo, 
2008).  
According to Mohamed (2002) safe work behaviors (in construction) are consequence of the existing 
safety climate, which, in turn, is determined by the identified independent constructs. Likewise, Larsson 
(2005) found, that a positive safety climate and supportive psychological climate in construction industry 
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are rather important for safety. So, safety climate may provide indications of workers safety behavior, 
originating simultaneously from policy and procedural actions of top management and from supervisory 
actions exhibited by frontline supervisors. It provides a “measure” of the workforce’s perception on 
attitudes towards safety within the organizational atmosphere (at a given point in time, like the overall risk 
assessment). 
Therefore, as stated by Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) factors related to safety climate should be 
considered (and measured) on RAOS processes. This work also advocates this posture, thus safety climate 
factors are considered in QRAM. Specifically, safety climate dimension is grounded in the Safety Climate 
model of Mohamed (Mohamed, 2002), which was developed for construction sites and is based on 11 sets 
of factors: management commitment, communication, safety rules and procedures, supportive 
environment, supervisory environment, workers’ involvement, personal appreciation of risk, appraisal of 
work environment, work pressure, safe work behavior and competence. 
5.5.1.  Safety Climate Adequacy Formal Model 
The Mohamed (2002) model was adapted for the QRAM SC dimension by introducing other conclusions 
of subsequent works (namely, Mearns et al., 2004; Larsson, 2005, Zohar and Luria, 2005; Muniz et al., 
2005; Lingard et al., 2011) and empirical knowledge of six Portuguese safety expert. The adapted safety 
climate aspects rely on three aspects: workers, management and safety work environment and each one 
has its own subset of factors divided in groups. 
The expert knowledge was elicited from a pole of six Portuguese safety experts on construction, with ten 
or more years of experience, using a guided brainstorming to assess whether: a) the set of factors is 
feasible in construction industry (time spent and available data), b) usefulness of evaluate safety climate 
and, c) the chosen set of factors give a correct picture of safety climate on site. At the end of this process a 
set of safety climate factors were identified as being enough and critical. These factors are related to 
workers, to management and safety work environment and are discussed below. Figure 5.3 depicts the 
architecture of the safety climate dimension, which includes the number of factors (posed as questions) for 
each parameter to be considered in this QRAM dimension. 
The SC dimension formal model is: 
8 7 9 16 13 12 8 10 9 9
1 1 11 11 1 1 11
( , , , , , , , , , )C Or R C E P MS S C B M L CP S S P Sθ=                                                             (eq. 13) 
Where: each of the ten composing parameters are depicted with subscript and superscript indexes to 
indicate the number of factors included in each of them (1,…,n).  
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Figure 5.3. Safety Climate Adequacy 
The parameters are:  
Safety Climate factors related to workers - Workers’ involvement is an important aspect in maintaining 
safety barriers. It should include procedures for reporting incidents and potentially hazardous situations. 
Here it is considered three classes of parameters: Safety rules and procedures; Worker´s competence; and 
Safe work behavior. Each parameter includes several factors that are evaluated, as above described with 
linguistic variables and are posed as questions to the safety experts to elicit the evaluation. 
• Safety Rules and Procedures - This parameter evaluates the extent to which workers 
perceive safety rules and procedures as promoted and implemented by the organization. It 
includes eight factors (questions to be evaluated) which are shown in annex I.1. 
• Workers’ Competence – This parameter evaluates workers experience and knowledge of 
safety issues (Burke et al., 2002). It includes seven factors which are shown in annex I.2.  
• Safe Work Behavior - This parameter evaluates, by observable actions and opinions, the 
workers behavior related to safety. It includes nine factors to be evaluated which are 
shown in annex I.3. 
Safety Climate factors related to management - Management’s commitment is an important element of 
the safety climate due to its role beyond organizing and providing safety resources, policies and working 
instructions. The greater the level of management commitment toward safety is, the more positive is the 
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safety climate. This aspect includes two classes: Management commitment and Supervisory action 
towards safety. 
• Management Commitment - This parameter evaluates the role that management plays in 
promoting safety. It includes sixteen factors which are shown in annex I.4. 
• Supervisory Action Towards Safety - This parameter evaluates the ability of supervisors to 
ensure that safety rules and procedures are carried out during daily operations. It includes thirteen 
factors which are shown in annex I.5. 
Safety Climate factors related to safety environment - Environment refers to the degree of trust and 
support within a group of workers (confidence that people have in working relationships with coworkers), 
the safety planning and management (tidy and well planned sites are more likely to provide a high level of 
safety performance), the degree to which employees feel under pressure to complete the work and the 
ways of formal and informal means of communication to promote and communicate its commitment and 
issues regarding safety. It can be seen as a “measure” of general morale (Mearns et al., 2004; Muniz et al., 
2007). 
• Communication and Participation - This parameter evaluates the effectiveness of 
communication and participation efforts. It includes twelve factors, suggested by Muniz et al. 
(2007), which are shown in annex I.6. 
• Supportive Environment - This parameter evaluates the degree of trust and support within a 
group of workers, i.e. the confidence that people have in working relationships with coworkers 
and general morale. It includes eight factors which are shown in annex I.7. 
• Safety planning - This parameter evaluates the level of safety’s integration in the work planning 
to identify and control safety hazards. It includes ten factors, suggested by Mearns et al. (2004),, 
which are shown in annex I.8. 
• Work Pressure over Safety - This parameter evaluates the workers perception of valuing 
expediency over safety when working under pressure. It includes nine factors which are shown in 
annex I.9. 
• Safety Management System - This parameter evaluates the safety’s integration in the overall 
management to maintain safe conditions on site. It includes nine factors, suggested by (Mearns et 
al., 2004), which are shown in annex I.10. 
To elicit the evaluation for each composing factor (question) that define the safety climate (see eq. 13), the 
analyst, uses the “adequacy” linguistic variable choosing the grade that best suits the factor under analysis 
(see table 5.1), and then the corresponding grades are aggregated using the Fuzzy-OR operator (see eq. 
11). With this aggregation it is obtained an estimate for the safety climate adequacy. In general, if the final 
value obtained for safety climate is close to 1 (one) it corresponds to a good safety climate and a value 
close to 0 (zero) corresponds to a bad safety climate. The same logic applies to each individual parameter 
of the SC. 
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5.5.2. Dimension discussion 
Although there are several tools for assess the safety climate on construction sites, as mentioned on 
section 5.5, the QRAM model extended and systematized existing works. Further it also proposed a 
uniform evaluation scale for rating the adequacy of each factor, the linguistic variable “adequacy”, which 
facilitates the elicitation and assessment of this dimension. 
A critic to this dimension of QRAM – pointed during the evaluation tests made to the whole model (by 
some experts) - was that safety climate had too many questions and this is in line with the opinion of the 
reviewers of the paper submitted to the Safety Science journal (still in the review process). With these 
opinions the model must be reformulated and approximately 40% of the factors could be removed. In this 
chapter we show the original questionnaire because it was the one that was used to mader the QRAM 
evaluation tests (as described in the chapter 6).  
Another critic made by the experts relates with the questions “form” since some were made in the positive 
(example: are tools equipped with the appropriate and properly mounted handles?) and others in the 
negative (example: are there (on site) poorly designed handles/grips?). On future work this aspect will be 
improved by having all questions in the same positive direction, thus making the questionnaire more user-
friendly. 
5.6.  Severity Factors: Second dimension 
In RAOS, assessing risk always has an element of subjectivity. A bad judgment about a risk level will 
result in false alarms and inappropriate preventive actions or, in the worst cases, no action at all. Estimate 
the expected severity grade is an important component of judging occupational risks and in QRAM it is 
one of the four essential dimensions considered. 
The notion of severity is useful for understanding occupational risks and mitigating them. However, as 
soon as one delves deeper into the question in terms of specific cases, it becomes obvious that it is rather 
difficult to estimate the severity factors and respective severity levels because of: 1) the existing 
multiplicity of possible consequences for a given accident and, 2) the diversity of points of view regarding 
possible severity assessments (potential victims, actual victims, medical staff (physicians), workers, 
managerial staff and safety managers). The apparently simple and easily applicable notion of conducting a 
severity assessment of an accident becomes complex in practice because of the assessment's imprecision 
and strong dependence on the analyst's perception. 
How does one estimate the severity in a proactive analysis with accuracy and in a practical way, in the 
construction industry? A method to estimate the level of the expected severity of potential work accidents 
would be of undeniable value to construction companies seeking to improve their understanding of such 
events. However, because an occupational accident at a construction site could cause multiple 
consequences of highly variable severity, it is a difficult issue to model. 
To capture the multifaceted nature of work accidents consequences in the construction industry, a more 
complete approach involves simultaneous consideration of several measurement factors for the severity of 
the accidents. The measurement is no longer simple but is complex because possible correlations between 
the different factors must be taken into account, to the intricate nature of consequences severity be 
correctly addressed and not reduced to a simple juxtaposition of factors (Cuny and Lejeune, 1999). 
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Related works as Cuny and Lejeune (1999) use factors such as, number of days off work and degree of 
permanent disablement to establish precise levels on the severity scale. Gennarelli and Wodzin (2006) 
pointed out several dimensions of severity, including threat to life, mortality (theoretical, expected, and 
actual), amount of energy dissipated/absorbed, hospitalization (need for intensive care), treatment cost, 
treatment complexity, length of treatment, temporary and permanent disability, permanent impairment and 
quality of life; however, they did not establish a measurement scale. Other authors (Aneziris et al., 2008) 
proposed or used “coarse” scales to assess levels of consequence severity, namely: lethal injuries, 
nonlethal permanent injuries, and recoverable injuries. In this work, it is planned to qualitatively assess the 
occupational accident severity from predictors related to the amount of energy dissipated/absorbed that 
can be evaluated in situ, such as heights, speeds, weights, and morphology of moving vehicles, relating 
them with the biomechanical limits of the human body, pointed in several studies (Viano, 1989 cited in 
Yang, 2002; McElhaney and Myers ,1993; Prasad, 1999; Eppinger et al., 2000; Yang, 2002; Sayed et al., 
2008). 
In this work, were defined severity functions (also called fuzzification process) to allow a better express of 
the imprecise severity of work accidents. Fuzzy membership functions (Zadeh, 1965; Ross, 2004) allow 
easy normalization and uniformization of all data; therefore, they are usefull to estimate the work accident 
severity expected grade on construction sites. This fuzzification process facilitates to handling uncertainty 
when assess work accident severity, offering a user-friendly assessment method. In addition, since QRAM 
uses an overall fuzzy approach, this dimension is seamlessly integrated in the QRAM model.  
In this work, the first attempt to model work accident severity was to collect and analyze statistical data of 
the relation between factors as heights and landing surfaces with physical consequences (body fractures, 
respiratory arrest, etc.). In Portugal, we contacted five insurance companies, construction associations, and 
the statistical bulletin of the Office of Strategy and Planning; in Brazil, we contacted Fundacentro; and in 
England, we contacted the Health and Safety Executive. Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain the 
necessary data, from any of these organizations, because there are no available statistics about physical 
aspects of work accidents. 
A second attempt was to model work accident severity using the empirical knowledge of a group of safety 
experts. However, the experts disagreed about various predictors; for example, for falls, the range of 
results (for maximum severity depending on the height) varied between 1.2 and 4.0 m. The experts failed 
to agree on a commum value, and when questioned about their reasons, they failed to provide a rational 
explanation. 
Therefore, in QRAM we followed a different approach, with a four-step process, which is detailed in the 
next sub-section. 
5.6.1. Severity formal model  
In this thesis a four-step process is used to define the linguistic variables for severity of accidents 
estimation: 1) based on the literature, it was identified a list of accident modes for occupational accident 
scenarios (see section 5.1), 2) it was selected the energy of related factors considered to be important in 
evaluating the severity of each accident mode, 3) the relationships between these factors (energies) and 
human biomechanical limits are considered using physical models and, 4) all severity functions associated 
with each accident mode are determined using fuzzy sets. 
On step two, a brainstorming session, attended by two Ph.D. professors, one Ph.D. student and three M.Sc. 
students, all with research experience related to safety, was conducted. In the brainstorming session, the 
complete set of energies and other factors that could contribute to the severity of each accident mode was 
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discussed. Then, it was identified which factors were relevant, in practice, and which predictors could 
characterize them and how. 
Hence, the relationships between energy factors and severity were established by physics models, taking 
into account the biomechanical limits of human body. Then, the linguistic variables, associated with each 
accident mode, were developed. Severity linguistic variables expresses how serious a certain accident 
consequences can be, so values close to 0 corresponds to the absence of any damage (to any worker) and 
close to 1 correspond to the maximum severity.The rationale provided by BS 8800:2004 (BSI, 2004) was 
also considered to establish the meaning of the extreme harm level (severity 1): premature death or 
permanent major disability (fatal injuries, amputations, multiple injuries or serious fractures). 
Figure 5.4 depicts the linguistic variables considered in the severity dimension of the QRAM model. 
 
Figure 5.4 - Work accident’s severity 
To model the membership functions (fuzzification) for the nine accident modes it is considered the body 
parts most likely to be affected (e.g., neck), particularly in the case in which workers do not use any 
personal protective equipment. In the literature (Prasad, 1999; Eppinger et al., 2000; Chaffin et al., 2006 
and Sayed et al., 2008) there are specific models for body segments that describe the severity of the 
consequences of an impact. Hence, this work started by compiling, from the literature, a threshold of 
values for the biomechanical limits of the human body in terms of injury forces for the most common 
different affected body parts, as follows. 
Head injury criteria: There are several models for head injury criteria, and some models are more 
sophisticated than others. Some of these models use data that are hard to collect at construction sites 
(Sayed et al., 2008). In most studies, head injury severity is a function of the average head acceleration 
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and its time duration (Prasad, 1999 and Eppinger et al., 2000). For head threshold limits, we will use the 
values depicted in table 5.5, as proposed by Yang (2002). 
Table 5.5 - Head tolerances to impact loads (Yang 2002) 
Cranial bones Compression 
Force (kN) 
Frontal 3.6 – 9.0 
Zygoma 0.5 – 2.9 
Temporo-Parietal 5.0 – 12.5 
Occipital 2.0 – 4.2 
Maxilla/Mandible 0.8 – 3.4 
 
Neck Injury Criteria: In terms of peak tensile force, the limit suggested (based on available 
biomechanical data) by McElhaney and Myers (1993) is 3.1 kN. Eppinger et al (2000) pointed for tension 
forces the values of 8.216 kN (Large Sized Male – LSM) and 4.287 kN (Small Sized Female – SSF) and, 
for compression forces the values of 7.44 kN (LSM) and 3.88 kN (SSF).  
Chest Injury Criteria: Viano (1989) cited by Yang (2002) pointed for thorax lateral impact injury 
tolerances a force of 5.5 kN. 
Femur Injury Criteria: Eppinger et al. (2000) pointed forces values of 12.7 kN (LSM) and 6.8 kN (SSF). 
Tibia Injury Criteria: The maximum allowable tibia compressive force (for break) could not exceed 8 
kN (Mertz, 1993). 
Ventricular fibrillation (due to the passage of electrical current in the heart): The threshold is 40 mA, 
in AC current (by Standard IEC 479-1:1984). 
Rescue time: According to Guidelines 2000 for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency 
Cardiovascular Care (2000), the percentage of survival decreases approximately 7% to 10% with every 
minute that defibrillation is delayed, and after 10 minutes the probability of survival is almost 0. 
As mentioned previously, the fuzzification of the severity of injuries was made by considering the 9 
accident mode (see section 5.1.). 
Falls - The severity of an injury is determined by the fall height and the impact surface (Cory and Jones, 
2006). In this accident mode it is selected the neck injury because it is considered the most likely and 
serious injury that can occur.  
Were considered two factors: a) Height of fall (it determines the velocity at the impact surface) and, b) 
Type of surface (given an impact velocity, it determines the magnitude of the force exerted on the fallen 
person).  
All the physical equations referred in this section may be found in (Tipler and Mosca, 2009). 
To characterize the fall event, the impact velocity is determined using: 
2V gh=                                                                                                               (eq. 14) 
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Where g is the acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m/s²), and h is the fall height.  
The change in momentum during impact (I) is determined using the following equation: 
( 1)I mV COR= +                                                                                                     (eq. 15) 
Where m, V, and COR are, respectively, the body mass, the impact velocity, and the coefficient of 
restitution of the impact surface. The COR is a measure of the elasticity of the surface. In falls onto a 
surface with a low COR, such as sand pile, most of the energy from the fall will be dissipated, conversely, 
in falls onto surfaces with a high COR, such as concrete, most of the fall energy will be absorbed by the 
body upon impact. This energy absorption typically leads to a greater risk of injury (Thompson et al. 
2009). 
As the human body limits, proposed in literature, are in terms of force. The change in momentum 
corresponds to exert a force during a certain period of time, considering that the force exerted during the 
time of the impact is constant (this expression is an approximation because typically, the interaction forces 
during impact displays a very thin Gaussian shape and therefore a peak intensity much higher than the 
value determined for the mean force). Formally the force formula is: 
med
IF t= ∆                                                                                                              (eq. 16) 
According to Thompson et al. (2009), the impact durations ranged from 12.1 milliseconds to 27.8 
milliseconds (for young children falls), and impact durations are lower for surfaces with lower coefficients 
of restitution. Since impact durations also depend on the object deformation, in this work we consider 
impact duration of 28 milliseconds for adults. 
Thompson et al. (2009) proposed a COR of 0.39 for carpet floor, and points that this COR was found to be 
not significantly associated with injury severity. Therefore, here we consider 0.39 for sand surface (or 
similar) and 0.8 for concrete ground (or similar). 
For sand surface, if we consider a Portuguese worker average weight is 74 kg (Barroso et al., 2005) and a 
compression neck injury of 7440 N (Eppinger et al, 2000), by eq. 14, 15 and 16, it follows that: 
3 2
3
2
(7440 28 10 )7440 28 10 1.39 74 2*9.8* 0.21
(1.39 74) *2*9.8
h h h m
−
− ∗ ∗∗ ∗ = ∗ ⇒ = ⇒ =
∗
 
Unfortunately, the resulting value of 0.21m does not match the empirical expert knowledge. Likewise 
considering only the head weight (which have a value of 5.0 kg, according Thorn et col.,1998), the value 
for the drop height is 45,3 m, which also does not match the empirical knowledge, as shown: 
3 2
2
(7440 28 10 ) 45.3
(1.39 5) *2*9.8
h h m
−∗ ∗
= ⇒ =
∗
 
Chafin et al (2006) refer head, neck and trunk as the main body segment and point to weight value of 
31.22 kg for a 5% percentile male. Using this data, the h is 1.16 m.  
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The problem of concordance with the empirical knowledge may be related to the estimated time of impact. 
Thompson's article (2009) is not clear about the indicators used to estimate the collision times and we 
assumed they were for an adult. 
The fall height is defined as the distance from the body’s center of mass at the start of the fall to the 
ground. The center of mass, in the sagittal plan, is at a point equivalent to 57% of the height for males and 
55% for females (Knudson, 2007). The average Portuguese worker (male) height is 1.69 m (Barroso et al., 
2005), so the body mass center is at a height of 0.96 m.  
Hence, in this thesis it is assumed that the fall height limit -calculated from the surface where the feet 
stands - is 0.20m (20 cm), which corresponds to a severity level of 1. For concrete surface, we assume that 
any height fall is always dangerous so severity limit 1 is considered for any fall greater than 0 cm. After 
all the above considerations, we propose a linguistic variable for neck injuries, denoted severity_falls-
height (see fig. 5.5) with two labels, Severity_falls = [Sand-surface, Concrete_surface], where each label 
is represented by the following membership functions (Figure 5.5 depicts this linguistic variable): 
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Figure 5.5 - Linguistic variable Severity_falls 
There are some limitations on this falls accident severity template. The mass center of the human body can 
move around because joints allow the masses of body segments to move. Whereby, the change in 
momentum during impact was measured at the center of mass, so the change in momentum is difficult to 
determine accurately.  
Safety experts agree, based on their experiences, that thebody point of contact is crucial to the accident 
severity; for example, when the worker hits with the back, severity is always greater (compared with other 
similar falls in height and surface), because is a helpless fall (worker cant use the arms to cushion the fall). 
Contact surface could also be important, especially in small falls, and obviously the severity may be 
different if the impact is on corners or sharp edges or iron points. 
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There are several other factors that could contribute to this type of injury, namely: initial body position, 
fall dynamics, body mass and age. However, in this work these were not considered due to the reasons 
given in 5.6.2. 
Contact with electricity - For this representation we consider two factors: a) Level of voltage, and b) 
work environment Humidity. 
The severity of electrical injuries can vary widely, from an unpleasant tingling sensation, caused by low-
intensity current to thermal burns, cardiopulmonary arrest, and death. Thermal burns may result from 
burning clothing that is in contact with the skin or from electric current traversing a portion of the body. 
When current transverses the body, thermal burns may be present at the points where the current entered 
and exited the body and crosses internally along its pathway. Cardiopulmonary arrest is the primary cause 
of immediate death due to electrocution (Cooper, 1995). Cardiac arrhythmias, including: ventricular 
fibrillation, ventricular asystole, and ventricular tachycardia that progresses to ventricular fibrillation, may 
result from exposure to low or high-voltage current. Respiratory arrest may result from electrical injury to 
the respiratory center in the brain or from tetanic contractions or paralysis of respiratory muscles (Browne 
and Gaasch, 1992). 
In this work, because ventricular fibrillation is the most drastic physiological effect due to the lack of 
human body resilience, it was used as a criterion to model the severity. As predictor, we use the tension 
value, in volts. As in the others accident modes, we consider that there are no protection devices. 
The standard IEC 479-1:1984, states that the value of 40 mA (AC current) for the threshold of ventricular 
fibrillation (is the lower limit of current likely to cause the heart to cease functioning correctly, which is 
not a single value of current, but varies with its duration), for transit times shorter than 3 s and a 
probability exceeding 50% for currents of 90 mA for passage times above 5 s. 
The IEC 479-1:1984 standard, also states that the impedance of the human body is voltage dependent 
(varies inversely as a function of the voltage applied) and path dependent (varies depending on the current 
path through the human body), so it depends on the current path through the human body.  
However, IEEE Std 80:1986, pointed to other important variables such as: human mass body and Soil 
Resistivity. The IEC 479-1 safety criteria are rather complexes while the safety criteria of IEEE Std 80 are 
simplified and addresses more relevant practical factors. Given the fact that the safety criteria include 
comfortable safety margins, one can conclude that the simplicity of IEEE Std 80 does not compromise 
safety, so its criteria was followed in this work. 
According to information provided by REN (2011), in Portugal the value of soil resistivity varies with 
geographical location and with the seasons, however it can be considered 100 (Ωm) as the average value. 
Using a conservative criteria about shock duration, it was choosen the value of 189.6 V as a voltage limit 
to reach maximum severity, according with the permissible touch voltages per IEEE Std 80:1986, 
considering a 50 kg human body and a probability for ventricular fibrillation of 0.5%. 
In accordance with IEC 479-1standard, moisture (normal water) lowers the impedance values of the 
human body by 10% to 25%. By conservative criteria we assume 25% and considering that the other 
factors remains, by Ohm's Law, in wet environments the maximum voltage decreases 25%, from 189.6 V 
to 142.2 V.  
Finally, the linguistic variable with two labels, Severity_contact-electricity= (Dry_environment, Wet-
environment) was proposed (see fig. 5.6), which is represented by the following membership functions: 
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Figure 5.6.- Linguistic variable Severity_contact-electricity 
There are some limitations on this accident mode severity template. For ventricular fibrillation as a 
severity criterion, rescue time can be an important predictor, however, it was not consider due to the 
practical difficulty of evaluating this factor because it is impossible to predict the time-delay for the 
arriving of a defibrillator. 
Struck by moving vehicle - For this accident mode were considered the factors proposed by Mizuno and 
Kajzer (1999): a) Vehicle speed and mass (it determines the energy impact at human body); b) Vehicle 
design (vehicle geometry). 
It should be pointed that to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies relating to being struck by 
moving vehicles on construction sites, so data from road accidents studies were extrapolated. 
The vehicle geometry is very important to determine the accident severity. The study by Lefler and Gabler 
(2004) pointed that, given an impact speed, the probability of serious head and thoracic injury is 
substantially greater when the striking vehicle is an LTV (light transport vehicle) rather than a 
conventional car. The vehicle geometrydetermines the probable zone of human body contact: lower limbs, 
main body or head (including neck). Another study developed by Ballesteros et al. (2004), pointed that 
pedestrians hit by SUVs and pick-up trucks were more likely to have more severe injuries (compared to 
conventional cars) but the increase in danger may be explained primarily by larger vehicle weights and 
faster vehicle speeds. Regardless of vehicle weight, pedestrians struck at slower speeds by SUVs, pick-
ups, and vans incurred in a rate of brain, thoracic, and abdominal injuries twice that of those struck by 
conventional cars, which indicates that vehicle design surely contributes to accident severity. 
Considering that at the moment of impact the worker is stopped (otherwise, it just needs to add W Wm V  on 
the right side of the eq. 20) and also considering that the collision is perfectly inelastic (i.e., after the 
collision vehicle and worker go together), it follows that: 
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( )( )w v w v v vm m V m V++ =                                                                                            (eq. 20) 
Where Wm  is the worker mass, Vm is the vehicle mass and VV  is the vehicle speed. Now, considering that 
( )w vV +  is the (scalar) velocity of the whole worker + vehicle, it follows that: 
( )
V
w v V
W V
mV V
m m+
=
+
                                                                                                (eq. 21) 
Further, the change in momentum during impact (on the worker body) is determined by: 
( )W w vM m V += ∆                                                                                                        (eq. 22) 
However, since the human body limits established in literature are in terms of force (Viano, 1989 cited in 
Yang, 2002; McElhaney and Myers, 1993; Prasad, 1999; Eppinger et al., 2000; Yang, 2002; Sayed et al., 
2008), the change in momentum (I) corresponds to exert a force (eq. 16) during a certain period of time   
( med IF t= ∆ ) 
For a Skid Steer Loader with a 3348 kg of mass (manufacturer's manual) and assuming that this machine 
geometry is similar to a conventional car where the impact mainly affects the lower limbs. Considering, 
again, the impact duration of 28 milliseconds, the Tibia Injury Criteria (Mertz, 1993) of 8 kN and for an 
average weight Portuguese worker of 74 kg (Barroso et al., 2005), by equations 16, 21 and 22, the 
maximum vehicle speed is 3.08 m/s (11.09 km/h). 
For a hydraulic excavator, with a 21860 kg of mass, assuming that this machine geometry is similar to a 
SUV and the chest injury criteria is 5.5 kN, the maximum vehicle speed is 2.08 m/s (7.49 km/h). 
Finally, the linguistic variable with two labels, Severity_ struck-by-moving-vehicle = (Skid Steer Loader, 
Hydraulic Excavator), was proposed (see fig. 5.7), which is represented by the following membership 
functions:  
Skid Steer Loader =
0.09 , 0 11.08
1, 11.08
x x
x
≤ ≤
 >
                                       (eq. 23) 
Hydraulic Excavator = 
0.13 , 0 7.49
1, 7.49
x x
x
≤ ≤
 >
                                    (eq. 24) 
The main limitation of the presented template is that the vehicle stiffness is not considered since on 
construction sites most vehicles have hard surfaces (do not allow surface deformation). 
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Figure 5.7.- Linguistic variable Severity_ struck-by-moving-vehicle 
Injured by falling/dropped/collapsing object/person/wall/vehicle/crane which is falling under 
gravity - For modeling this accident mode it was considered two parameters: a) Height of fall (it 
determines the velocity at impact surface); b) Object mass (together with the velocity determines the 
energy impact); 
In case of falling objects, the most exposed body part is the head. The object most commonly used on 
construction sites, in Portugal, is the brick 11 (made of clay and measures 30x20x11), with a mass of 
4,5Kg (manufacturer's data). So, to characterize the fall event, the impact velocity was determined using 
equation 14 ( 2BV gh= ) 
Due to the principle of conservation of momentum and considering that the collision is perfectly inelastic, 
ie, during the collision brick and worker’s head go together, it follows that: 
( )( )B H h b B B H Hm m V m V m V++ = +                                                                           (eq. 25) 
Where Bm  is the brick mass, BV  is the brick velocity, Hm is the head mass, HV  is the head velocity and 
( )h bV +  is the (scalar) velocity of the whole head + brick. 
Thorn et col. (1998) present a head form table listing weights, shapes and sizes of skulls, here we choose 
the DOT Medium with circumference of 56cm and a mass of 5.0 kg. From (14) and (25) it follows that: 
( ) 2.09h bV h+ =    /m s                                                                                         (eq. 26) 
and the change in momentum during impact (I),on the head, is determined by: 
( )H h bI m V += ∆                                                                                                       (eq. 27) 
10.45I h=  . /N m s  
The average force applied on the head was determined using equation 16 ( med IF t= ∆  )     
Where: t∆  is the contact time duration between the brick and the head (deceleration time), such as 
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( )h b
xt
V +
∆
∆ =                                                                                                            (eq. 28) 
Where: x∆  is the elastic absorption of the skull bones (it was consider 5mm – extrapolated from 
Gennarelli,1984) 
Hence the force for this case is: 0.00436medF h=                                                 (eq. 29) 
In a vertical object fall the head bones most likely to be hit are the frontal and the parietal. Considering the 
average values pointed for tolerances to impact loads, Yang (2002) pointed thebreak forces values of 6.3 
kN for the frontal bone and 8.75 for the parietal bone. Choosing the smallest value the severity reaches the 
maximum for a fall at 1.44 m height (and for an object with 4.5 kg mass). 
The most widely used tools on construction sites are hammers and flat chisels. Considering a claw 
hammer with a mass of 800g, for the frontal bone biomechanical limit of 6.3 kN (Yang, 2002), the 
severity will reach the maximum for a hammer fall from 16.9 m height. 
Finally, the linguistic variable with two labels, Severity_ injured-by falling/dropped/collapsing 
object/person/wall/vehicle/crane = (Brick 11, Claw hammer), was proposed (see fig. 5.8), which is 
represented by the following membership functions:  
Brick 11 =          
0.69 , 0 1.44
1, 1.44
x x
x
≤ ≤
 >
                                                    (eq. 30) 
Claw hammer = 
0.06 , 0 16.9
1, 16.9
x x
x
≤ ≤
 >
                                                     (eq. 31) 
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Figure 5.8 - Linguistic variable Severity_ injured-by-falling/dropped/ 
collapsing object/person/wall/vehicle/crane which is falling under gravity 
The main limitation of this template is that the object stiffness is not considered because on construction 
sites almost all objects (that may fall) have hard surfaces (do not allow surface deformation). The object 
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geometry (e.g.: corners or sharp edges) was also not considered because on a fall it’s not possible to 
accurately estimate which object hedge will hit the worker. 
Cave-ins - For modeling Cave-ins it was considered that the rescue time as the overrinding factor, because 
the life of an injured worker, who is deprived of air, depends on the rescue celerity. 
According the Guidelines 2000 for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular Care 
(2000), the percentage of survival decreases approximately 7% to 10% with every minute that 
defibrillation is delayed and, after 10 minutes, the probability of survival is almost 0. In this work (see fig. 
5.9) it was proposed a fuzzy set, Severity_cave-ins = (Rescue time) represented by the following 
membership function: 
Rescue time =
0.1 , 0 10
1, 10
x x
x
≤ ≤
 >
                                                            (eq. 32) 
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Figure 5.9 - Fuzzy set Severity_cave-ins (rescue time) 
The main limitation for this template is the soil typehas not been considered (e.g.: soft or with rock 
blocks), but it is difficult to establish a relationship between soil type and the occupational accident 
severity. In the literature search, was not found any mention about this subject and safety experts do not 
agreed to relate the soil type as a determining factor in cave-in severity because, for example, if a rocky 
soil may cause more serious injuries can also create channels or air bags that maintain the life of the 
victim. 
Hit by rolling/sliding object or person - For the modeling this accident it was considered two factors: a) 
Object mass and velocity (determines the energy impact) and, b) Object geometry (e.g.: corners or sharp 
edges). 
In construction sites this accident mode commonly happens due to release of stones from slopes. 
A stone, sliding from a slope with an angle of θ  and considering that there is no friction (is difficult to 
estimate because the friction depends on soil type, soil moisture, shape and surface of the stone…), hits 
the victim with a force: 
. .F m g senθ=                                                                                                            (eq.33) 
Where g is the acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m/s²), m is the object mass and θ  is the slope angle.  
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A small/medium stone (until 1000 kg) has no large volume and most likely it will reach the victim's legs, 
so it was used a Tibia Injury criteria value of 8 kN (Mertz, 1993). From equation 33,, a spheroid stone, 
sliding from a slope with an angle of 70.0 degrees, with a mass weight of 868.7 kg (or more) can crack the 
tibia worker. 
Another example is been hit by a rolling boom of a hydraulic excavator. A boom of a hydraulic excavator 
hits the victim with a “force”: 
.P I α=                                                                                                                  (eq. 34) 
Where I is the moment of inertia (it depends on the geometry of the rolling object) and α  is the angular 
acceleration.  
The boom moment of inertia, considering as a thin bar – (a bar whose length is much larger than the 
diameter), whose axis of rotation is at one end, could be calculated, approximately, by: 
21 .
3
I M L=                                                                                                            (eq. 35) 
Where: M is the boom mass and L the boom range.  
For a hydraulic excavator, with a boom mass of 5820 kg and a boom range of 9 meters (at 1.2 m height)., 
At a 1.2 m height, the body part that can be hit is the chest. Thorax lateral impact injury tolerance has a 
force of 5.5 kN according Viano (1989) cited by Yang (2002). So, the maximum α is 0.035 rad. 2s−  
corresponding to a linear acceleration at the boom tip of 0.315 2.m s− . 
For a backhoe loader with a boom mass of 2547 kg and a boom range is 4.5 meters (at 1.2 m height), the 
maximum α is 0.21 2s−  corresponding to a linear acceleration at the boom tip is 0.96 2.m s− . 
In sites with small spaces and blind spots, there is a strong possibility of collisions between workers. 
Considering a frontal shock between two workers, the change in momentum during impact (I) is 
determined by : 
1 1 2 2* *w w w wI m V m V= +                                                                                (eq. 36) 
The value for the mean force is determined by equation 16 ( med IF t= ∆ ). 
Considering a frontal shock between two workers with 74 kg of body mass (mean weight Portuguese 
workers according Barroso et al. (2005)), moving at a speed of 1.4 m/s and that both are moving in 
opposite directions and in view of an impact duration of 28 milliseconds. For neck injury criteria of 7440 
N according to Eppinger et. al (2000): 
3
1 2 1 27440 28 10 74* 74* 2,81w w w wV V V V
−∗ ∗ = + ⇒ = +                                        (eq. 37) 
The linguistic variables Severity_ hit by rolling/sliding object or person: tibia/Sliding stone, Neck/( 
Hydraulic excavator, Backhoe loader) and Collision between workers was proposed (see figs. 5.10, 5.11 
and 5.12), which is represented by the following membership functions:: 
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A. related with Tibia (Figure 5.11): 
Sliding stone =                                 
0.00115 , 0 868.7
1, 868.7
x x
x
≤ ≤
 >
              (eq. 38) 
B. related with neck (Figure 5.10): 
Rolling object Hydraulic excavator =
3.17 , 0 0.315
1, 0.315
x x
x
≤ ≤
 >
             (eq. 39) 
Rolling object Backhoe loader =       
1.04 , 0 0.96
1, 0.96
x x
x
≤ ≤
 >
            (eq. 40) 
C. Collision between workers (Figure 5.12):  
Collision between workers=               
2.81 , 0 0.356
1, 0.356
x x
x
≤ ≤
 >
         (eq. 41) 
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Figure 5.10 - Linguistic variable Severity_hit for neck/(Rolling object Hydraulic excavator,  
Rolling object Backhoe loader) 
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Figure 5.11 - Linguistic variable Severity_hit-for tibia/Sliding stone 
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Figure 5.12 - Linguistic variable Severity_hit for workers-collision 
Contact with machinery moving parts (any injury type) - In this accident mode it was not 
distinguished any type of injury physical part because they are all equally severe, depending on the 
machine type, power and category. It also includes hand held tools operated by the worker. For the 
modeling it is considered two main factors: a) machine category: b) machine power. 
Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 determines a set of 
particularly dangerous machines categories, namely: a) circular saws (single- or multi-blade) for working 
with wood and material with similar physical characteristics or for working with meat and material with 
similar physical characteristics, of the following types: b) sawing machinery with fixed blade(s) during 
cutting, having a fixed bed or support with manual feed of the work piece or with a demountable power 
feed; c) sawing machinery with fixed blade(s) during cutting, having a manually operated reciprocating 
saw-bench or carriage; d) sawing machinery with fixed blade(s) during cutting, having a built-in 
mechanical feed device for the work pieces, with manual loading and/or unloading and; e)sawing 
machinery with movable blade(s) during cutting, having mechanical movement of the blade, with manual 
loading and/or unloading.  
For all these categories of machinery, in QRAM the severity should be considered as the maximum (equal 
to 1). For other machine types, the analyst must estimate the severity based on the body part that is likely 
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to be affected, the type of injury that could be produced and the machine power. In summary, this factor in 
the QRAM model is usually evaluated with severity 1 but when more information is available it is 
possible to tune this parameter. 
Lost buoyancy in water - The outcome following a drowning depends on the duration of the submersion, 
the water temperature, and how promptly CPR is started. Case reports have documented intact neurologic 
survival in small children following prolonged submersion in icy waters (Suominen et al., 2002). For 
modeling this parameter it was considered the rescue time, because the life of an injured person who is 
deprived of air depends on it. 
Based on survival rates rescue time (Guidelines 2000 for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency 
Cardiovascular Care, 2000), the same fuzzy set, depicted on Fig. 5.9 (Severity_cave-ins = (Rescue time)) 
should be used. 
A limitation in this template is that the water temperature was not considered because in countries with 
moderate climate, like Portugal, there are no icy temperatures. Another limitation is that in waters with 
high currents, the current can complicate and increase the rescue time because it moves the location of the 
victim, but no data about this could be found. 
Fire and Explosion (any injury type) - Regarding this factor the QRAM considers always a maximum 
severity because: 1) the found models are not related with specific accidents or injuries, e.g. Pennes’ 
equation and thermal wave model of bio heat transfer – TWMBT (Liu et col., 1999), and 2) factors such 
as temperature of skin surface, activation energy, thickness of tissue… are almost impossible to estimate 
due to its variation (human, geographical and climatic). 
Also, for explosions there was no suitable data found and the pole of safety experts suggested to always 
expect the maximum severity (equal to 1) for any explosion. In cases where there are no hazardous places 
belonging to the zones with frequency and duration of the occurrence of an explosive atmosphere 
determined by the Directive 99/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
1999, the severity assessment should be made based on safety analyst knowledge and perception. 
5.6.2. Dimension discussion 
From the literature survey, there is very few data referring to severity of occupational accidents on 
construction sites, which is the scope of this work. So it was necessary to extrapolate data from other 
areas, namely, traffic accidents and home child accidents, to surrogate for the adult male human body 
response. This might bring model limitations that were not yet determined. Moreover, QRAM considered 
the maximum severity for certain cases, e.g. skull fracture and tibia fracture but in (empirical experts’ 
knowledge), there are cases where a skull fracture had a more rapid recovery than a tibia fracture (perhaps 
because the medical staff pay much more attention to critical cases).  
There are some other influencing factors not considered in the severity dimension of QRAM because, in 
practice, they were not significant to improve safety and some can even raise ethical questions (to assess 
and manage). The main parameters not consider in this dimension of QRAM are: 
1. The BMI score, because in practice, its management is difficult and raise ethical questions (it 
is not acceptable, by social and ethical reasons, to choose (and/or exclude) workers by their 
BMI score); 
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2. The impact angle, because in practice, be difficult to accurately estimate (which, in some 
cases will determine if the applied force is compressive or tensile, or in other cases, will 
determine the bending moment or the shear force, in long bones); 
3. The movement kinematics, because in practice, be difficult to accurately estimate (e.g., in a 
fall from height is difficult to estimate in advance the area of the body which will be 
impacted); 
4. The worker gender, because in Portugal, the working population on construction sites is 
overwhelmingly male; 
5. The worker age, because in practice, its management is difficult and raises ethical questions 
(due to social and ethical reasons it is not acceptable prohibit people above a certain age to 
work); 
6. The worker physical fitness, because due to social and ethical reasons it is not acceptable to 
choose workers by their physical fitness); 
7. The hour (of the day) that accident happens. According to López et al. (2011), the severity of 
occupational accidents suffered by construction workers, in Spain, at the interval of time 
between 13:00 and 17:00 has incomprehensibly high rates of severe and fatal accidents. 
However, in practice it’s impossible to accurately estimate the time that the accident will 
occur.  
8. Regarding the shape of severity curves, the lack of knowledge about the severity evolution 
due to the increase of energy involved in work accidents, it was chosen the simplest shape that 
is a straight line. 
5.7.  Possibility Factors: Third dimension 
RAOS methods must also estimate the possibility of the occurrence of work accidents since it is an 
essential component of the overall occupational risk.  
The notion of the possibility of occurrence of work accidents seems very clear and extremely useful to 
understand occupational risks and hence mitigate them. But, as soon as one digs into specific cases, it 
transpires that the concept application becomes a complex task. Complexity derives from the multiplicity 
of possible combinations of precursors and immediate factors for a given accident mode due to the 
diversity of equipment’s, materials, worker’s personal characteristics (age, training, experience, etc.), 
work organization, organization of safety culture, leadership, etc... 
Phimister et al. (2004) and Wu et al. (2010) defined: a) precursors factors as signs that always seem to 
precede the accidents caused by occupational safety hazard on construction sites and; b) immediate factors 
as the failure in the interaction between the work team, workplace, equipment and materials, which are 
important exacerbating factors of accidents on construction sites. Differences between precursors and 
immediate factors lie essentially on time constraints. Immediate factors always have a short period for 
taking preventive actions, while precursors allow taking early preventive measures (Phimister et al., 
2004). Precursor factors consist not only of factors related with workers, environment, equipment and 
material but, also, in their mutual interactions.  
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On this demension, the focus was to define a model for estimate the degree of the possibility of occurrence 
of accidents and identifie the chain of factor linking the hazard to the accident. This information would be 
of undeniable value to organizations seeking to improve their understanding of the complexity of work 
accident to prevent them. The possibility estimation implies the determination, based on the “adequacy” 
(or inadequacy) of several factors, as described in the next sub-section. 
5.7.1. Possibility Formal Model 
Since each accident mode may be caused by a specific set of factors, the extent of these factors represent 
the evaluation of the work situation, under analysis and determine the greater or lesser possibility of 
occurring work accidents. The considered factors for assessing the possibility of accident occurrence were 
mainly obtained from the MOSH Checklist for Self-Inspection (2011) and was improved with knowledge 
elicited from the pole of six safety experts. In the annexes I.11 to I.19 are presented the prepared checklist 
of questions with the identified the possibility factors, that will serve as the basis for the dimension 
evaluation and respective rating. Moreover, since the factors are viewed by accident mode, figure 5.13 
shows how many factors were considered in this QRAM model dimension, since each question 
corresponds to one factor. Each question of the checklist will be answered by the safety expert using the 
linguistic variable “Adequacy” (see table 5.1) to rating the adequacy of each factor is. (i.e. the safety 
analist will rate each question using one of the six terms, from strongly adequate to inadequate, that are 
described on table 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.13.- Work accident’s possibility 
After the rating process, the factors are aggregated with the “Fuzzy-OR” operator (see eq. 12). 
Formally, the mathematical expressions that will be considered per each accident mode for the possibility 
of work accident occurrence are depicted in table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6 - Possibility Factors for each accident mode 
 
Possibility factors affecting Falls (F) - The evaluation and rating of the 76 questions, which are shown in 
annex I.11, allow to assessing the factors that contribute to the possibility of work accidents by fall, 
including falls on the same level and numerous other types of falls from heights (from ladders, roofs, 
moveable platforms, etc. 
Possibility factors affecting contact with electricity (E) - The evaluation and rating of the 32 questions, 
which are shown in annex I.12, allow to assessing the factors that contribute to the possibility of work 
accidents by contact with electricity. 
Possibility factors affecting struck by moving vehicle (S) - The evaluation and rating of the 36 
questions, which are shown in annex I.13, allow to assessing the factors that contribute to the possibility 
of work accidents by struck by moving vehicle. 
Possibility factors affecting injured by falling/swinging objects (Fo) - The evaluation and rating of the 
48 questions, which are shown in annex I.14, allow to assessing the factors that contribute to the 
possibility of work accidents by injured by falling/swinging objects, including persons, dropped or 
collapsing objects (such as: walls, vehicles, cranes, etc.).  
Possibility factors affecting Cave-ins (Ci) - The evaluation and rating of the 16 questions, which are 
shown in annex I.15, allow to assessing the factors that contribute to the possibility of work accidents by 
cave-ins either extension or ditch. 
Possibility factors affecting Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden 
movement) (H) - The evaluation and rating of the 33 questions, which are shown in annex I.16, allow to 
assessing the factors that contribute to the possibility of work accidents by hit by rolling/sliding object or 
person (including awkward or sudden movement). 
Possibility factors affecting Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped 
between objects) (M) - The evaluation and rating of the 50 questions, which are shown in annex I.17, 
allow to assessing the factors that contribute to the possibility of work accidents by contact with 
machinery or work equipment moving parts (including trapped between objects).  
Possibility factors affecting Lost buoyancy in water due to the activity (LW) - The evaluation and 
rating of the 13 questions, which are shown in annex I.18, allow to assessing the factors that contribute to 
the possibility of work accidents by lost buoyancy in water.  
Possibility factors affecting Fire or explosion (including confined spaces) (FE) - The evaluation and 
rating of the 22 questions, which are shown in annex I.19, allow to assessing the factors that contribute to 
the possibility of work accidents by fire or explosion (including work on confined spaces).  
1...76F or fAP F fθ= =  1...32E or eAP E eθ= =  1...36S or sAP S sθ= =  
1...48Fo or rAP Fo rθ= =  1...16Ci or iAP Ci iθ= =  1...33H or hAP H hθ= =  
1...50M or mAP M mθ= =  1...13LW or yAP Fe yθ= =  1...22FE or zAP FE zθ= =  
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5.7.2. Dimension discussion 
The possibility of work accident dimension model supports the analysts in expressing their subjectivity in 
assessing occupational accidents possibility of occurrence, through the use of the defined checklist and the 
use of the linguistic variable “Adequacy”. The aim is to determine the greater or lesser possibility of each 
factor to contribute to the occurrence of an occupational accident and thus contributing to advances in 
determining the quality of the overall occupational risk assessment. 
There are some other factors that may increase the risk of accidents, which are not considered in the 
Possibility dimension because we only selected the ones, directly affecting the possibility of occupational 
accidents and that may be assessed directly on-site. Obviously QRAM is a work-in-progress but its 
versatility makes the task of adding more factors rather simple. For instance, body weight influences 
postural stability, and is an important risk factor for falling occupational accidents (Gauchard et al., 2003; 
Hue et al. 2007). Psychotropic medications are associated with an increased risk of falls among the elderly 
(Ray, 1992; Landi et al., 2005), both psychotropic drugs and excessive alcohol consumption increase the 
risk of occupational and traffic accidents (Mura et al., 2003). Disabilities, especially physical, sensory and 
cognitive disabilities, carry a high risk for occupational (specially falls) accidents (Zwerling et al., 1997; 
Zwerling et al., 1998; Chau et al., 2004 a,b).  
Besides the described works there are many other important studies and identified factors that may affect 
the possibility of occupational accident occurrence, such as: age, training, temporal factors, shiftwork, 
fatigue and sleepiness, temporary employment, foreign contractors, foreignemployees and workers 
performing tasks that were not a usual job requirement (Hertz and Emmett, 1986, Hallsten, 1990, Jimeno 
and Toharia 1993, 1996, Dinges, 1995, Spurgeon et al. 1997, Nag and Patel 1998, Hamermesh 1999, Chau 
et al., 2004 a,b), Nakata et al., 2006, Fabiano et al. 2008, Khlat et al. 2008, Williamson et al., 2011). In 
summary, most of the factors just described, were not considered in this work for two main reasons: a) 
some characteristics of the construction make it impossible to have proactive data that can be used in their 
evaluation and, b) other management factors, such as, age, disabilities, alcohol and drugs consumption, 
smoking, etc., could pose ethical issues. 
Two important issues need further research to improve this dimension. It was assumed that all factors are 
independent of each other and that all have the same importance (weight) however, in real world, this is 
not the case and these are open issues to be investigated in the future. 
5.8. Safety barriers Effectiveness: the forth dimension 
As mentioned before, RAOS methods aims to produce guidance how to reduce risks of work accidents 
(and incidents) either by eliminating hazards, preventing initiating events, and/or protecting against 
unwanted events (accidents).  
In the construction industry, prevention and protection usually involve the use of some sort of barriers. 
Prevention consists on blocking or hampering initiating factors from triggering or contributing to an 
accident. Protection consists on blocking or hindering accident´s consequences severity. 
Prevention and protection can be accomplished by using the following four types of barrier systems, 
namely: physical, functional, symbolic and incorporeal, either individually or, in a more reliable way, in 
combination (Hollnagel 2008). Protection involves the use of either physical or functional barrier systems 
(Duijm et al., 2003). Prevention is preferable to protection, in other words, risks should be reduced by 
reducing their frequency of occurrence other than by mitigation actions (Dianus and Fiévez, 2006). 
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Although some kind of safety barriers have been used since the origins of our species (Sklet, 2006) to 
protect humans and property from enemies and natural hazards (e.g. floods, fires) there is no 
commonly/general accepted definition for them. Different authors (Johnson, 1980; Svenson, 1991; 
Kecklund et al., 1996; Ringdahl, 2003; Sklet, 2006; EC, 2006; Hollnagel, 2004, 2008) use different terms 
with similar meanings, such as: barrier, safety barrier, defense, safety defense, protection barrier, 
protection layer, safety critical element, safety function or safety system. Without a clear definition and 
delimitation of the concept, a safety barrier could be any physical entity, any technical aspect (e.g. 
hardware component) or even any procedural or organizational element of the work environment, which 
aims to avoid, prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events such as work accidents and incidents. 
Moreover, European regulations and International standards (EC, 1996; IEC, 1998, 2002; ISO, 1999, 
2000) enhance the importance of considering safety barriers to reduce the risk of accidents. Reason (1990) 
stated that most of the accidents are due to a combination of an unexpected event with a dysfunctional or 
missing barrier, rather than to a single initiating action. 
To ensure adequate levels of occupational safety by preventing work accidents or minimizing their 
consequences, it is first of all necessary to identify all involved risks and its characteristics. Any SB design 
should only be attempted after completing the occupational risk assessment process thus ensuring its 
adequacy by function specificity. Guldenmund et al. (2006) stated that each SB has to be designed (or 
ordered) according to particular specifications and must be built or delivered including installation and 
adjusted for use. Even for checking the performance of existing SB it needs to know, in detail, the 
characteristics of the risks that intend to be reduced. 
As referred before, another point to consider is that when dealing with vague and/or imprecise knowledge 
or concepts, like effectiveness, adequacy, efficiency or performance, this cannot be accurately estimated 
by probabilities so a more realistic approach may be used. Fuzzy variables with linguistic semantic terms, 
as discussed in the section 5.2 seem to be a more adequated mathematical framework.  
In general, a barrier is any obstacle that obstructs the access, the progress or the spread of something. A 
common definition of safety barrier is an obstacle (physical barrier), which function is to protect 
vulnerable targets (e.g. humans, environment, objects…) from hazards (e.g. dangerous energy) (Haddon, 
1973, 1980; Kaplan, 1990). Later, this concept was extended to a “defense in depth” (Hollnagel, 1999); 
meaning a set of barriers (barrier system), located along the chain between hazards and possible accidents 
(or unwanted events), where each one (barrier element) is not sufficient to protect the target from the 
hazard, but working as a whole they can. 
The term “defense barrier” was defined by Reason (1997) as ‘‘the various means by which the goals of 
ensuring the safety of people and assets can be achieved”. The same author divided defenses in ‘‘hard 
defenses”, such as physical barriers and alarms, and ‘‘soft defenses” such as regulation, procedures, and 
training and refers to defense-in-depth as ‘‘successive layers of protection”. Comparing with other similar 
terms, such as: safety barrier, protection barrier or protection layer, defense concept has a wider range.  
Accident investigations highlight the influence that management has on safety barriers effective operation. 
For example, MTO-analysis (Human, Technology, and Organization) applied in accident investigations, 
defined safety barrier as ‘‘any operational, organizational, or technical solution or system that minimizes 
the probability of events to occur, and limit the consequences of such events’’ (Bento, 2003). Svenson 
(1991) pointed that is useful and very necessary to use a more precise terminology particularly to make a 
distinction between barrier systems and barrier functions. Barrier function, describes the modes by which 
it is possible to prevent or to protect against the hazards. Barrier system, describes the means by which the 
barrier functions are fulfilled.  
Many safety barriers division were suggested in the literature, of which we highlight: 
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• Duijm et al. (2003), presents a division based on the action verbs to avoid, to prevent, to control, and to 
protect: 1) avoid intends to suppress all the potential causes of an event by changing the design of the 
equipment or the type of product used, 2) prevent intends to reduce the probability of an event by 
suppressing part of its potential causes or by reducing their intensity, 3) control intends to limit the 
deviation from a normal situation to an abnormal (and unacceptable) one and, 4) to protect intends to 
cover or shield from injury or loss (the environment) from the consequences of an event that has 
occurred. 
• Schupp (2004, in Sklet, 2006) divided SB in two types related to “hazard targets”, namely: 1) primary 
barriers which are associated with primary hazards (hazards that could be directly harmful to humans) 
and, 2) secondary barriers which are associated with functional hazards (hazards that could indirectly 
become hazardous to humans). 
• Hale (2003) and Kjellén (2000) divided SB in two types related to dependence on actions in order to 
achieve its function, namely: 1) passive barriers (do not requires any action to achieve its function in 
reducing risk) and, 2) active barriers (requires an action to achieve its function). 
• Guldenmund et al (2006) divided barrier systems in two groups, hardware and behavioral elements, 
related with the risk assessment and management process:  
• A- Hardware related: 1) hazard (scenario) identification, barrier selection and specification; 2) 
monitoring, feedback, learning and change management; 3) design specification, purchase, 
construction, installation, interface design/layout and spares; 4) inspection, testing, performance 
monitoring, maintenance and repair. 
• B- Behavior related: 1) procedures, plans, rules and goals; 2) availability, manpower planning; 3) 
competence, suitability; 4) commitment, conflict resolution; 5) coordination, communication. 
In this dimension of QRAM we follow the division of Hollnagel (2008) because it seems the most realistic 
and applicable in the construction industry. This author divides barrier systems, in four types, by 
describing their aim and function, namely: 
• Physical or material – the aim is to prevent accidents or mitigate its consequences by blocking 
mass and/or energy flow. Examples of physical barrier systems are buildings, walls, fences, 
railings, bars, cages, gates, containers, fire curtains, etc. An important characteristic of a physical 
barrier is that it does not have to be perceived or interpreted by someone (or something) in order 
to work and can therefore be used against energy and material, as well as opposed to people. 
• Functional – the aim is to create at least one pre-condition to be met before an action could be 
performed, for instance, by establishing an interlock, either logical or temporal. It may or may not 
require human action, i.e. some requires a user to change from one state to another; others are 
autonomous and can change depending on external conditions. A functional barrier system could 
not be visible or discernible by a human user, although its presence usually is indicated in some 
way. 
• Symbolic – it requires an act of interpretation by someone, indirectly through their ‘meaning’. 
They are omnipresent everywhere by a variety of visual and auditory signs and signals, warnings 
(by text or symbol), alarms, etc. 
• Incorporeal – it requires incorporating knowledge from users to achieve their purpose. This type 
has not physical presence in the working site. In safety occupational context, incorporeal barrier 
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systems are related to organizational aspects, such as, rules and procedures for actions (that are 
imposed by the organization), knowing and complying with regulations and standards, etc. 
In summary, QRAM SB dimension follows the division proposed by Hollnagel (2008) because it seems 
more flexible, understandable and quite appropriate for the construction industry (i.e. it is closer to what is 
usually considered a good practice).  
5.8.1. Safety Barriers Effectiveness Formal Model 
Usually, in construction sites there are formal and informal safety barriers elements in parallel, often 
overlapping. Sometimes this works as safety redundancy, which makes the safety system less vulnerable 
to changes and supports safety preservation (safety resilience). Ringdahl (2009) describes this as a safety 
web rather than a distinct set of barriers. This feature can improve safety resilience but, on the other hand, 
this interaction between safety barriers could decrease its effectiveness and/or create new risks, hence, it 
complicates the analysis and evaluation of the implemented safety barriers system (Ringdahl, 2009). 
Further, the analyst should understand well the safety barriers elements and systems implemented, and its 
interactions, to understand its adequacy and availability. To achieve this understanding he should observe 
directly the site, and perform interviews with workers, foreman and engineers (to understand the informal 
safety barriers) and consultation of site documents (working procedures, reports of work accident 
investigation and others) in order to understand its reliability, robustness and resilience. 
In QRAM model, the first step for assessing SB in the construction industry is to identify which are the 
safety barriers implemented, per accident mode. 
Figure 5.14 depicts the SB model for fire and explosion accident mode. The other accident modes follow 
the same rational. 
 
 
Figure 5.14.-.Safety barriers effectiveness 
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Table 5.7 shown the SB dimension- using the Hollnagel (2008) division into four classes, with some 
examples of safety barriers used on construction sites for each accident mode 
Table 5.7 – Identified safety barriers on construction sites 
Accident 
mode 
Examples on construction 
Physical Functional Symbolic Incorporeal 
Contact 
with 
electricity 
Keep safety distances 
to the electric lines (2 
m until 1 kV, 4 m 
between 1 kV and 60 
kV, 5 m to over 60 
kV). Hand electric 
powered tools with 
double insulation. 
Enclosure doors 
locked. 
CHPtD. 
Stroke limiters in 
aerial lift 
equipment’s 
working near 
energized lines. 
Residual-current 
devices. Residual 
current circuit 
breakers. 
Signaling enclosure 
doors and other spots 
with electrical risk. 
Lock-out procedures. 
Training, instructions, 
procedures, safety 
meetings. 
Law: 
Directive 
92/57/CEE, 
24-06-1992 
and Directive 
98/34/EC, 20-
07-1998 
Struck by 
moving 
vehicle 
Vehicles safety belts. 
Separate routes for 
vehicles and 
pedestrians. 
Antilock Brake 
Systems. Speed 
bumps. 
Traffic plans 
established in the sites. 
Traffic signals. 
Warning vests. Vehicles 
inspections procedures. 
Machine horn signs. 
Training, instructions, 
safety meetings. 
Speed 
restrictions. 
Law (in 
Portugal: 
Decreto Lei 
n.º 114/94, 
03/05/1994; 
revue by 
Decreto –Lei 
n.º 44/2005, 
23/02/2005) 
Injured by 
falling 
objects 
Accessible areas 
within the swing 
radius of the rotating 
superstructure of the 
crane properly 
barricaded or 
protected. 
Scaffoldings provided 
with toe-boards. 
Materials stored in 
tiers stacked, racked, 
blocked, interlocked, 
or otherwise properly 
secured to prevent 
sliding, falling, or 
collapse. Helmets. 
Falling Object 
Protective Structures 
on vehicles. 
Mobile Elevating 
Work Platforms 
(MEWP’S) 
provided with 
stability devices 
Demarcation areas 
around portable ladders. 
Forbidden of work in 
MEWP’S with winds 
exceeding 40 km/h. 
Training, instructions, 
procedures, and safety 
meetings. 
Law: 
Directive 
92/57/CEE, 
24-06-1992 
and Directive 
89/655/CEE, 
30/11/1989, 
revue by 
Directive 
95/63/CE, 
05/12/1995 
and Directive 
2001/45/CE, 
27/06/2001. 
Formal works 
inspections. 
Cave-ins Shoring systems. 
Anchorage of existing 
structures (walls, trees, 
poles). 
Construction 
Hazards 
Prevention through 
Design (CHPtD). 
Excavation area 
demarcated and 
signalized. Training, 
instructions, 
procedures, safety 
meetings. 
Law: 
Directive 
92/57/CEE, 
24-06-1992 
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Accident 
mode 
Examples on construction 
Physical Functional Symbolic Incorporeal 
Hit by 
rolling/ 
sliding 
object 
Abrasive wheel 
grinders provided with 
safety guards. 
Vehicles loaded 
safely. 
MEWP’S provided 
with stability 
devices. Rolling 
Over Protective 
Structures on 
vehicles. 
Excavation area 
demarcated and 
signalized. Training, 
instructions, 
procedures, safety 
meetings. 
Forbidden 
throw tools or 
other objects 
Contact 
with 
machinery 
moving 
parts 
 
Machinery guards in 
risky spots (e.g. belts, 
gears, shaft, pulleys, 
sprockets, spindles, 
drums, fly wheels, and 
chains). Guards in 
removable mechanical 
transmission devices. 
Power-operated 
interlocking 
movable guards. 
Signaling of risky spots. 
Lock-out procedure. 
Training, instructions, 
safety meetings. 
Law: 
Directive 
2006/42/CE,1
0-01-2006. 
Fire or 
explosion 
Flammable, 
combustible and 
explosives materials 
stored in appropriated 
containers and in 
appropriated 
conditions. 
Energy limiters 
and relief devices 
Signaling of risky spots. 
Training, instructions, 
procedures, safety 
meetings. 
Law: 
Directive 
92/57/CEE, 
24-06-1992. 
For obtaining an evaluation for any SB system the safety experts should follow the sequence of the 
possible chain of events, either by starting with the accident modes and going backwards or starting in the 
hazard and look forward to the probable work accident. In general, for each accident mode, QRAM 
analysis should be guided with questions such as: 
• What technical mean could prevent work accident mode X and in what circumstances? And how? 
• What human action could prevent work accident mode X and in what circumstances? And how? 
• What organizational routine could prevent work accident mode X and in what circumstances? 
And how? 
• Are there any legal or other requirements applicable to it? 
To answer these questions, the analyst should check key points, namely: 1) safety barriers design – 
including interfaces and work modifications required, 2) checking/supervision of construction and 
installation, 3) human factors of safety barriers operation and maintenance – availability, commitment and 
competence of personnel, 4) inspections and maintenance programs, 5) supervision of maintenance tasks, 
6) SBs management – including communication and coordination, conflict resolution and the existence of 
spares (when required) and, 7) risks review (including the SBs). These data can be obtained by direct 
observation and analysis of documents such as: a) safety barriers project, b) accidents and incidents 
research reports, c) inspections and maintenance programs and reports, etc… 
There is a difference in effectiveness between the use of personal protective equipment’s (PPEs) and 
collective protective equipment; this proposed model reflects this fact. Since PPEs depend on humans to 
achieve its purpose (and only offers limited protection to a part of the body of one worker), its maximum 
effectiveness will be classified as “partial” (never reach the “excellent”, “very good” or “good” grades). 
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By the same reason (dependence on humans), work instructions and procedures, training, signalization, 
alarms, or more generally, for all symbolic barriers type the maximum effectiveness should be “partial”.  
Between “excellent” and “very good” there is no difference with regard (directly) to safety, the difference 
lies on resources efficiency and intrusiveness to the production process. An efficient and not intrusive SB 
have better acceptance at all organization levels and, therefore, should be “excellent”.  
This work do not present more details about defining a checklist with questions to obtain the 
classifications for effectiveness of safety barriers because there are a very big set of safety barriers that can 
be used on construction sites and there are some checklists available on literature that can be used. 
In summary, to assess SB Effectiveness, the safety analist should: 1) identify, by accident mode, all the 
safety barriers implemented in the site, 2) understand how to work the safety barriers to divide them is the 
four types pointed by Hollnagel (2008), 3) for each type, using the linguistic variable “SB Effectiveness” 
(see table 5.2) rating their effectiveness and, 4) for each accident mode, estimate the SB effectiveness by 
aggregating the rated grades by the OR operator (see eq. 9) with a parameter, 0.98γ = . 
5.8.2. Dimension discussion 
To better understand the presented QRAM SB dimension, see the following examples. 
Using a safety net as an example, safety nets are barrier systems because their effectiveness depends on 
the physical device and the riggers training, inspection and maintenance procedures. So, physical 
effectiveness is “excellent” if the net complies with EN 1263-1 standard and is mounted to cover all 
possible points of fall. If there are cheaper preventive techniques available (to ensure the same level of 
effectiveness), effectiveness should be considered “very good”. If the site is located in a climate adverse 
place, e.g. snow and strong winds, its effectiveness should be “good” (because reliability may be 
compromised). If the net does not cover one spot (e.g. in a corner or a pillar…) or is fitted far away from 
the work position, effectiveness should be “partial”. If the safety net does not comply with any recognized 
and accepted standard (even if its robustness seems to be adequate) effectiveness should be “bad” 
(because there are no guarantees about its robustness). If the safety net possesses some defects (color 
changes, broken wires or ropes…) effectiveness should be “bad” (because its robustness may be 
compromised). 
If the safety net rigging is carried out by riggers who are fully qualified and are inspected and 
systematically maintained, symbolic effectiveness should be “partial”. If the safety net is not inspected or 
systematically maintained, within appropriate intervals, symbolic effectiveness should be “insufficient”. If 
the safety net rigging are carried out by riggers who are not qualified symbolic, effectiveness should be 
“bad”.  
Now considering an illustrative example with two safety barriers types, a physical one and a symbolic 
one, and by direct observation the analyst classified the two safety barriers, as depicted in table 5.8. Then 
using the respective relative importance/weights and the weighted Hammacher-OR operator (see eq. 9) 
with a parameter, 0.98γ =  the result for the SB effectiveness estimation is: 
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(1 0.98)*0.75*0.94*0.45*0.41 0.75*0.94 0.45*0.41
1 0.98*0.75*0.94*0.45*0.41
SBEfectiveness − + +=
+
 
SBEfectiveness = 0.79.  
Since the effectiveness results from aggregation of two safety barriers that contribute to mitigate the same 
risk, one excellent and important and one partial and less important, the effectiveness result is “very good” 
= 0.79. This result matched the conservative empiric expert knowledge of the safeyt experts’ pole. 
Table 5.8 - Illustrative example of SB effectiveness for Safety Nets 
SB Type Analyst 
Assessment 
(Semantic term and 
respective grade) 
Analyst choice justification 
Physical 
(weight=0.7) 
Excellent/0.94 The net complies with EN 1263-1 standard and is 
mounted to cover all possible points of fall and there 
aren’t cheaper preventive techniques available that 
ensure the same level of effectiveness 
Symbolic 
(weight=0.4) 
Partial/0.41 The safety net rigging is carried out by riggers who 
are fully qualified and are inspected and 
systematically maintained 
Now, let’s considering another example, the use of safety helmets to protect workers heads against falling 
objects, which is also a barrier system. If the physical device (the helmet) complies with the EN397:1995 
standard (or other similar), is in good condition, is suitable for the workplace and can be adapted to the 
users morphology, so physical effectiveness should be “partial”. If the helmet has small defects such as: 
color changes, small changes in structure (small holes for ventilation, for example), paintings (names or 
something else), stickers (some manufacturers advise against), etc. or is not suitable for the workplace or 
can’t be adapted to the users morphology, physical effectiveness should be “bad” (because there are no 
guarantees about its robustness). If the helmet does not comply with EN397:1995 standard (or other 
similar) or has defects such as fissures, physical effectiveness should be “bad” (because there are no 
guarantees about its robustness). If workers had training and know how properly use, inspect, maintain 
and clean and there is a procedure for the proper PPEs management, symbolic effectiveness should be 
“partial”. If workers didn’t inspect, maintain or clean the helmets regularly (but use them and had training) 
or the company don’t manage PPEs properly, symbolic effectiveness should be “insufficient”. If workers 
didn’t have training or there is no procedure for PPEs management symbolic effectiveness should be 
“bad”. Table 5.9 depicts the classifications for this example, considering two similar “partial” 
classification of SB elements (0.41) but since they have different importance weights, when applying the 
Hammacher-OR operator (see eq. 9) with a parameter 0.98γ = , it results on a SB Effectiveness= 0.47, i.e. 
it can be classified as a little better than a “partially safe” SB system. This result matched the conservative 
empiric expert knowledge of the safeyt experts’ pole. 
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Table 5.9 - Illustrative example of SB effectiveness for Safety Helmets 
SB Type Analyst 
Assessment 
(Semantic term and 
respective grade) 
Analyst choice justification 
Physical 
(weight 
0.75) 
Partial/0.41 The helmet complies with the EN397:1995 standard, 
is in good condition, is suitable for the workplace and 
can be adapted to the user morphology. 
Symbolic 
(weight 
=0.45)  
Partial/0.41 The user (worker) had training and know how 
properly use, inspect, maintain and clean and there is 
a procedure for the proper PPIs management. 
Another example of safety barriers widely used at construction is the fall arrest system. Although it is a 
PPE that protects the entire body their effectiveness is not the same as collective protective equipment. 
The use of this equipment carries the risk of orthostatic syndrome (Seddon, 2002). If all physical device 
(harness, ropes, lanyards, shock absorbing, etc.) complies with the EN361 standard (or other similar), are 
in good condition, are suitable for the workplace, can be adapted to the users morphology and there are 
sufficient and robust anchor points to which workers could fasten their personal fall arrest equipment, so 
physical effectiveness should be “partial”. If the harness (or accessories) has small defects such as: color 
changes, small changes in structure geometry etc. or is not suitable for the workplace, physical 
effectiveness should be “bad”. If the harness (or accessories) does not complies with the EN361 standard 
(or other similar) or has defects or there aren’t sufficient or robust anchor points to which workers could 
fasten their personal fall arrest equipment, physical effectiveness should be “bad”. If workers had training 
and know how properly use, inspect, maintain and clean and there is a procedure for the proper PPEs 
management and work at height, including emergency rescue, symbolic effectiveness should be “partial”. 
If workers didn’t inspect, maintain or clean the equipment daily (but use them and had training) or the 
company don’t manage PPEs properly, symbolic effectiveness should be “insufficient”. If workers didn’t 
have training or there are no procedure for PPEs management or emergency rescue is not assured, 
symbolic effectiveness should be “bad”. 
Incorporeal barriers, such as legal requirements (or others), should be “excellent” if the company identify, 
access and apply legal or other requirements, keep this information up-to-date and communicates, timely, 
relevant information about these requirements to persons working under its control and other interested 
parties, in an efficient way, using a documented procedure. If the company doesn’t have a documented 
procedure, incorporeal safety barriers should be considered “very good”). If the company identify access 
and apply legal or other requirements, keep this information up-to-date but not communicate, timely, 
relevant information, incorporeal effectiveness should be “partial”. If the company identify access and 
apply legal or other requirements, keep this information up-to-date but not communicates relevant 
information, effectiveness should be “partial”. If the company don’t identify or access or apply legal or 
other requirements or don’t keep this information up-to-date or not communicates, timely, relevant 
information, incorporeal effectiveness should be “bad”.  
The advantages of the proposed dimension model are: 
Supports proactive estimates by identifying effective, adequate, efficient, reliable and robust features of 
the safety barriers;  
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Uses the useful four types of safety barriers proposed by Hollnagel (2008) and enumerates the criteria to 
be used for the assessment of their effectiveness; 
Both technical and organizational safety barriers, formal and informal, can be analyzed in a uniformly 
way; 
The tool is easy to understand for safety practitioners and construction technical personnel because it uses 
semantic evaluations such as “good”, “very good”, etc. This understanding is important because it 
facilitates discussions about safety barriers design problems and potential improvements. 
Disadvantages are: 
The safety barriers division on 4 types could, in some contexts, be confused for safety practitioners 
(example, if there is a legal requirement to put a physical barrier, is this a physical or a incorporeal 
barrier?); 
The diversity of possible safety barriers makes it difficult to identify all types; 
The method only gives an estimate of effectiveness and does not provide recommendations to improve SB 
design. 
In summary, it seems that the proposed procedure may reduce the subjectivity in assessing SB 
effectiveness by estimating their ability to achieve their purpose, i.e., how well they can withstand the 
variability of the work environment in construction sites. Moreover, it was presented exampples to better 
clarify the usage of the proposed procedure and how to interpret the results. In addition, since our 
proposed procedure is quite versatile and adaptable, it will contributes to advances in determining the 
quality of the overall occupational risk assessment in construction sites.  
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6. Qualitative Risk Assessment Model application test 
and results discussion 
In this chapter it will be discussed the application of the QRAM method to 12 different construction sites. 
In sections 6.1 and 6.2 it is presented detailed applications of the QRAM model, step by step, in Portugal 
(cases 1, and 2). Section 6.3 discusses the results of applying QRAM on 10 construction sites in Brazil 
(cases 3 and 4), Bulgaria (case 5), Greece (cases 6, 7 and 8), Portugal (case 12) and Turkey (cases 9, 10 
and 11), with the objective of comparing the results of the QRAM model with the expert opinions, 
requested to verify if the results correspond to their empirical knowledge, using a 5-point semantic Likert 
scale: Strongly Approve, Approve, Undecided, Disapprove and Strongly Disapprove (see Annex II.1). In 
section 6.4 QRAM is compared with other techniques, currently used to assess safety risks on construction 
sites, and section 6.5 includes a general discussion of the QRAM evaluation. 
6.1. Qualitative risk assessment model application on a 
construction site – Case 1 
To illustrate the application of the QRAM model to a real situation, it was apllied to a remodeling of the 
interior of a luxurious apartment, located in central Lisbon. When the analysis was carried out, 2 plasterers 
and 4 painters was working, headed by a foreman. All workers had fixed-term contracts. Some pictures 
taken in the worksite are presented in figure 6.1. 
Step 1 and step 2. Consist on the identification and rating of the factors affecting the safety climate on 
site. To rate the safety climate factors (with the linguistic variable “Adequacy” – see table 5.1), the 
foreman, one painter and one plasterer were interviewed (to assess the safety climate factors). For each 
factor, the analyst assessment was made by taken the semantic term which was more times chosen by the 
interviewed pool. In annex II.2 it is presented the analyst assessments for each safety climate factor. 
Step 3. Consist on the determination of the safety climate final estimation. In this case, by aggregating all 
safety climate factors, using equation number 12, the determined Safety Climate Level is 0.82. Since 0 
means good safety climate and 1 means very bad, 0.82 is considered a bad safety climate; therefore, the 
site safety climate needs to be improved. 
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Figure 6.1 – Photo’s from construction site case 1 
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Step 4. Consist on the identification and listing of all work tasks performed on the site. When the analysis 
was carried out, the tasks being performed were: a) repair of cracks in plaster, b) preparation for painting 
ceilings and c) painting of walls and ceilings. Note that it was only analyzed the task a). 
Step 5. For each task, was identified the accident modes possible of occurring. During the execution of 
task a), repair of cracks in plaster, the accident modes that are possible to occur (determined by the 
analyst) are: falls, contact with electricity, injured by falling/swinging objects, hit by rolling/sliding/flying 
object (including awkward or sudden movement), contact with machinery/equipment moving parts 
(including trapped between objects) and fire or explosion (including confined spaces). 
Step 6 and Step 7. On step 6 and step 7, for each accident mode, the analyst identified and rated the 
factors affecting the work accidents possibility factors. In annexes II.3, II.4, II.5, II.6, II.7 and II.8 it is 
presented the analyst assessment for each accident mode. It should be noted that some factors are specific 
of certain construction types and are not applicable to all construction sites, hence, the factors “not 
applicable” in this construction site were deleted from the list. 
Step 8. On Step 8 it is estimated the final evaluation of the work accident possibility of occurrence. By 
aggregation of all possibility factors, using QRAM equation 12, the possibility of occurring work 
accidents is depicted in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 - Work accidents possibility level for the accident modes analyzed in case 1 
Accident Mode 
Possibility 
level 
Falls 0.67 
Contact with electricity 0.74 
Injured by falling/swinging objects 0.75 
Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden movement) 0.71 
Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between 
objects) 
0.72 
Fire or explosion 0.84 
Since in QRAM scale, 0 means no possibility that a work accident occurs and 1 means that a work 
accident is very likely to occur (just do not know when), if the possibility of work accidents is higher than 
0.3 it should be improved (see section 5.4). In this test case for all accident modes the possibility of 
occurring accidents is higher than 0.3 hence the site needs to be improved regarding the risky factors 
affecting this dimension.  
Step 9. On step 9 the expected work accidents severity is estimated. For each accident mode, the 
estimation of the expected severity is made using the linguistic variables presented in section 5.6. 
Therefore the expected severity for each accident mode is depicted on table 6.2. 
86 
 
Table 6.2 - Work accidents severity estimation for the accident modes analyzed in case 1 
Accident mode Task characterization 
Severity 
Assessment 
Criteria Value 
Falls Workers working at 1.5 meters height, over a hard impact surface (similar to concrete surface) Fig. 5.5 1.00 
Contact with 
electricity 
Workers use electrical power tools, 220VAC in a 
dry environment Fig. 5.6 1.00 
Injured by falling/ 
swinging objects 
Workers use, at 1.5 meters in height, tools with 
mass and geometry similar to the claw hammer Fig. 5.8 0.10 
Hit by 
rolling/sliding/ 
flying object 
Due to the meager space and blind spots, there is a 
strong possibility of collision between workers, one 
stopped and another moving at 1 m/s 
Fig. 5.12 0.72 
Contact with 
machinery/ 
equipment moving 
parts (including 
trapped between 
objects) 
At this site, there aren’t machines belonging to the 
particularly dangerous machine categories 
determined by the Directive 2006/42/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 
2006, mustly there are manual and electric handling 
tools. 
Safety 
expert 
estimation 
0.20 
Fire or explosion 
There are no hazardous places belonging to the 
zones with frequency and duration of the 
occurrence of an explosive atmosphere determined 
by the Directive 99/92/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
1999, however there are in use some flimsy 
flammable substances. 
Safety 
expert 
estimation 
0.10 
Step 10. On step 10, safety barriers implemented on the site are identified, for each accident mode, by its 
SB type, namely: physical (or material), functional, symbolic and incorporeal (see column 2 of the table 
6.3). 
Step 11 and step 12. These steps consist on estimating the safety barriers effectiveness. For each accident 
mode, the effectiveness of the safety barriers implemented on the site were evaluated, using the fuzzy 
linguistic variable “effectiveness” (see table 5.2), and then using the aggregation operator, equation 10, the 
effectiveness was estimated (see column 4 of the table 6.3). The notation N/A used in the table 6.3 means 
“not applicable”, because that type of safety barrier was not in use on the site for prevent/protect that 
accident mode. 
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Table 6.3 – SB effectiveness estimation for the accident modes analyzed in case 1 
Accident mode SB Existence SB Rating SB Effectiveness 
Falls 
Physical: None implemented Physical: N/A 
0.94 
Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met 
Incorporeal: 
Insufficient 
Contact with 
electricity 
Physical: Electric powered tools 
with double insulation Physical: Very good 
0.10 
Functional: Residual current circuit 
breakers Functional: Excellent 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met 
Incorporeal: 
Insufficient 
Injured by 
falling/swingin
g objects 
Physical: Some workers wore the 
safety helmet Physical: Insufficient 
0.79 Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met 
Incorporeal: 
Insufficient 
Hit by 
rolling/sliding/f
lying object 
(including 
awkward or 
sudden 
movement) 
Physical: Abrasive wheel grinders 
provided with safety guards. Some 
workers wore the safety gloves 
Physical: Good 
0.54 Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met 
Incorporeal: 
Insufficient 
Contact with 
machinery/equi
pment moving 
parts (including 
trapped 
between 
objects) 
Physical: None implemented Physical: N/A 
0.59 
Functional: Command type man 
killed in the manual tools Functional: Good 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met 
Incorporeal: 
Insufficient 
Fire or 
explosion 
Physical: Inks, varnishes and 
solvents stored in appropriated 
containers 
Physical: Good 
0.53 Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met 
Incorporeal: 
Insufficient 
Step 13. This is the final step of QRAM model, where the overall risk level for the site being analyzed is 
determined. For each accident mode, the final evaluation of the risk level on this construction site was 
determined by aggregating the values of the four dimensions, previously estimated, using the equation 8. 
The final risk level, for each accident mode, is depicted in the table 6.4. 
88 
Table 6.4 - Work accident risk level for the accident modes analyzed in case 1 
                 Dimensions 
 
Accident Mode 
Safety 
Climate Possibility Severity 
Safety 
Barriers 
effectiveness 
Risk Level 
Falls 
0.82 
0.67 1.00 0.94 0.78 
Contact with electricity 0.74 1.00 0.10 0.44 
Injured by falling/swinging 
objects 0.75 0.10 0.79 0.41 
Hit by rolling/sliding/flying 
object (including awkward 
or sudden movement) 
0.71 0.72 0.53 0.63 
Contact with 
machinery/equipment 
moving parts (including 
trapped between objects) 
0.72 0.20 0.59 0.43 
Fire or explosion 0.84 0.10 0. 53 0.38 
As can be observed, falls accident mode displays a “high” risk level and considering the ALARP (As Low 
As Reasonably Possible) approach zones, it is unacceptable. This implies that safety related with this 
accident mode must be quickly improved; the other accident modes are within the acceptable ALARP 
zones, hence safety should be improved if it is technically and financially practicable. 
Step 14. This step deals with conclusions& recommendations aiming to lowering the risks. It is performed 
after obtaining the risk level for the construction site regarding all dimensions and factors affecting the 
construction site.  
The most immediate conclusions are described above, in step 13. The risk of falls is unacceptable with a 
value of 0.78, which means that the work cannot continue to be made as it is being executed. All the other 
accident modes have some risk, not too serious, but attention should be paid to them to reduce ALARP 
risks. To advise about the measures that should be implemented, the analyst must begin by observing, for 
each accident mode, what is the dimension - and its corresponding factors - that most contributes to the 
final level of risk. In this case, it is obvious that the safety climate level is very bad (0.82 to 1.00) and it is 
therefore necessary to lower it. Within this dimension - safety climate - the analyst must find out which 
questions (factors) were rated as “Inadequate” and propose measures to improve them (see short example 
on table 6.5) 
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Table 6.5 - Advised safety measures for case 1 
Questions rated as “inadequate” Advised measures to improve it 
Written work procedures match the way tasks are 
done in practice? 
Written work procedures must be rewritten 
to match the way tasks are done in practice. 
Written work procedures are technically accurate 
and adequate sources of safety information? 
Written work procedures must be rewritten 
in a technically accurate way in order to be 
adequate sources of safety information. 
Written work procedures are complete and easy 
to read and understand? 
Written work procedures must be rewritten 
to be complete and easy to read and 
understand. 
Written work procedures are always available 
whenever needed be consulted? 
Written work procedures must be always 
available whenever needed be consulted. 
Workers can easily identify the applied procedure 
for each job? 
Workers must be trained to easily identify the 
applied procedure for each job. 
Rules enforce the use of personal protective 
equipment whenever necessary? 
Workers must be trained on rules that 
enforced the use of personal protective 
equipment whenever necessary. 
Rules require detailed work plans from 
subcontractors or self-employed individuals? 
Rules should be established to require detailed 
work plans from subcontractors or self-
employed individuals. 
The definition of responsibilities and 
accountabilities is quite adequate? 
Responsibilities and accountabilities must 
be properly defined and must be communicated 
to employees. 
After tackling the worst dimension the analyst should verify which dimension is the second worst, after, 
the third worst and so forth. In this case, the second worst is safety barriers dimension (still observing the 
falls accident mode). The analysis of the results, for the other accident modes, is made in the same way. 
Notice that measures taken to improve the safety climate will affect the whole construction site, because 
they are transversal to the whole site, covering all accident modes and all activities. 
A brief discussion about possible recommendations for the second worst classified dimension, possibility 
of work accidents occurence, is described next. 
About falls, working on the ceilings should be performed on stable platforms;portable ladders should be 
used only in short-term jobs (not exceeding 30 min) and that do not require the worker side loads. Contact 
with electricity, measures should be taken to prevent unauthorised persons from working on the 
installation under tension and to protect flexible cords and cables against damage.Injured by 
falling/swinging objects, simultaneous activities in a small space should be properly planned and the 
weight of the loads moved manually should be known before starting to move them to ensure it is carried 
out in a safe way and is appropriately supervised. Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including 
awkward or sudden movement), machines and tools should be inspected (by the users) at the beginning 
of each shift to assure that they are free of defects and workers should be aware of the dangers of incorrect 
usage of tools or aids. Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between 
objects), he power actuated tools should be left unloaded until they are ready for immediate use and 
workers should be aware of the dangers of using hand tools in an unsafe position. Fire or explosion, 
workers should be aware of the dangers of smoking in the immediate vicinity of flammable substances. 
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6.2. Qualitative risk assessment model application on a 
construction site – Case 2 
In this case, QRAM model was applied to a construction site of a pumping station and a pipeline. It is a 
very different type of construction site (from the case 1), using different construction methods and 
equipment’s and it is exposed to atmospheric events. When the analysis was performed, the activities that 
were being carried out are: a) opening of trench, installation of conduct, b) iron assembling and, c) 
welding of metal profiles. Working on the site were: a safety coordinator, a safety technician, a 
construction engineer, 2 foremen, 1 welder, 3 iron assemblers, 3 machine operators and 8 unskilled 
workers (see figures 6.2 and 6.3). 
Step 1 and 2. On step 1 and step 2 the factors affecting the safety climate on site are evaluated and rated. 
To rate the safety climate factors it was interviewed the safety coordinator, a foreman, an iron assembler 
and a machine operator. Annex II.9 presents the evaluations for each safety climate factor. 
Step 3. By aggregating all safety climate factors (see eq. 12), the Safety Climate Level is 0.49, which is 
considered acceptable (although it could be improved). 
Step 4. The identification of work tasks took place in two work fronts: a) construction of pumping station 
and, b) construction of a pipeline. On front a) the activities that were being carried out were iron 
assembling and welding of metal profiles and, on front b) the activities that were being carried out were 
opening of the trench and installation of the conduct. 
Step 5.On front a) the activity that was analysed was the iron assembling and the accident modes 
identified as the ones that are likely to occur are: falls, contact with electricity, struck by moving vehicle 
(including heavy equipment), injured by falling/swinging objects, hit by rolling/sliding/flying object 
(including awkward or sudden movement), contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including 
trapped between objects) and cave-ins (while or after excavation). 
On front b) the activity analysed was the opening of the trench and the accident modes identified as the 
ones that are likely to occur are: falls, contact with electricity, struck by moving vehicle (including heavy 
equipment), injured by falling/swinging objects, hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or 
sudden movement), contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between objects) 
and cave-ins (while or after excavation). 
It should be noted that this front is later on used to compare the QRAM with other techniques, currently 
used to assess safety risks on construction sites (see section 6.4). 
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Figure 6.2 – Photo’s from construction site case 2, front a) 
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Figure 6.3 – Photo’s from construction site case 2, front b) 
93 
 
Steps 6 and 7.On front a) construction of pumping station, for each accident mode, the analyst identified 
and rated the factors affecting the work accidents possibility. In annexes II.10, II.11, II.12, II.13, II.14, 
II.15 and II.16 it is presented the analyst assessment for each accident mode. As refered before it should 
be noted that some factors are specific of certain construction types and are not applicable to all 
construction sites, hence, the factors “not applicable” in this construction site were deleted from the list. 
Step 8.The final evaluation of each work accident possibility is estimated by aggregation their respective 
possibility factors, using equation 12, and the results are depicted in table 6.6.  
Table 6.6 - Work accidents possibility level for the accident modes analyzed in case 2 
Accident Mode Possibility level 
Falls 0.56 
Contact with electricity 0.62 
Struck by moving vehicle 0.52 
Injured by falling/swinging objects 0.65 
Cave-ins 0.52 
Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden 
movement) 0.53 
Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including 
trapped between objects) 0.50 
Step 9. On this step the expected work accidents severity are estimated. For each accident mode, the 
estimation of the expected severity is made with the linguistic variables presented in section 5.6. A 
summary of the expected severity, for the different accident modes, is depicted on table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 - Work accidents severity estimation for the accident modes analyzed in case 2 
Accident mode Task characterization Severity Assessment Criteria Value 
Falls Workers carrying out work at 8 meters in height over a concrete surface Fig. 5.5 1,00 
Contact with 
electricity 
Workers were used electrical power tools, 
220VAC in a wet environment Fig. 5.6 1.00 
Struck by moving 
vehicle A hydraulic excavator was operating on site Fig. 5.7 1.00 
Injured by 
falling/swinging 
objects 
Possibility of objects bigger than a claw 
hammer falling from 8 m height Fig. 5.8 1.00 
Cave-ins First aid may take more than 10 m. Fig. 5.9 1.00 
Hit by 
rolling/sliding/flying 
object 
Possibility of sliding object with weighing more 
than 800 kg Fig. 5.10 1.00 
Contact with 
machinery/equipment 
moving parts 
(including trapped 
between objects) 
At this site, there are machines belong to the 
particularly dangerous machine categories 
determined by the Directive 2006/42/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
May 2006 
Safety 
expert 
estimation 
1.00 
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Step 10. On this step the safety barriers implemented on site were identified, for each accident mode, by 
its SB type, namely: physical (or material), functional, symbolic and incorporeal (see column 2 of table 
6.8). 
Step 11 and step 12. These steps consist on estimating the safety barriers effectiveness. For each accident 
mode, the effectiveness of the safety barriers implemented on the site were evaluated, using the fuzzy 
linguistic variable “effectiveness” (see table 5.2), and then using the aggregation operator, equation 10, the 
effectiveness was estimated (see column 4 of the table 6.8). 
Table 6.8 – SB effectiveness estimation for the accident modes analyzed in case 2 
Accident mode SB Existence SB Rating SB Effectiveness 
Falls 
Physical: None implemented Physical: N/A 
0.94 
Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met Incorporeal: Insufficient 
Contact with 
electricity 
Physical: Electric powered tools 
with double insulation Physical: Excellent 
0. 05 
Functional: Residual current circuit 
breakers (30 mA) Functional: Excellent 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met Incorporeal: Partial 
Struck by moving 
vehicle  
Physical: None implemented Physical: N/A 
0. 76 
Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: High visibility vests. 
Reversing alarm Symbolic: Partial 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met Incorporeal: Insufficient 
Injured by 
falling/swinging 
objects 
Physical: Safety helmets Physical: Partial 
0. 20 
Functional: Locking system in case 
of load excess Functional: Excellent 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met. 
Safety inspections 
Incorporeal: Insufficient 
Cave-ins  
Physical: Shoring Physical: Good 
0. 49 
Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met. 
Safety inspections 
Incorporeal: Partial 
Hit by 
rolling/sliding/flyin
g object (including 
awkward or sudden 
movement) 
Physical: Abrasive wheel grinders 
provided with safety guards. Some 
workers wore the safety gloves. 
Safety helmet. 
Physical: Good 
0. 53 
Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: N/A 
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Accident mode SB Existence SB Rating SB Effectiveness 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met. 
Safety inspections 
Incorporeal: Insufficient 
Contact with 
machinery/equipme
nt moving parts 
(including trapped 
between objects) 
Physical: Protection devices Physical: Good 
0.20 
Functional: Command type man 
killed in the manual tools Functional: Good 
Symbolic: Signals Symbolic: Partial 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met. 
Safety inspections 
Incorporeal: Insufficient 
Step 13. This is the final step of QRAM model, where the overall risk level for the site being analyzed is 
determined. For each accident mode, the final evaluation of the risk level on this construction site was 
determined by aggregating the values of the four dimensions, previously estimated, using the equation 8. 
The final risk levels, for each accident mode, are depicted in table 6.9.  
Table 6.9 - Work accident risk level for the accident modes analyzed in case 2 
Accident Mode Safety Climate Possibility Severity 
Safety 
Barriers Risk Level 
Falls 
0.49 
0.56 1.00 0.94 0.64 
Contact with electricity 0.62 1.00 0.05 0.34 
Struck by moving vehicle 0.52 1.00 0.76 0.61 
Injured by falling/swinging 
objects 0.65 1.00 0.20 0.43 
Cave-ins 0.52 1.00 0.49 0.57 
Hit by rolling/sliding/flying 
object (including awkward or 
sudden movement) 
0.53 1.00 0. 53 0.59 
Contact with 
machinery/equipment moving 
parts (including trapped 
between objects) 
0.50 1.00 0.20 0.41 
Step 14.In this step a brief overview of recommendations is provided for this site. About safety measures 
to be taken, safety climate needs to be improved. It could be done by making the writing procedures 
available whenever they need to be consulted and also by giving to the safety personnel the power to do 
their job correctly, by listening and acting on the workers feedback and by undertaking campaigns to 
promote safe working practices. Furthermore, the work place must be properly signalized and legal 
requirements must be fully met and SB should be implemented to avoid falls in the trenches. 
The recommendations per accident mode after observing the results obtained with QRAM are:  
• About falls, the risk level 0.64 is the higher, so it should be the first priority to tackle (improve). 
For example,should be improved the lighting levels on workplaces.  
• Struck by moving vehicles has the second higher risk level, with 0.61. So, it should be the second 
factor to tackle (or improve). For example, space enough must be created to maneuver the 
vehicles safely (avoiding the vehicle to enter pedestrian zones when being maneuvered), 
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obstructions (sharp bends, pillars, other vehicles, stacks of material, etc.) should be make clearly 
visible and traffic warning signs should be improved. 
• Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden movement) has the third higher 
risk level with 0.59, so, it should be the third risk to be improved, as for example: observers and 
aides must keep a safe distance from the work heavy equipment’s. 
• Cave-ins has the fourth higher risk level with 0.59, so, it should be the fourth risk to be to 
improved and measures could be: vehicle speed should be properly reduced in roads near 
excavations (to reduce vibration). 
For thehe other accident modes, some measures could be taken, with lower priority, to improve safety, 
namely: Contact with electricity,should be taken measures to prevent unauthorised persons from working 
on installations under tension and metal ladders should not be used when working on or near electrical 
equipment.Injured by falling/swinging objects, zones of swinging/hanging loads or in the vicinity of 
rotating arms or counterweights should be clearly indicated by means of marking and/or signaling and 
danger zones of hanging loads should be indicated by means of marking and/or signaling. Contact with 
machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between objects), power actuated tools should 
be left unloaded until they are ready for immediate use and locations where objects, machines or obstacles 
were placed too closely to each other so that workers could be trapped if the objects or machines started 
moving should be clearly indicated by means of marking and/or signaling. 
6.3. Qualitative risk assessment model application results for cases 
3 to 12 
This section presents the results of the practical application of QRAM to 10 different construction sites. 
Nine of the cases are related with different building types (school, house, and hotel) and one is a highway 
construction. The objective is to compare the results of the QRAM model with the elicited expert opinions 
(Questionnaire in annex II.1). The data gathered are summarized in tables 6.10 to 6.12. 
The table 6.10 presents the data relating to the respective construction company details: a) in column 1 is 
the case test number; b) in column 2 is the country where the test was performed; c) in column 3 is the 
construction company basic data, d) in column 4 is the construction type, e) in column 5 is the 
construction basic description; and f) in column 6 is the list of accident modes that has been analyzed. 
The table 6.11 presents the data relating to occupational safety risk level; a) in column 1 is the case test 
number, b) in column 2, is the safety climate level, c) in column 3 is the accident mode, d) in column 4, is 
the severity level (for the accident mode), e) in column 5, is the possibility level, f) in column 6, is the 
safety barriers effectiveness and g) in column 7, is the occupational safety risk level (for the accident 
mode). On the columns 2 and 5, the S stands for Strongly adequate, the V for Very adequate, the A for 
Adequate, the Aa for Almost adequate, the L for Low adequate and, the I for Inadequate; the number 
following the letter is the number of questions rating with that semantic term. On column 6, Ph stands for 
safety barrier Physical type, the F for the Functional type, the S for the Symbolic type and the I for the 
Incorporeal type; E stands for Excellent, the VG for Very good, the G for Good, the P for Partial, the Ins 
for Insufficient and the B for Bad. 
All the risks on the unacceptable (red) zone must be lowered quickly (and works should be stopped until 
the risk is reduced), the others on the ALARP (yellow) zone should be lowered, with different priorities 
according the risk level, following technical and economic ALARP criteria. 
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After applying the model to real construction sites, ten safety experts, linked to the construction sites (with 
different profiles and expertise) were requested to verify if the QRAM results (partial results of each 
dimension and the risk level) correspond to their empirical knowledge. This was done using a 5-point 
semantic Likert scale (Strongly approved, Approved, Undecided, Disapproved and Strongly disapproved).  
The table 6.12 presents the ten experts opinions, gathered from the QRAM application to cases 3 to 12; a) 
in column 1 is the case test number, b) in column 2 is the experts basic data, c) in column 3 is the 
construction company data, d) in column 4 is the experts opinions about safety climate dimension , e) in 
column 5 is the experts opinions about severity dimension, f) in column 6 is the experts opinions about 
possibility dimension, g) in column 7 is the experts opinions about safety barriers dimension and, h) in 
column 7 is the experts decisions about QRAM risk levels results. 
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Table 6.10 - Company data and construction brief descriptions from cases 3 to 12 
Case Country Company data Construction type Construction brief description Accident modes analysed 
3 Brazil Private company with 
over 250 employees with 
a safety engineer on site. 
Housing building Building with eleven floors with 
concrete structure and masonry walls. 
When the evaluation was conducted, 
masonry work (on the upper floors) and 
specialized work (sewers, water and 
electricity supply) were on-going. About 
fifty workers were on site. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Injured by falling object, Hit 
by rolling/sliding object, 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts, Fire and 
Explosion. 
4 Brazil Private company with less 
than 250 employees, with 
a part-time safety 
engineer (at the 
headquarters, had never 
visited the site).  
School building Ground floor building with concrete 
structure and masonry walls. When the 
evaluation was conducted, the masonry 
work was starting and the structure work 
was being concluded. Twenty-three 
workers were on site. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Injured by falling object, Hit 
by rolling/sliding object, 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts, Fire and 
Explosion. 
5 Bulgaria  Private company with 
less than 250 employees, 
with a safety technician at 
headquarters that goes to 
the site when requested. 
Housing building Building with five floors with concrete 
structure and masonry walls, built on the 
riverbank (on cliff). When the 
evaluation was conducted, finish works 
(painting, paving, carpentry) were 
ongoing and the roof (traditional roof 
with slope and tile coverage) was being 
concluded. About thirty workers were 
on site. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Injured by falling object, Hit 
by rolling/sliding object, 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts, Lost buoyancy 
in water, Fire and Explosion. 
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Case Country Company data Construction type Construction brief description Accident modes analysed 
6 Greece  Private company with 
more than 250 employees, 
with a safety technician 
on site. When the 
evaluation was conducted 
were six sub contractors 
on site. 
Housing building Set of three buildings with four floors 
with concrete structure and masonry 
walls. When the evaluation was 
conducted, masonry work and conclude 
structure work (on one of the buildings) 
and specialty work (sewers, water and 
electricity supply) and finish works 
(painting, paving, carpentry) on the 
other two were ongoing. About seventy 
workers were on site. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Injured by falling object, Hit 
by rolling/sliding object, 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts, Fire and 
Explosion. 
7 Greece  Private company with 
more than 250 employees, 
with a safety engineer at 
headquarters that goes to 
the site when requested. 
When the evaluation was 
conducted was one sub 
contractor on site.  
Housing building Rebuild of a building with five floors 
with concrete structure and masonry 
walls. When the evaluation was 
conducted, finish works (painting, 
paving, carpentry), works on the roof 
(traditional roof with slope and tile 
coverage) and painting of the facades 
were ongoing. Seventeen workers were 
on site. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Injured by falling object, Hit 
by rolling/sliding object, 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts, Fire and 
Explosion. 
8 Greece  Private company with 
less than 250 employees, 
with a part-time safety 
technician (at the 
headquarters, had never 
visited the site). 
Housing building Building with two floors with concrete 
structure and masonry walls and garden. 
When the evaluation was conducted, 
works on the roof (traditional roof with 
slope and tile coverage), painting works 
(inside and outside) and modulation of 
the ground in the garden were ongoing. 
Twelve workers were on site. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Injured by falling object, Hit 
by rolling/sliding object, 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts, Fire and 
Explosion. 
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Case Country Company data Construction type Construction brief description Accident modes analysed 
9 Turkey  Private company with 
more than 250 employees, 
with a safety technician at 
headquarters that goes to 
the site when requested 
(in this construction step). 
When the evaluation was 
conducted was one sub 
contractor on site.  
Housing building Building with nine floors with concrete 
structure and masonry walls. When the 
evaluation was conducted, only 
excavation works were ongoing. Eleven 
workers were on site. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Injured by falling object, Hit 
by rolling/sliding object, 
Cave-ins, Contact with 
machinery moving parts, Fire 
and Explosion. 
10 Turkey  Private company with 
less than 250 employees, 
with a safety technician 
on site. When the 
evaluation was conducted 
were two sub contractors 
on site.  
Services building Building with ten floors with concrete 
structure and masonry walls. When the 
evaluation was conducted, masonry 
work (on the ground floors and 
basement), specialty work 
(communications and electricity supply) 
and finish works (painting, paving, 
carpentry) were ongoing. About one 
hundred workers were on site. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Injured by falling object, Hit 
by rolling/sliding object, 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts, Fire and 
Explosion. 
11 Turkey  Private company with 
more than 250 employees, 
with a safety technician 
on site (watched several 
spots along the 
construction).  
Highway Construction of a highway with four 
lanes, in a plain ground. When the 
evaluation was conducted, works of 
grading and compaction of the ground 
were ongoing. Seven workers were on 
the visited spot. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts, Fire and 
Explosion. 
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Case Country Company data Construction type Construction brief description Accident modes analysed 
12 Portugal  Private company with 
more than 250 employees, 
with a safety technician at 
headquarters that goes to 
the site when requested. 
The site had a safety 
coordinator. When the 
evaluation was conducted 
were five sub contractors 
on site. 
Hotel building Rebuild of a building with five floors 
with resistant stone walls and wooden 
floors and construction of a new 
building with four floors with concrete 
structure and masonry walls. When the 
evaluation was conducted, works of 
installation of plasterboard partitions 
and specialty work (sewers, water and 
electricity supply) and finish works 
(painting, paving, carpentry), in the old 
building and masonry works on the new 
building were ongoing. About fifty 
workers were on site. 
Falls, Contact with electricity, 
Struck by moving vehicle, 
Injured by falling object, Hit 
by rolling/sliding object, 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts, Fire and 
Explosion. 
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Table 6.11 - Safety risks level results for cases 3 to 12 
Case Safety 
Climate 
Level 
Accident modes Severity Possibility Safety barriers Accident mode Risk level 
3 
0.587 
(S - 27; 
V - 5;  
A - 19; 
Aa - 15; 
L - 12;  
I - 23) 
Falls 1.000 0.597 (S - 14; V - 11; A - 18; Aa - 3; L - 7; I - 22) 
SB effective. = 0.361 (Ph–VG;  
S-B;  I-Ins) 
0.64 
ALARP Zone 
Contact with 
electricity 1.000 
0.611 (S - 5; V - 1; A - 12; 
Aa - 2; L - 3; I - 8) 
SB effective.=0.125 (Ph-VG;  
F-VG;  S-B; I-Ins ) 
0.58 
ALARP Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 
0.598 (S - 4; V - 7; A - 10; 
Aa - 2; L - 3; I - 10) SB effective. = 0.761 (S-P;  I-Ins ) 
0.74 
Unacceptable Zone 
Injured by falling 
object 1.000 
0.544 (S - 7; V - 11; A - 18; 
I - 12) 
SB effective. =0.618 (Ph–P;  S-B;  
I-Ins) 
0.69 
ALARP Zone 
Hit by rolling/sliding 
object 0.600 
0.713 (S - 2; V - 3; A - 6; 
Aa - 5; L - 2; I - 15) 
SB effective. = 0.618 (Ph–P;  
S-B;  I-Ins) 
0.63 
ALARP Zone 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts 1.000 
0.599 (V - 13; A - 18; Aa - 6;  
I - 13) 
SB effective.=0.103 (Ph-G;  F-E;  
S–P; I - Ins ) 
0.47 
ALARP Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.445 (S - 5; V - 4; A - 9; L - 4) SB effective. = 0.761 (S–P;  I-Ins) 
0.57 
ALARP Zone 
4 
0.662 
(V - 5; 
A - 46; 
Aa - 15; 
L - 12;  
I - 23) 
Falls 1.000 0.708 (V - 3; A - 22; Aa - 17; L - 9; I - 24) 
SB effective. =0.618 (Ph–P;  S-B;  
I-Ins) 
0.75 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
electricity 1.000 
0.662 (S - 1; A - 13; Aa - 7; 
L - 2; I - 8) 
SB effective. = 0.329 (Ph-G;   
F-P;   S-B; I-Ins ) 
0.66 
ALARP Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 
0.695 (V - 6;  A - 11;  L - 5; 
I - 14) 
SB effective. = 0.849 (S-Ins;   
I-Ins ) 
0.80 
Unacceptable Zone 
Injured by falling 
object 1.000 
0.599 (S - 2; V - 7; A - 25; 
L – 2; I - 12) 
SB effective. =0.618 (Ph–P;   
S-B;  I-Ins) 
0.72 
Unacceptable Zone 
Hit by rolling/sliding 
object 1.000 0.813 (V - 5; A - 6; I - 22) 
SB effective. = 0.788 (S– Ins;  
I-Ins) 
0.81 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts 1.000 
0.715 (V - 4; A - 17; Aa - 3; 
L - 3; I - 22) 
SB effective. = 0.365 (Ph -P;   
F-P;   S-Ins; I-Ins) 
0.68 
ALARP Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.554 (V - 9; A - 7; L – 2; I - 4) SB effective. = 0.761 (S-P;  I-Ins ) 
0.62 
ALARP Zone 
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Case Safety 
Climate 
Level 
Accident modes Severity Possibility Safety barriers Accident mode Risk level 
5 
0.480 
(V - 22; 
A -69; 
L - 10) 
Falls 1.000 0.689 (V - 1; A - 25; Aa - 10;  L - 36; I - 3) 
SB effective. = 0.168 (Ph-E;  S-P;   
I-P) 
0.58 
ALARP Zone 
Contact with 
electricity 1.000 0.534 (A - 21; Aa - 8; L – 2) 
SB effective. = 0.115 (Ph -VG;   
F-G;   S-P;I-P) 
0.53 
ALARP Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 
0.494 (V – 2; A - 15;  
Aa - 19) SB effective. = 0.710 (S-P;   I-P) 
0.67 
ALARP Zone 
Injured by falling 
object 1.000 
0.529 (S - 2; V - 2; A - 32; 
Aa - 3; L - 9) 
SB effective. = 0.572 (Ph-P;   
S-B;  I-P) 
0.64 
ALARP Zone 
Hit by rolling/sliding 
object 0.700 
0.569 (S - 1; V - 4; A - 11; 
Aa -14; L – 2; I - 1) 
SB effective. = 0.449 (Ph-P;   S-P;   
I-P) 
0.55 
ALARP Zone 
Contact with 
machinery moving 
parts 
1.000 0.663 (V - 4; A - 18; Aa -3;  L –3; I - 16) 
SB effective. = 0.103 (Ph-E;   
F-E;   S-P;   I-Ins) 
0.56 
ALARP Zone 
Lost buoyancy in 
water 1.000 0.388 (S – 1; A - 12) 
SB effective. = 0.449 (Ph-P;   S-P;   
I-P) 
0.58 
ALARP Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.367 (S – 3; V – 7; A - 9; Aa - 3) SB effective. = 0.710 (S-P;   I-P) 
0.51 
ALARP Zone 
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Case Safety 
Climate 
Level 
Accident modes Severity Possibility Safety barriers Accident mode Risk level 
6 
0.701 
(V - 5; 
A - 46; 
L - 12;  
I - 38) 
Falls 1.000 0.734 (A - 25; Aa - 11; L - 12;I - 27) 
SB effective. = 0.572 (Ph-P;   
S-B;  I-P) 
0.75 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
electricity 1.000 
0.659 (A - 15; Aa -6; L – 4; I 
- 6) 
SB effective. = 0.283 (Ph-P;    
F-P;    S-P; I-P) 
0.66 
ALARP Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 
0.623 (V – 5; A - 13; Aa - 9;  
L - 2; I - 7) SB effective. = 0.761 (S-P;  I-Ins ) 
0.77 
Unacceptable Zone 
Injured by falling 
object 1.000 
0.569 (S – 1; V – 4; A - 31;  
Aa - 4; L - 3; I - 5) 
SB effective. = 0.618 (Ph-P;   
S-B;   I-Ins ) 
0.72 
Unacceptable Zone 
Hit by rolling/sliding 
object 1.000 
0.570 (V - 5; A - 14;  
Aa – 11; I - 3) 
SB effective. = 0.797 (S–Ins;  
I-Ins) 
0.77 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
machinery moving 
parts 
1.000 0.626 (V – 9; A - 22; Aa - 2;  L - 4; I - 13) 
SB effective. = 0.488 (Ph-P;   
F-B;   S-Ins; I-P) 
0.70 
Unacceptable Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.521 (S - 3; V - 2; A - 14; I - 3) SB effective. = 0.761 (S-P;   I-Ins) 
0.62 
ALARP Zone 
7 
0.730 
(A - 51; 
I - 50) 
Falls 1.000 0.679 (V – 7; A - 25;  Aa - 11; L - 12; I - 20) 
SB effective. = 0.572 (Ph-P;   
S-B;   I - P) 
0.74 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
electricity 1.000 
0.611 (S – 6; A - 12; L – 7;  
I - 6) 
SB effective. = 0.373 (Ph-P;   F-P;   
S-B;  I-P) 
0.68 
ALARP Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 
0.781 (A - 13; Aa - 4; L - 7;  
I - 12) SB effective. = 0.710 (S-P;    I-P) 
0.80 
Unacceptable Zone 
Injured by falling 
object 1.000 
0.723 (A - 29; Aa - 4; L - 3;  
I - 12) 
SB effective. = 0.489 (Ph-P;     
S-P;    I-Ins ) 
0.73 
Unacceptable Zone 
Hit by rolling/sliding 
object 0.700 0.613 (A - 19; Aa – 9; I - 5) 
SB effective. = 0.409 (Ph-P;    
S-B;   I-Ins) 
0.61 
ALARP Zone 
Contact with 
machinery moving 
parts 
1.000 0.735 (A - 31; L - 4; I - 15) SB effective. = 0.663 (Ph-Ins;  F-B;   S-Ins; I-Ins) 
0.78 
Unacceptable Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.559 (V - 2; A - 17; I - 3) SB effective. = 0.762 (Ph – Ins;   S-B;   I-Ins) 
0.64 
ALARP Zone 
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Case Safety 
Climate 
Level 
Accident modes Severity Possibility Safety barriers Accident mode Risk level 
8 
0.742 
(A - 44; 
L - 14;  
I - 43) 
Falls 1.000 0.689 (V - 1; A - 25; Aa - 10;  L - 36; I - 3) 
SB effective. = 0.801 (Ph-Ins;   
S-B;   I-B) 
0.81 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
electricity 1.000 
0.724 (S – 2; A - 14; L – 9;  
I - 4) 
SB effective. = 0.538 (Ph-P;   
F-Ins;   S-B; I-B) 
0.75 
Unacceptable Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 
0.683 (S – 4; V – 2; A - 13; 
Aa - 4; L - 7; I - 5) SB effective. = 0.710 (S-P;    I-P) 
0.78 
Unacceptable Zone 
Injured by falling 
object 1.000 
0.670 (V – 5; A - 30; Aa - 4;  
L - 3;  I - 6) 
SB effective. = 0.699 (Ph -Ins;   
S-Ins;  I-Ins) 
0.78 
Unacceptable Zone 
Hit by rolling/sliding 
object 1.000 0.816 (V - 5; A - 6; I - 23) SB effective. = 0.917 (S-B;  I-Ins) 
0.87 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
machinery moving 
parts 
1.000 0.764 (A - 25; Aa – 2; L - 4;  I - 19) 
SB effective. = 0.663 (Ph -Ins;  
F-B;  S-Ins; I-Ins) 
0.79 
Unacceptable Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.390 (V - 1; A - 5) SB effective. = 0.761 (S – P; I - Ins  
0.60 
ALARP Zone 
9 
0.653 
(V - 9;  
A - 53; 
L - 10;  
I - 29) 
Falls 1.000 0.708 (V - 3; A - 22; Aa - 17;  L - 9; I - 24) 
SB effective. =0.513 (Ph–G;  S-B;  
I-Ins) 
0.72 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with electricity 1.000 0.380 (V – 3; A - 9) SB effective. = 0.329 (Ph-G;   F-P;   S-B; I-Ins ) 
0.59 
ALARP Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 
0.772 (A - 13; Aa - 4; L - 7; I - 
10) SB effective. = 0.761 (S-P;   I-Ins ) 
0.80 
Unacceptable Zone 
Injured by falling object 1.000 0.650 (V – 5; A - 33; Aa - 4;  L - 3;  I - 3) 
SB effective. = 0.462 (Ph–G;   
S-Ins;  I-Ins) 
0.69 
ALARP Zone 
Hit by rolling/sliding 
object 1.000 0.803 (V - 2; A - 8; I - 15) SB effective. = 0.788 (S–Ins;  I-Ins) 
0.81 
Unacceptable Zone 
Cave-ins 1.000 0.557 (V – 2; A – 13; L - 1) SB effective. = 0.321 (Ph-VG;  S-Ins;  I-Ins) 
0.63 
ALARP Zone 
Contact with machinery 
moving parts 1.000 0.723 (A - 24; I - 12) 
SB effective. = 0.369 (Ph-G;  F-Ins;   
S-Ins; I-Ins) 
0.69 
ALARP Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.338 (V - 3; A - 2) SB effective. =0.618 (Ph–P;  S-B;  I-Ins) 
0.64 
ALARP Zone 
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Case Safety 
Climate 
Level 
Accident modes Severity Possibility Safety barriers Accident mode Risk level 
10 
0.644 
(V - 12; 
A - 46; 
Aa - 7; 
L - 10;  
I - 26) 
Falls 1.000 0.597 (S - 14; V - 11; A - 18; Aa - 3; L - 7; I - 22) 
SB effective. = 0.423 (Ph-G;   
S-Ins;   I-P) 
0.67 
ALARP Zone 
Contact with 
electricity 1.000 
0.744  (A - 14; Aa – 2; L – 9;  
I - 4) 
SB effective. = 0.181 (Ph-G;    
F-G;    S-P; I-P) 
0.64 
ALARP Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 
0.661 (S – 4; V – 2; A - 17; 
Aa - 2; L - 7; I - 3) SB effective. = 0.710 (S-P;  I-P ) 
0.75 
Unacceptable Zone 
Injured by falling 
object 1.000 
0.612 (S – 4; V – 10; A - 24; 
Aa - 7;  I - 3) 
SB effective. = 0.321 (Ph-VG;  
S-Ins;  I-Ins ) 
0.64 
ALARP Zone 
Hit by rolling/sliding 
object 0.700 0.763 (V - 1; A - 17; I - 15) 
SB effective. = 0.797 (S–Ins;  
I-Ins) 
0.73 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
machinery moving 
parts 
1.000 0.734 (S – 3; V – 3; A - 22;  L - 4;  I - 18) 
SB effective. = 0.455 (Ph-P;  
F-Ins;   S-Ins; I-Ins) 
0.71 
Unacceptable Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.680 (V - 1; A - 3; Aa – 3; I - 1) 
SB effective. = 0.761 (S-P;   I-Ins) 
 
0.65 
ALARP Zone 
11 
0.734 
(A - 28; 
Aa - 25; 
L - 10;  
I - 38) 
Falls 1.000 0.597 (S - 14; V - 11; A - 18; Aa - 3; L - 7; I - 22) 
SB effective. = 0.513 (Ph-G;   
S-B;   I-Ins) 
 
0.71 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
electricity 1.000 0.719  (A - 19; L – 6;  I - 5) 
SB effective. = 0.240 (Ph-G;   
F-G;   S-Ins; I-Ins) 
 
0.67 
ALARP Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 
0.631 (S – 4; V – 2; A - 23;  
L - 3; I - 3) 
SB effective. = 0.710 (S-P;  I-P ) 
 
0.77 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
machinery moving 
parts 
1.000 0.751 (V – 4; A - 23; L - 4;  I - 19) 
SB effective. = 0.530 (Ph-P;   
F-B;   S-Ins; I-Ins) 
 
0.75 
Unacceptable Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.836 (A - 1; L – 1; I - 2) SB effective. =0.761 (S-P;   I-Ins )  
0.71 
Unacceptable Zone 
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Case Safety 
Climate 
Level 
Accident modes Severity Possibility Safety barriers Accident mode Risk level 
12 
0.747 
(A - 28; 
Aa - 25; 
I - 48) 
Falls 1.000 0.679 (V – 7; A - 25; Aa - 11; L - 12; I - 20) 
SB effective. = 0.801 (Ph-Ins;   
S-B;   I-B) 
0.83 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
electricity 1.000 
0.670 (V – 3;  A - 19;  L – 2;   
I - 4) 
SB effective. = 0.413 (Ph-G;   
F-Ins;   S-B; I-Ins) 
0.71 
Unacceptable Zone 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1.000 0.362  (V – 4; A - 6) SB effective. = 0.710 (S-P;    I-P) 
0.71 
Unacceptable Zone 
Injured by falling 
object 1.000 0.704 (A - 27 L - 4;  I - 7) 
SB effective. =0.561 (Ph–P;   
S-Ins;  I-Ins) 
0.75 
Unacceptable Zone 
Hit by rolling/sliding 
object 0.700 0.816 (V - 5; A - 6; I - 22) SB effective. = 0.710 (S-P;    I-P) 
0.74 
Unacceptable Zone 
Contact with 
machinery moving 
parts 
1.000 0.773 (A - 25; L - 4; I - 21) SB effective. = 0.488 (Ph-P;   F-B;   S-Ins; I-P) 
0.75 
Unacceptable Zone 
Fire and Explosion 0.500 0.554 (V - 9; A - 7; L – 2; I - 4) 
SB effective. = 0.761 (S-P;    
I-Ins) 
0.64 
ALARP Zone 
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Table 6.12 - Expert opinions regarding evaluations obtained with QRAM for cases 3 to 12 
Case Experts Data Company Data 
Experts evaluation 
Safety Climate Severity Possibility Safety Barriers Risk level 
3 Safety 
engineer, with 
15 of 
experience in 
the current 
position and in 
the industry. 
Involved in: 
developing RA, 
implementing 
RA and 
evaluating RA.  
Big company 
working on 
buildings 
(residences, 
factories…) 
It is a good way to 
consider safety 
climate data 
should be more 
practical by 
reducing the 
number of 
questions because 
some are repeated 
(i. e. get the same 
information by 
performing the 
question 
differently). 
APPROVED. 
It is a practical and 
objective way to 
estimate severity but 
I am not sure about 
results reliability. 
UNDECIDED. 
The model is very 
intuitive and easy 
to apply and 
allows 
characterizing in a 
reliable way the 
possibility of work 
accidents 
occurrence. 
STRONGLY 
APPROVED. 
 
It is easy to apply but 
it is not intuitive. It 
needs some time to be 
well understood. 
UNDECIDED. 
APPROVED. 
4 Safety 
technician, with 
16 of 
experience in 
the current 
position and in 
the industry. 
Involved in: 
developing RA 
and 
implementing 
RA. 
Big company 
working on 
buildings 
(residences, 
factories…) 
It is easy to apply 
and even 
pedagogical, but it 
has too many 
questions and 
some seem to 
repeated. 
APPROVED. 
It works well in 
some accident 
modes (falls, contact 
with electricity and 
struck by moving 
vehicle) and not in 
others (hit by 
rolling/sliding 
object).  
APPROVED. 
Allows to estimate 
quickly and 
accurately the 
possibility of 
occurrence of an 
accident. 
STRONGLY 
APPROVED. 
Allows estimating the 
SB effectiveness in a 
reliable way. 
APPROVED. 
STRONGLY 
APPROVED. 
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Case Experts Data Company Data 
Experts evaluation 
Safety Climate Severity Possibility Safety Barriers Risk level 
5 Construction 
engineer, with 
11of 
experience in 
the current 
position and 
in the 
industry. 
Involved in: 
implementing 
RA. 
Average 
company 
working on 
buildings 
(residences, 
factories…). 
Don´t know 
much about 
safety climate. 
NO OPINION. 
Estimate the 
severity correctly 
needs time and 
expertise. 
APPROVED. 
It is quick to 
apply. 
 APPROVED. 
The categorisation 
should be re-
examined in terms 
of the legal 
requirements 
category. I do not 
think that this is 
clearly defined. It 
may be closely 
associated with 
other categories 
also.  
APPROVED. 
APPROVED. 
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Case Experts Data Company Data 
Experts evaluation 
Safety Climate Severity Possibility Safety Barriers Risk level 
6 OSH Labour 
Inspector, with 
11 of 
experience in 
the current 
position and 3 
in the industry. 
Involved in 
evaluating RA. 
OSH Labour 
Inspection 
Using QRAM 
method to 
complete ORA is 
a structured way 
to qualitatively 
assess the risks in 
the construction 
projects which is 
a step in front if 
taken into account 
the changing 
environment of 
the construction 
sector. However, 
the set of safety 
climate factors 
should be 
redefined and 
measured by 
skilled and 
experienced 
assessors to 
guarantee the 
effectiveness, 
efficiency and 
satisfaction. 
UNDECIDED. 
Severity has to be 
further investigated 
and researched. 
More risks and 
their severity 
should be included 
in the proposed 
method. 
UNDECIDED. 
The scale used to 
measure 
possibility seems 
appropriate. 
APPROVED. 
The categories in 
which safety barriers 
are distinguished 
should be re-
examined with a 
clear distinction 
between them. 
Further research 
should be made in 
the bibliography to 
check the 
categorisation of 
safety barriers. 
Besides, legal 
requirements are 
present in all 
categories of safety 
barriers. It needs a 
more clear 
distinction of the 
categories of safety 
barriers. 
UNDECIDED. 
UNDECIDED
. 
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Case Experts Data Company Data 
Experts evaluation 
Safety Climate Severity Possibility Safety Barriers Risk level 
7 Mechanical 
Engineer – 
Safety Engineer, 
with 4 of 
experience in the 
current position 
and 18 in the 
industry. 
Involved in: 
developing RA, 
implementing 
RA and 
evaluating RA.  
Big company 
working on 
buildings 
(residences, 
factories…), 
infrastructures 
(including 
roads), sea and 
rail works. 
Safety Climate 
represents a more 
restricted set of 
factors related 
mainly to 
individual 
perceptions and 
not to issues such 
as safety 
management or 
safe work 
behaviours (which 
I consider a result 
of safety climate 
and not a part of 
it). Some factors 
related to safety 
climate require 
significant 
expertise to 
evaluate, others 
require a lot of 
time for this 
reason, I believe 
that both 
efficiency and 
effectiveness are 
subject to risk 
analysts 
experience, 
knowledge and 
commitment. 
UNDECIDED. 
They address only 
particular 
dimensions of 
severity (in respect 
to mechanical or 
electrical hazards). 
DISAPPROVED. 
APPROVED. Cat. confusing and 
incomplete. I would 
consider safety 
barriers as layers of 
immediate (physical, 
mechanical etc.), 
basic (procedures, 
training, signs) and 
underlying (mgt 
commitment, 
organizational 
arrangements) 
measures, and I would 
not incorporate h&s 
legislation in these 
since this can be taken 
into account in all 
types of measures as 
minimum 
requirements. 
UNDECIDED. 
UNDECIDED. 
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Case Experts Data Company Data 
Experts evaluation 
Safety Climate Severity Possibility Safety Barriers Risk level 
8 OSH Labo 
Inspector with 
10 of 
experience in 
the current 
position and in 
the industry. 
Involved in 
evaluating RA. 
OSH Labor 
Inspection 
The set of factors 
contributing to 
“Safety Climate” 
could be 
redefined and 
include only the 
factors dealing 
with employee 
and management 
perception of 
safety. The 
expected quality 
of the output of 
ORA using 
QRAM depends 
on the ability of 
users (is quite 
subjective). 
UNDECIDED. 
More risks and 
their severity 
function could be 
added. 
APPROVED. 
Doesn’t seem 
improper. 
APPROVED. 
The categories of 
safety barriers should 
be clear so as not to 
be repeated (for 
example, legal 
requirements 
coincide with 
physical safety 
barriers in many 
cases). 
UNDECIDED. 
APPROVED. 
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Case Experts Data Company Data 
Experts evaluation 
Safety Climate Severity Possibility Safety Barriers Risk level 
9 Mechanical 
Engineer – 
Safety 
Engineer, with 
8 of experience 
in the current 
position and 21 
years in the 
industry. 
Involved in: 
developing RA, 
implementing 
RA and 
evaluating RA.  
Big company 
working on 
buildings 
(residences, 
factories…), 
infrastructures 
(including 
roads),   
bridges and 
viaducts. 
Safety climate 
very important to 
plan safety. 
QRAM method 
allow a structured 
analysis to 
qualitatively assess 
safety climate. The 
proposed model 
has more questions 
than necessary. 
APPROVED. 
I am not sure that it 
addresses all 
severity factors. 
UNDECIDED. 
Facilitates the 
estimation of work 
accidents 
occurrence on site. 
Although the 
check-list seems 
complete, there is 
always the 
possibility that 
there are factors 
other than those 
listed.  
APPROVED. 
This categorization 
could be confusing in 
construction industry 
and if safety 
technicians don’t 
understand well the 
methodology this will 
affect the quality of 
results 
APPROVED. 
APPROVED. 
10 OSH 
technician, with 
14 of 
experience in 
the current 
position and in 
the industry. 
Involved in: 
developing RA 
and 
implementing 
RA. 
Big company 
working on 
buildings 
(residences, 
factories…), 
infrastructures 
(including 
roads). 
This model has too 
many questions, 
when compared 
with similar 
models that I 
know. I think it 
can be simplified 
by reducing the 
number of 
questions. 
The data needed is 
easy to obtain but I 
doubt its reliability 
because is based in 
workers and 
foremen responses 
APPROVED. 
Incomplete. More 
risks and their 
severity should be 
included in the 
proposed method. 
UNDECIDED. 
 
Good usability and 
the way to estimate 
possibility seems 
appropriate. 
APPROVED. 
The categories in 
which safety barriers 
are divided are not 
incorrect but are not 
intuitive. It is needed 
a more clear 
distinction of the 
safety barriers 
categories. 
APPROVED. 
APPROVED. 
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Case Experts Data Company Data 
Experts evaluation 
Safety Climate Severity Possibility Safety Barriers Risk level 
11 Safety 
technician, with 
10 years of 
experience in 
the industry. 
Involved in: 
implementing 
RA. 
Average 
company 
working on 
buildings 
(residences, 
factories…). 
Seems incomplete 
because there 
aren’t factors 
about management 
perception of 
safety. 
APPROVED. 
More risky 
situations and their 
severity functions 
must be added. It is 
important that each 
severity function be 
carefully validate. 
APPROVED. 
Appropriate and 
complete and 
produce good 
results in less time 
than other 
methodologies that 
I know. 
APPROVED. 
The safety barriers 
division should be 
clearer. 
It is not easy to 
understand. More 
investigation on 
applied on SB is 
needed.  
APPROVED. 
APPROVED. 
12 Safety 
technician level 
V, with 26 
years of 
experience in 
the current 
position and in 
the industry. 
Involved in: 
developing and 
implementing 
RA. 
Big company 
working on 
buildings  
(residences, 
factories…),  
infrastructures 
(including 
roads),   
bridges, 
viaducts, Sea 
and Rail 
Works and 
football 
stadium. 
Allows to estimate 
an important risk 
factor that is very 
important to be 
estimated, but 
should be 
simplified. 
APPROVED. 
The model seems to 
be an easy way to 
estimate severity 
with some accuracy 
but there are lacks of 
risky situations that 
are likely to occur 
on construction 
sites. It could 
provide quality 
results in some 
accident modes such 
as: falls, contact 
with electricity and 
struck by moving 
vehicle; in the other 
I am not convinced 
of the 
appropriateness of 
the model. 
UNDECIDED. 
Covers all factors 
that may cause a 
work accident in 
almost all kinds of 
construction 
projects where I 
had worked. 
Allows estimating 
quickly and 
accurately the 
possibility of 
occurrence of an 
work accident. 
Repeats some 
issues already 
addressed in the 
safety climate as 
training, use of 
PPEs and safety 
planning. 
STRONGLY 
APPROVED. 
Allows estimating the 
SB effectiveness in a 
reliable way but only 
by experienced safety 
technicians on 
construction industry. 
APPROVED. 
APPROVED. 
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6.4. Qualitative risk assessment model comparison with 
other methods 
 
In this section the QRAM results are directly compared with other techniques, currently used to 
assess safety risks on construction sites. For simplifying the comparison it will be used data 
from the front b) of case 2, above presented. 
6.4.1. Summary of qualitative risk assessment model applied to case 2 
front b) 
A summary of the results, obtained by applying the QRAM method, for case 2 front b) are 
depicted in tables 6.13 to 6.16. The estimated safety climate level on this site was 0.49. 
Table 6.13 - Work accident possibility from case 2 front b 
Accident Mode Possibility level 
Falls 0.80 
Contact with electricity 0.53 
Struck by moving vehicle 0.56 
Injured by falling/swinging objects 0.62 
Cave-ins 0.60 
Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or 
sudden movement) 0.73 
Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including 
trapped between objects) 0.67 
Table 6.14 - Work accident severity estimation from case 2 front b 
Accident mode Task characterization 
Severity 
Assessment 
Criteria Value 
Falls Workers carrying out work at 8 meters in height over a concrete surface Fig. 5.5 1,00 
Contact with 
electricity 
Workers were used electrical power tools, 
220VAC in a wet environment Fig. 5.6 1.00 
Struck by moving 
vehicle A hydraulic excavator was operating on site Fig. 5.7 1.00 
Injured by 
falling/swinging 
objects 
Possibility of objects bigger than a claw 
hammer falling from 8 m height Fig. 5.8 1.00 
Cave-ins First aid may take more than 10 m. Fig. 5.9 1.00 
Hit by 
rolling/sliding/flying 
object 
Possibility of sliding object with weighing more 
than 800 kg Fig. 5.11 1.00 
Contact with 
machinery/equipment 
moving parts 
(including trapped 
between objects) 
At this site, there are machines belong to the 
particularly dangerous machine categories 
determined by the Directive 2006/42/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
May 2006 
Safety 
expert 
estimation 
1.00 
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Table 6.15 - Safety barriers effectiveness from case 2 front b 
Accident mode Safety Barriers Existence SB Rating SB Effectiveness 
Falls 
Physical: None implemented Physical: Bad 
0.91 
Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: None implemented Symbolic: Bad 
Incorporeal: No legal 
requirements were being met Incorporeal: Bad 
Contact with 
electricity 
Physical: Electric powered tools 
with double insulation Physical: Good 
0. 20 
Functional: Residual current 
circuit breakers (30 mA) Functional: Good 
Symbolic: Overhead power lines 
unmarked 
Symbolic: 
Insufficient 
Incorporeal: Legal requirements 
were being met Incorporeal: Good 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 
Physical: None implemented Physical: Bad 
0. 67 
Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: High visibility vests. 
Reversing alarm Symbolic: Partial 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met 
Incorporeal: 
Partial 
Injured by 
falling/swinging 
objects 
Physical: Safety helmets Physical: Partial 
0. 53 
Functional: None Functional: Bad 
Symbolic: Slopes heads a little 
clean 
Symbolic: 
Insufficient 
Incorporeal: Few legal 
requirements were being met. 
Incorporeal: 
Insufficient 
Cave-ins 
Physical: Shoring Physical: Excellent 
0. 20 
Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: No systematic 
procedure 
Symbolic: 
Insufficient 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met. 
Safety inspections 
Incorporeal: 
Partial 
Hit by 
rolling/sliding/ 
flying object 
(including 
awkward or 
sudden movement) 
Physical: None implemented Physical: Bad 
0. 81 
Functional: None implemented Functional: N/A 
Symbolic: No systematic 
procedure 
Symbolic: 
Insufficient 
Incorporeal: Few legal 
requirements were being met. 
Incorporeal: 
Insufficient 
Contact with 
machinery/equip
ment moving 
parts (including 
trapped between 
objects) 
Physical: Protection devices Physical: Good 
0.15 
Functional: Command type man 
killed in the manual tools 
Functional: Very 
Good 
Symbolic: Very few signals Symbolic: Insufficient 
Incorporeal: Some legal 
requirements were being met. 
Safety inspections 
Incorporeal: 
Partial 
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Table 6.16 - Risk level results for case 2 front b, using QRAM method 
Accident Mode Safety Climate Possibility Severity 
Safety 
Barriers Risk Level 
Falls 
0.49 
0.80 1.00 0.92 0,68 
Contact with electricity 0.42 1.00 0.20 0,40 
Struck by moving vehicle 0.56 1.00 0.67 0.60 
Injured by 
falling/swinging objects 0.62 1.00 0.53 0.59 
Cave-ins 0.60 1.00 0.20 0.42 
Hit by 
rolling/sliding/flying 
object (including awkward 
or sudden movement) 
0.73 1.00 0. 81 0.65 
Contact with 
machinery/equipment 
moving parts (including 
trapped between objects) 
0.57 1.00 0.15 0.39 
6.4.2. Risk assessment occupational safety unsystematic technique 
applied to case 2 front b) 
A safety expert on construction was asked to apply the usual RAOS unsystematic technique, 
described on 3.4.1, to the front b) case and the results obtained are summarized on table 6.17, 
the task analyzed was the opening of the trench. 
1. Based on experience, the safety expert identified the accident modes that can occur: 
Falls, Contact with electricity, Struck by moving vehicle or heavy equipment, Injured 
by falling/swinging objects, Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object, Contact with 
machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between objects). He didn’t 
identify Cave-ins (when asked justify he said that with those shoring, cave-ins are very 
unlikely to occur), 
2. For the identified accident modes, he evaluated qualitatively the likelihood and severity 
using, respectively, the criteria depicted on tables 3.1 and 3.2, 
3. For each accident mode, he estimated the risk level using the matrix depicted on table 
3.3. The table 6.17 shows the risks estimation and the resulting priority for the control 
actions that must be taken. 
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Table 6.17 - Risk level results for case 2 front b, using an unsystematic RAOS technique 
Accident mode Likelihood Severity Risk estimation Priority 
Falls 2 2 4 Medium 
Contact with 
electricity 2 2 4 Medium 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 1 3 3 Acceptable 
Injured by 
falling/swinging 
objects 
1 2 2 Acceptable 
Hit by 
rolling/sliding/flying 
object 
2 1 2 Acceptable 
Contact with 
machinery/equipment 
moving parts 
2 2 4 Medium 
6.4.3. Workmed® method applied to case 2 front b) 
The Workmed® method (described in 3.4.2) was applied to case 2, front b, by a skilled safety 
expert (who knows well the method). The results obtained are shown on table 6.18. As in the 
previous performance, the analyst had to take decisions about to rate factors, based in its 
empirical knowledge. 
Table 6.18 - Risk level results for case 2 front b, using the Workmed® method 
Weights 9  3  3  1  4   
Accident modes Af F Ae E As S Ad D At T Risk Level [%] 
Falls 9 2 3 5 3 4 1 4 4 4 69 
Contact with 
electricity 9 1 3 5 3 2 1 3 4 4 43 
Struck by moving 
vehicle 9 2 3 5 3 3 1 3 4 4 66 
Injured by 
falling/swinging 
objects 
9 3 3 5 3 1 1 3 4 4 67 
Cave-ins 9 1 3 5 3 2 1 2 4 4 41 
Hit by 
rolling/sliding/flying 
object 
9 2 3 5 3 4 1 3 4 4 68 
Contact with 
machinery/equipment 
moving parts 
9 1 3 5 3 1 1 2 4 4 35 
6.4.4. Discussion of comparison of qualitative risk assessment model 
with the other methods 
The two analysed methods, plus the QRAM, have only in common the concept that the risk is 
proportional to the possibility of occurrence and the severity of the consequences. The RAOS 
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unsystematic technique is neither objective nor systematic, so the results depend heavily on the 
knowledge and experience of the analysts. The Workmed® method is a configurable method, 
therefore adaptable to perform risk assessment in any activity, but loses specificity and does not 
analyze all risk factors as fully as the QRAM. Further, this method is not divided into four 
dimensions as QRAM, although it considers some factors related to the safety climate and 
safety barriers. 
The comparison of the risk level results obtained with QRAM and the other two methods, 
shown that QRAM final results are comparable with those obtained by the other methods (see 
table 6.19). It is important to note that the site chosen to perform this comparison had a safety 
climate unusually good (for construction sites - 0.49, in QRAM); if the safety climate was bad 
(what is more normal on construction sites in Portugal) risk level results obtained by QRAM 
would be higher than those obtained with other methods that do not incorporate this dimension. 
Furthermore, QRAM enables a detailed assessment for each dimension, and, within each 
dimension for each contributing factor thus providing a versatile tool for assessing the overall 
risk level and also all contributing factors, which clearly distinguishes this method from the 
other two compared methods.  
Table 6.19 – Risk level results 
Accident Mode QRAM Risk Level 
Workmed Risk 
Level [%] 
Unsystematic 
technique 
Falls 0,68 69 Medium 
Contact with electricity 0,40 43 Medium 
Struck by moving vehicle 0.60 66 Acceptable 
Injured by falling/swinging objects 0.59 67 Acceptable 
Cave-ins 0.42 41 ---------------- 
Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object  0.65 68 Acceptable 
Contact with machinery/equipment 
moving parts  0.39 35 Medium 
 
In conclusion, QRAM produces results that are aligned with those obtained with other methods 
but also allows an in-depth characterization and classification of all the risks present in the sites 
- through the rating of their composing factors - that facilitates identifying the factors that 
should be improved for increasing the site safety. 
6.5. Chapter conclusions 
The results and expert opinions supported that the QRAM is a good alternative to existing 
RAOS methods; specifically for the construction industry.  
QRAM was approved by all the 12 safety experts by: strongly approved, 1 (8.3%), approved, 9 
(75.0 %) and undecided, 2 (16.7%). By dimensions, safety climate was approved by 8 (66.7%), 
3 were undecided (25.0%) and 1 had no opinion (8.3%); expected severity was approved by 6 
(50.0%), 5 were undecided (41.6%) and 1 disapproved (8.3%); possibility of work accidents 
occurrence was strongly approved by 3 (25.0 %) and approved by 9 (75.0%); safety barriers 
effectiveness was strongly approved by 1 (8.3%), approved by 9 (75.0%) and 2 were undecided 
(16.7%). 
QRAM application to several sites proved to be a general and suitable operational tool for risk 
managers to evaluate safety vulnerabilities on construction sites, since it provides a more 
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detailed picture of the safety situation. The needed information to run QRAM can be elicited by 
interviews from site operatives and by direct observation, as shown in the cases tested. 
The main advantages of QRAM are: 
• Consideration of four dimensions that are essential in construction sites for determining 
the risk level: safety climate adequacy; possibility of occurrence of work accidents, 
expected severity of work accident and also safety barriers effectiveness. These four 
dimensions provide the experts with a thorough analysis of all parameters involved in 
the risk assessment of construction sites.  
• The criteria for assessment is clearly defined with the identification of the most 
important factors for each dimension and leads to the clarification of issues that, so far, 
have not been formally addressed by safety experts on construction sites.  
• The specific checklists proposed for the elicitation of risk information (which are 
exploited through a clearly understandable representation) are a good guide for the 
analysts, and the use of the linguistic variables to assess them, proved to be a versatile 
and robust way of estimating the risks and to provide more accurate recommendations. 
The experts that participated in the QRAM evaluation considered that the linguistic scale 
measurement has the advantage of being intuitive and quick to apply. Moreover, they 
considered that QRAM framework enforces a more systematic risk assessment process, thus 
avoiding “analysts’ creativity” and a more reliable and uniform way to assess the risks. The 
experts also commented that the application of QRAM, although easy to implement requires 
experience to achieve good results. 
In addition, although there are some differences, not very significant, in methods of 
construction, culture, ability/qualifications of both safety technicians and workers, there were no 
significant differences in the opinions of experts from different countries. Further, on the road 
construction site, there was no difference or difficulty on the tests carried out comparatively to 
the sites of buildings construction. Only in the safety climate, the three Greek experts who 
contributed to the study rated as “undecided” its “approval” decision.  
Finally, there are still open issues in the QRAM method, e.g. the weighting of the dimensions 
remains to be explored. There are other potential improvements to the method through 
simplification of the “safety climate” and “severity of expectable consequences”.  
Lastly, in the future it will be important to carefully consider other application situations; 
QRAM has only been tested on buildings and roads construction. 
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7. Conclusions and future work 
A labour workforce is a valuable asset to construction industry which is a major source of 
employment in Portugal and plays a vital role in the local economy. In this work it was 
addressed the problematic of assessing occupational accident´s risks in the construction industry 
and a novel method, denoted QRAM (Qualitative Risk Assessment Method), is proposed, which 
incorporate uncertainties by using fuzzy sets theory. 
The QRAM model is accident mode oriented and was built on the analysis of the limitations of 
the existing RAOS methods when applied in construction sites. The model supports risk 
reduction and was tailored to the specific needs of the construction industry. 
QRAM framework conception was based on the features of construction work environments, 
the fundamentals laws of physics and engineering and the characteristics of human behaviour. 
Construction industry records high accident rates, which results mainly in absenteeism, loss of 
productivity, permanent disability, and fatalities. Many safety problems found in construction 
sites are explained by a combination of reasons, such as the high-risk nature of construction 
work, the limited knowledge, the economic and time pressures, the constantly changes on 
worksites and the lack of risk awareness of construction workers and managers. 
In fact, several studies have established that construction workers are more likely to be injured 
than workers in other industries. The majority of accidents occur due to the inability to predict, 
identify, and respond to occupational risks at the workplaces. A large proportion of occupational 
risks on construction sites are usually not identified due to a lack of reliable statistical data 
which are required by the use of probabilistic RAOS methods. By other hand, studies suggest 
that most accidents and injuries are attributed to unsafe acts, rather those unsafe working 
conditions. 
Unsafe acts are related (by any way) with an inadequate safety climate, which is not considered 
in the existing RAOS methods described in literature; this may lead to an underestimation of the 
risk associated with the task to be performed. This increases interactive complexity and make it 
difficult for the analysts to consider all the potential expected system states, abnormal situations 
and disturbances that can occur, in a reliable way, by the use of statistical data.  
Besides, much of the data related to RAOS are imprecise, ill-define or vague in nature and not 
numerical; instead it is expressed as words or even sentences in natural language (such as: 
hazardous, very risky, risk acceptable, safe enough…). 
The imprecision, ill-definedness and vagueness that tend to characterize RAOS factors are 
predominantly subjective and linguistic in their nature and can be expressed more easily and 
reliably in a qualitative way by linguistic variables which are a mathematical concept from 
fuzzy sets theory. 
The complexity of the safety systems should force to alter the traditional approaches to RAOS 
and thus, to accept as unavoidable a substantial degree of fuzziness in the description of the 
safety systems behavior, as well as in their characterization. This fuzziness, distasteful though it 
may be, is the price it has to be paid for the ineffectiveness of precise mathematical techniques 
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in dealing with this type of systems that comprise a very large number of interacting elements 
and involving a large number of variables. 
It is understandable that the most effective way for improving safety performance is to prevent 
accidents before they occur. To improve safety performance of the construction industry, safety 
professionals are carrying out RAOS on sites. Previous research revealed that safety 
professionals on construction sites lacked systematic risk assessment techniques considering all 
relevant risk factors (including safety climate) and historical statistical data are not available for 
the objective use of probabilistic RAOS methods; hence they conducted assessments without 
following any structured method and simply by relying in their experience and perception. 
However, safety professionals’ understandings and perceptions of safety risks will affect the 
quality and reliability of RAOS results. 
Further, to achieve a good safety performance (to lower the risk), safe work practices must be 
sought, effective management commitment is needed, effective communication should be 
sought with workers, effective safety instructions should be provided to workers and safety 
awareness should be increased. Studies on the role of organizational and psychosocial factors in 
influencing risk behaviors and the likelihood of injury at work proved that safety climate has 
great impact in workplaces safety. However, estimating the safety climate using the existing 
models is a time consuming process, embedded with gross simplifications and imprecisions and 
requires important resources (it requires to visit and revisit the site in order to come up with 
conclusions relating to the real situation). Furthermore, current safety climate assessment 
methods do not provide a direct relationship between safety climate level and safety risks level. 
So, new methods both reliable and user friendly are needed to construction industry. 
The conceptual goal of RAOS process is to eliminate the risk, but it would be naive to believe 
that this may be completely achieved because the resources are limited (the really aim is to 
prevent and/or minimize the occurrences of accidents and hazards that threaten workers in the 
work place). So, the question “How safe is safe enough” must be answered and the available 
resources should be efficiently allocated. Organizations have moral, legal, and financial 
responsibilities to limit the risks their operations pose, but spending resources on risk reduction 
projects whose benefits are grossly disproportionate to their costs will weakness the 
organization competitive position.  
The acceptable risk problem has been discussed in the literature and the ALARP – ‘as low as 
reasonably practicable’ – concept based on the notion of a maximum acceptable individual or 
societal risk is one of the most spread and used. QRAM results ranks the risks obtained in 3 
regions: acceptable (below 0.30), meaning that no more safety barriers are needed, ALARP 
(between 0.30 and 0.70, including these values), meaning that the risk should be lowered if the 
resources needed are not disproportionate to the benefits and, unacceptable (above 0.70) 
meaning that the work can’t be performed with such risk (must be stopped). This way of 
displaying results proved to be more helpful for the safety managers. 
To rank the safety risks at construction sites, QRAM provides a practical way to rating the risk 
factors which are taxonomically divided into four dimensions, namely: Safety Climate 
Adequacy, Severity Factors, Possibility Factors, and Safety Barriers Effectiveness. 
Each dimension is composed by a set of factors which are assessed and rated by linguistic 
variables. To obtain the final estimated risk level, the composing factors of each dimension are 
aggregated by specific aggregation operators. 
The set of data required to running this method would be captured in 3 ways: 1) by direct 
observation of the site workplaces, 2) by consult of the site documentation (safety plan, work 
accident reports, safety meeting records…) and 3) by interviewing site workers, supervisors and 
managers. Thus, avoid using (usually unreliable) historical data. 
123 
In addition, QRAM provides a novel way to handle imprecision and uncertainty in the factors 
influencing the risk by using FST to rate the risk factors and to aggregate them.  
QRAM method allows supporting risk characterization, by rating factors that may influence the 
safety condition in natural language (linguistic variables) to help safety managers to decide: 
a) If the risk is acceptable and, 
b) Pointed a prioritization of safety barriers to be taken. 
In summary, the use of probabilistic RAOS models at constructions sites requires analysts to 
make harsh estimates based on their experience and perceptions, while FST proved be a good 
framework for RAOS especially because it allows the use of ill-defined data and the use of 
empirical knowledge to deal with fuzzy (real) concepts. Besides the safety studies and 
techniques using FST developed in recent years, the application of FST to construction 
occupational safety has not yet been fully explored. 
This thesis presents a structured method (QRAM) to assess occupational safety risks at 
constructions sites. The method was been tested and evaluated in 12 sites in different countries: 
Brezil (2), Bulgaria (1), Greece (3), Portugal (3), and Turkey (3), and proved be an operational 
tool for risk managers, like competent authorities, site managers and the risks experts to 
evaluate safety vulnerabilities on construction sites, providing a detailed picture of the situation.  
To conclude, this research provides a tool that should help construction industry to decrease 
safety risks on sites to avoid workers’ injuries and provides further areas of research for 
interested parties. 
This thesis was divided in 7 chapters. The first one discussed concepts and related works to 
RAOS. Chapter 2 presents the background on hazards in the construction industry. Chapter 3 
presents an overview on risk assessment occupational methods. Chapter 4 is focused on the 
concepts and techniques of FST used in this work. Chapter 5 describes the various stages of 
development of the model and presents the four QRAM dimensions. Chapter 6 is devoted to 
applying the model to real work situations to evaluate the model. Chapter 7 presents the 
conclusions and suggestions for future work.  
This dissertation ends with the compilation of the references used and 34 Annexes.  
7.1. Strengths and limitations 
The construction community has largely neglected the treatment and storage of data concerning 
occupational safety and health, related to accidents, risk management from the individual 
worker behaviour to the organization-level. Such information is essential to produce accurate 
models. In the construction industry, reliable historical data does not exists, so they use data 
from other industries or similar sites. Another problem is that occupational historical data may 
include no extreme observations (for the proper data treatment), but this does not preclude that 
such events occurring in the future. 
The lack of data and information was one of the main limitations on this work development. 
This prevented, for example, being able to assign a weight to each dimension of the model to 
express the relative importance of each dimension. They do not contribute equally to the risk 
level but there isn’t information about that. 
The severity dimension could be modeled in a manner more consistent with reality if the 
accident investigation records were more rigorous and recorded data/information that would 
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allow linking factors such as drop height, landing surface, fall dynamics, personal data (age, 
fitness, BMI…) with the severity of the accident consequences. 
According to the safety expert pool, QRAM method seems to be a good tool for occupational 
safety risk assessment on construction sites and allows an easy and explicit identification of the 
accident factors, making the communication between the stakeholders easier or at least more 
straightforward and structured. The specific checklists used for the elicitation of risk 
information (which are exploited through a clearly understandable representation) are a good aid 
to analysts and the use of the linguistic variables to assess them is a better way to make the 
estimates more objective. They considered that the linguistic scale measurement has the 
advantage of be intuitive and quick to apply. However, using QRAM enforces a more 
systematic risk assessment process but leaving little space to the analysts’ creativity 
QRAM results were presented in 3 semantic levels to facilitate the understanding of the risk 
factors assessment by safety experts and non-experts. 
An important advantage of QRAM is that it shows clearly which factors have an influence on 
risk control and/or have to be improved. It gives site managers better information to decide how 
to invest in safety measures. The necessary evaluation of the safety climate enables them to 
improve their safety functions, and is favourable to get their commitment to obtain a better level 
of safety on site. 
Concluding, the results of QRAM application proved its ability to identify and rate all the 
significant factors that could affect safety on construction sites and its fitness for use, providing 
a good basis for anticipating safety troubles, before or during construction and thus, preventing 
safety problems. 
7.2. Future work 
In future developments it is desirable to research a model to “measure” the accuracy of safety 
climate dimension and perform more detailed comparisons of QRAM with other “so-called” 
quantitative methods (WORM for example) and to assess the advantages and disadvantages of 
each framework in occupational risk assessment and management. 
Further, the severity dimension needs to be simplified in order to better incorporate the 
empirical knowledge of safety experts. 
In addition to the important issues of validity and reliability, there are still other matters open 
for questioning. For instance, the weighting of the dimensions remains to be explored. Although 
the reasoning of equally and unequally weighted systems appears to be sound, there is no 
empirical evidence or scientific knowledge for its support. 
Lastly, the relationship between barrier types and occupational safety risk level is still open for 
more research. 
Although the limitations appointed and the additional research work that should be done to 
improve the QRAM method, the tests made prove that it allows the analyst to resolve the 
difficulties of traditional methods to deal with the uncertainties due to imprecise, ill-define or 
vague data and to use their own perceptions and the workers perceptions to make more accurate 
occupational risk estimations, in a more user friendly way. 
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Annex I 
Annex I.1 – Safety Climate assess, questions related with Safety Rules and 
Procedures 
Safety Rules and Procedures 
1RS  
Written work procedures match the way tasks are done in practice? 
2RS  
Written work procedures are technically accurate and adequate sources of safety 
information? 
3RS  
Written work procedures are complete and easy to read and understand? 
4RS  
Written work procedures are always available whenever needed to be consulted? 
5RS  
Workers can easily identify the applied procedure for each job? 
6RS  
Rules enforce the use of personal protective equipment whenever necessary? 
7RS  
Rules require detailed work plans from subcontractors or self-employed individuals? 
8RS  
The definition of responsibilities and accountabilities is adequate? 
 
Annex I.2 - Safety Climate assess, questions related with Workers’ Competence 
Workers’ Competence 
1C  
Workers received adequate training to perform theirs jobs safely (when entering on site, 
changing jobs or using a new technique)? 
2C  
Workers use, keep, inspect and test the appropriate personal protective equipment as 
indicated? 
3C  Workers know and correctly use relevant safety procedures? 
4C  Workers report, appropriately, incidents and accidents? 
5C  
Workers take general precautions to avoid the dangers of workplace hazards? 
6C  
Workers identify and communicate potentially hazardous situations? 
7C  
Workers apply appropriate work practices to reduce exposures to hazards? 
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Annex I.3 - Safety Climate assess, questions related with Safe Work Behavior 
Safe Work Behavior 
1B  
In this site safety plays an effective role in preventing accidents? 
2B  
In this site safety makes it possible to get the job done? 
3B  In this site safety is not restrictive and superficial? 
4B  In this site safety helps to increase workers’ productivity? 
5B  
In this site safety contributes to workers satisfaction on work? 
6B  In this site safety inspires workers to work more safely? 
7B  
In this site safety has a positive influence on morale? 
8B  
In this site workers are proud to take part of it? 
9B  
In this site workers have proactive behaviors in removing workplace safety hazards? 
 
Annex I.4 - Safety Climate assess, questions related with Management 
Commitment 
Management Commitment 
1CM  
Management clearly considers safety as important as production? 
2CM  
Management expresses concern if safety procedures are not adhered to? 
3CM  Management acts decisively when a safety concern is raised? 
4CM  Management acts quickly to correct safety problems? 
5CM  
Management commitment to safety is visible (e.g. by usage of PPEs)? 
6CM  Management praises site employees for working safely?  
7CM  
Management disciplines site employees for working unsafely? 
8CM  
Management considers a person’s safety behavior when moving/promoting people? 
9CM  
Management requires each manager to help improve safety in his/her department? 
10CM  
Management uses any available information to improve existing safety rules? 
11CM  
Management gives safety personnel the power they need to do their job correctly? 
12CM  
Management clearly communicates and continues to bring safety information to site 
employees’ attention at all levels within the site? 
13CM  
Management operates an open-door policy on safety issues? 
14CM  
Management encourages feedback from site employees on safety issues? 
15CM  
Management undertakes campaigns to promote safe working practices? 
16CM  
Management provides a sufficient budget for safety on site? 
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Annex I.5 - Safety Climate assess, questions related with Supervisory Action 
Towards Safety 
Supervisory Action Towards Safety 
1L  
Supervisors have positive safety behaviors? 
2L  Supervisors usually engage in regular safety talks? 
3L  Supervisors welcome reporting safety hazards/incidents? 
4L  Supervisors are a good resource for solving safety problems? 
5L  
Supervisors do not allow working around safety procedures even to meet important 
deadlines? 
6L  
Supervisors value workers ideas about improving safety even when significant changes to 
working practices are suggested? 
7L  
Supervisors say a “good word” to workers that pay special attention to safety? 
8L  
Supervisors make sure that workers receive all the equipment needed to do the job safely? 
9L  
Supervisors discuss how to improve safety with workers? 
10L  
Supervisors listen to and act upon feedback from site employees? 
11L  
Supervisors communicate lessons from accidents to improve safety performance? 
12L  
Supervisors appropriately report incidents, accidents, and/or illnesses? 
13L  
Supervisors wear personal protective equipment even if it is uncomfortable? 
 
Annex I.6 - Safety Climate assess, questions related with Communication and 
Participation 
Communication and Participation 
1CP  
Site safety policy and objectives are clearly communicated to site employees’ at all levels 
within the site? 
2CP  Workers participate in hazard identification, risk assessment, determination of risk controls 
(safety barriers) and personal protective equipment’s choice? 
3CP  Workers and subcontractors are consulted and involved in the ongoing review of safety? 
4CP  Workers and subcontractors are consulted and involved in accident investigation? 
5CP  
Workers participate in work planning? 
6CP  
There is good communication at shift hand over? 
7CP  
Communication with the supervisors regarding safety matters is easy? 
8CP  
There is a fluent communication embodied in periodic and frequent meetings, campaigns or 
oral presentations to transmit principles and rules of action? 
9CP  
Information is available to workers prior to modifications and changes in production 
processes or job positions? 
10CP  When starting in new job position, it is provided written information about procedures and 
correct way of doing tasks? 
11CP  
Written circulars elaborated and meetings organised to inform workers about risks 
associated with their work and how to prevent accidents? 
12CP  Information flow (e.g. policy, procedures, vertical and horizontal channels, scheduled and 
unscheduled meetings) are used in support of various types of decision-making processes? 
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Annex I.7 - Safety Climate assess, questions related with Supportive Environment 
Supportive Environment 
1ES  
Subcontractors’ safety records are inspected before awarding contracts? 
2ES  Coworkers adopt a no-blame approach to highlight unsafe work behavior? 
3ES  Coworkers often remind each other on how to work safely? 
4ES  Coworkers believe it is their business to maintain a safe workplace environment? 
5ES  
Coworkers always offer help when needed to perform the job safely? 
6ES  
Coworkers endeavor to ensure that individuals are not working by themselves under risky or 
hazardous conditions? 
7ES  
Coworkers maintain good working relationships? 
8ES  
Coworkers ensure that the workload is reasonably balanced among themselves? 
 
Annex I.8 - Safety Climate assess, questions related with Safety planning 
Safety planning 
1PS  Does safety started at design stage? 
2PS  Construction schedule is reasonable? 
3PS  Safety is a primary consideration when determining site layout? 
4PS  Chances of being involved in a site accident are quite large, due to unsafe conditions? 
5PS  
Operating site conditions may hinder one’s ability to work safely? 
6PS  
Detecting potential hazards is not a major aim of the site planning exercise? 
7PS  
Working with defective equipment is not allowed under any circumstances? 
8PS  
Potential risks and consequences are identified prior to execution? 
9PS  
Weather (and soil conditions) are considered in work planning? 
10PS  Training includes effective skills practice for normal work and skill practices for emergencies? 
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Annex I.9 - Safety Climate assess, questions related with Work Pressure over 
Safety 
Work Pressure over Safety 
1P  
Is there sufficient “thinking time” to enable workers to plan and carry out their work to an 
adequate standard? 
2P  Are there enough workers to carry out the required work? 
3P  Workers consider that is necessary depart from safety requirements for production’s sake? 
4P  Workers perceive that operational targets conflict with some safety measures? 
5P  
Workers consider that is normal to take shortcuts at the expense of safety? 
6P  
Workers tolerate minor unsafe behaviors performed by coworkers? 
7P  
Workers consider that is not acceptable to delay periodic inspection of plant and equipment? 
8P  Management is strict about working safely when work falls behind schedule? 
9P  
Supervisors refuse to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule? 
 
Annex I.10 - Safety Climate assess, questions related with Safety Management 
System 
Safety Management System 
1MS  
Are periodic checks conducted on execution of prevention plans and compliance level of 
regulations? 
2MS  
Are systematic inspections conducted periodically to ensure effective functioning of whole 
system? 
3MS  
Are accidents and incidents reported, investigated, analyzed and recorded? 
4MS  
Are external evaluations (audits) periodically conducted of validity and reliability of 
prevention management system? 
5MS  
Personal protective equipment usage is monitored to identify problem areas? 
6MS  
Is ensured daily housekeeping at all workplaces? 
7MS  
After using, any tools and small machinery these are stored in a correct place? 
8MS  Safety devices on machines are maintained in good operating? 
9MS  
Are there markings and sign-posting of all risks and relevant safety information? 
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Annex I.11 – Questions to assess Possibility factors affecting Falls 
Possibility factors affecting Falls 
General  
To what extent: 
 
F1 
The work (at height) was properly planned to be carried out in a safe way (especially work on or 
near fragile roof surfaces, on a roofs and store floors being built or demolished or 
erecting/dismantling/altering scaffolding) and properly supervised? 
F2 Were simultaneous activities at the same location properly planned to be carried out in a safe 
way and appropriately supervised? 
 
F3 
Are fragile surfaces (unable to support a load such as: dome lights, glass sheets, asbestos cement 
sheet, plastic sheet, corroded metal sheet, rotten woods, roof lights, bridged materials in silos, 
crusted surfaces of sludge lagoons) identified? 
F4 Are floor openings and storey floor edges properly protected? 
F5 Are skylights openings guarded by fixed standard railings on all exposed sides or are covers 
capable of supporting 100 kg installed? 
F6 Are the wall openings with 1.20 m or more above ground properly protected? 
F7 Are the means to access to workplaces at height are adequate and properly protected? 
F8 The working surface provides sufficient grip (refers to surfaces that were not made or designed 
to climb onto, walk on or provide support)? 
F9 Are form and scrap lumber with protruding nails and all other debris kept clear from work areas, 
passageways, and stairs? 
 
 
F10 
Are work platforms adequate and robust enough (to resist to wind and other forces exerted by 
falling objects or by workers when using hand-operated tools) and protected by guardrails (top 
railings at least 1 meter above the working platform, foot rails at no less than 15 cm and 
intermediate rails so that no openings are greater than 47 cm, around the perimeter)? 
F11 Is assured that working platforms are not overloaded and the the loads correctly distributed? 
F12 Are extension platforms outside a wall properly guarded with side rails or equivalent guards? 
F13 Are the standard railings used and installed properly for open sided floors platforms with 1.20 m 
or more above ground or floor levels? 
F14 Are proper measures taken so that employees working at a height greater than 1.20 m are 
protected from falling? 
F15 Are opening areas properly protected? 
F16 Are stairways, runways and wall opening areas well illuminated? 
 
F17 
Are lighting levels adequate (functioning and position of lights to ensure that all floor areas are 
evenly lit and all potential hazards, e.g. obstructions and spills can be clearly seen)? 
 
F18 
Are the workplaces maintained clean and tidy, with floors and access routes kept clear of 
slippery (due to mud, wetness, moisture, oil, grease, powder, insufficient drainage, freezing, 
snow or ice…) and obstacles were workers could slip or trip? 
 
F19 
The working floors are not uneven and/or unstable (it means that the surface was on level, there 
were not loose or unstable floor parts, wrinkled carpets, etc.) or have dangerous thresholds or 
steps? 
F20 Are the works stopped due to inclement weather (i.e. when workers could be thrown off-
balance by the wind, snow, heavy rain…)? 
F21 Are assured that cranes and lifts are fixed on solid foundations? 
F22 Is strictly prohibited to stay at height while this was not necessary for carrying out tasks? 
F23 Is strictly prohibited to talking on the mobile telephone during work? 
F24 Are the workers protected from the risk of being pushed or bumped by swinging objects and/or 
by major gusts of wind? 
 
F25 
Are workers aware of the dangers of lose their balance when using hand tools (e. g. lipping, 
tripping, taking a wrong step, being bumped by someone and consequently losing the balance)? 
 
F26 
Are workers aware of the dangers of not using the right equipment for climbing on objects (such 
as vehicles) or descend from them (e. g. jumping out of a lorry at quite a height (without using 
the stairs) or climbing on a vehicle on the outside)? 
F27 Are workers aware of the dangers of leaving or entering the vehicle, while it was not yet 
(entirely) brought to a standstill by the driver? 
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Possibility factors affecting Falls (continuation) 
Scaffolds 
To what extent: 
F28 Is the scaffold adequate to the use (able to support loads and provide good access to 
workplaces), regularly inspected and kept in good condition? 
F29 Are all workers involved in the erection, alteration and dismantling of scaffolds competent to 
perform the task? 
F30 Are scaffolds secured to the building or structure in enough places (known that was strong 
enough) to prevent collapse? 
F31 Are scaffolds inspected for defects and damaged parts prior to use? 
 
F32 
Do scaffolds protect the users against falls (top railings at least 1 metre above the working 
platform, foot rails at no less than 15 cm and intermediate rails so that no openings are greater 
than 47 cm, around the perimeter whilst the distance between the outside wall and the 
scaffolding exceeded 10 cm)? 
F33 There are safe accesses to the scaffold’s platforms such as a staircase, an access tower or a 
passenger lift? 
F34 Are mobile scaffolds wheels adequate (diameter greater than or equal to 15 cm) and respect the 
stability condition (height/width at least 3.5)? 
F35 Have mobile scaffolds wheels a braking system (kept in good condition) that prevents their 
uncontrolled movement? 
F36 Are mobile scaffolds protected on (all) edges? 
F37 Are mobile scaffolds inspected to detect signs of metal fatigue (e.g. hair cracks and/or 
corrosion)? 
F38 Extent are suspended scaffolds safely adequate (in EU countries must bear the “CE” mark) and 
are regularly inspected and kept in good condition? 
F39 Is it forbidden to work in suspended scaffolds with winds exceeding 40 km/h? 
F40 Is it forbidden a single worker to work in suspended scaffolds? 
F41 Is it complied with the maximum permissible load (in any kind of scaffold)? 
F42 Are the scaffold floors kept clear and cleaned (i.e. tools were not lying on it, it was not muddy or 
oil was not present)? 
F43 Are the scaffolds protected against being hit by lorries, cranes or other vehicles or machines? 
F44 Are the scaffolds (of any kind) sufficiently shored up and anchored (fastened solidly to prevent it 
from toppling over)? 
F45 The scaffold (of any kind) loads bearing capacity are correctly posted? 
F46 Are the scaffolds inspected by an expert after a storm? 
F47 Are the loads correctly distributed across the scaffold (of any kind) platforms? 
Ladders 
To what extent: 
 
 
F48 
Are fixed ladders safely designed and constructed (i.e. not too steep and not too narrow, 
without: slippery floors, worn floor, not uniform floor, steps with not uniform heights, handrails 
loose or weak, the distance between the permanent floor and the first rung was greater than the 
space between two consecutive rungs, rungs slippery by itself and/or landing platforms were 
missing if the ladder was higher than 3 m)? 
F49 Are fixed ladders provided with protection against falling from either side (e.g. robust handrails)? 
F50 Are fixed ladders robust enough for the planned efforts? 
F51 Are fixed ladders properly fixed to the upper or lower floor (for instance, because it was being 
built or rebuilt)? 
F52 Are the rungs (of all kinds of ladders) kept clear of soiling (such as mud, oil, paint, snow or ice or 
other slippery material)? 
 
F53 
Are conditions such as: wearing shoes with slippery soles, the presence of objects on the ladder, 
hastily ascending or descending, being distracted or preoccupied with something at the same 
time, and poor vision, under which workers can lose their balance, be maintained under control? 
F54 Are ladders inspected and kept in safe conditions (without weak, broken or missing steps and 
weak, broken or missing handrails)? 
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Possibility factors affecting Falls (continuation) 
Portable (or moveable) ladders 
To what extent: 
 
F55 
Are portable ladders placed correctly, at an angle of one in four, (one unit of measurement out 
for every four units up), on and against a material that has a reasonable coefficient of friction 
and strength and was the step ladder placed on a surface that was not level and/or stable? 
F56 Are portable ladders large enough to workers to be able to reach their workplaces? 
F57 Are portable ladders equipped with stability devices or tied (or equally effectively secured 
against movement) at the top? 
F58 Is strictly prohibited to place portable ladders on incline or sloping surfaces? 
F59 Are ladders with broken or missing rungs or split side rails, tagged and taken out of service? 
F60 Are metal ladders inspected for damage or signs of corrosion? 
F61 Are portable ladders used only in short-term jobs (not exceeding 30 min and do not require the 
worker side loads)? 
 
F62 
Are portable wood ladders adequate for their purpose, maintained in good condition, and 
provided with secure footing (i.e. rungs of ladders uniformly spaced and not exceeding 30 cm)? 
 
F63 
Do workers assume a correct position on the ladder (not standing on the side of the ladder, feet 
in the middle, face toward the rungs, using both hands for support, not standing on the ladder 
whilst shifting or extending, not slipping off the ladder without using the rungs and not hanging 
onto the side)? 
F64 Are areas around the top and bottom of the portable ladder kept clear? 
F65 Are portable ladders prohibited from being used in a horizontal position as platforms, runways, 
or scaffolds? 
F66 Are the side rails of the portable ladder extending above the landing (at least 90 cm)? 
F67 Is the distance at the base of the open portable ladders 15 cm by each 30 cm high? 
F68 Are there warning signs indicating that work was being performed on a ladder? 
 
F69 
Are workers aware of the dangers when they are in poor physical condition (sick, weak, 
nauseous, disabled to some extent, dizzy, vertigo, fatigued, tense or under the influence of 
drugs, alcohol or medicine, etc.) whilst standing on the ladder? 
Moveable platforms 
To what extent: 
F70 Are moveable platforms provided with guard rails and stability devices (e.g. outriggers, locking-
out controls) to prevent inadvertent operation? 
F71 Are moveable platforms inspected to detect signs of wear and tear in the lifting and hoisting 
mechanism (cables, chains, hydraulics, etc.)? 
 
F72 
Are moveable platforms operation and control devices inspected to detect signs of technical 
malfunctions and to assure that the control panel is clear (that means the symbols on the control 
panel cannot be interpreted in several ways and that all parts are visible)? 
F73 Are the moveable platforms sufficiently shored up and anchored? 
F74 Are the moveable platforms protected against being hit by lorries, cranes or other vehicles or 
machines? 
 
F75 
Are the loads correctly distributed across the moveable platforms (it means that the load is 
placed in such a way that it can start sliding and/or that it can make the platform unstable)? 
F76 Is strictly prohibited to place moveable platforms on incline or sloping surfaces? 
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Annex I.12 - Questions to assess Possibility factors affecting Contact with 
electricity 
Possibility factors affecting Contact with electricity 
To what extent: 
E1 Is it ensured that the work was properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried out in a 
safe way as it is reasonably practicable? 
E2 Is electrical equipment’s (cables, frames, accessories) revised before being reassembled in a new 
site? 
E3 Does electrical equipment meet all the legal and/or normative requirements? 
E4 Are all electrical cords or cables taken out of service when worn or frayed? 
E5 Are voltage transmission lines clearly indicated by means of marking and/or signalling? 
 
E6 
Is aerial lift equipment’s working near energized lines or equipment grounded or barricaded 
properly and considered as energized equipment or the truck insulated for the work being 
performed? 
E7 Is all electrical equipment free from recognized hazards (insulation defects, e.g.) that may cause 
death or serious harm? 
E8 Are live electrical parts properly guarded against accidental contact? 
E9 Are safety distances to the electric network (2 m until 1 kV, 4 m between 1 kV and 60 kV, 5 m to 
over 60 kV) met? 
E10 Are ground fault circuit interrupters properly used to protect employees? 
E11 Are all outlet devices correctly and properly matched with load being served? 
E12 Is the path to ground from circuits, equipment, and enclosures satisfied so that they are 
permanent and continuous? 
E13 Are there (on site) measures’ in place to prevent unauthorised persons from working on 
installations under tension (e. g. locker keys, supervision and key procedures)? 
E14 Are all the electrical extension cords of the three wire types (with ground wire, green wire and 
yellow wire)? 
E15 Are the lamps for general illumination properly protected against breakage? 
E16 Are the protection measures against damage for flexible cords and cables satisfactory? 
 
E17 
Are all cabinets, cut out boxes, fittings, boxes, panel board enclosures, switches, circuit breakers, 
through doorways or windows, attached to building surfaces, or concealed behind walls, ceilings, 
or floors? 
E18 All pull boxes, junction boxes and fittings have covers? 
E19 Are all electrical equipment’s used in hazardous locations intrinsically safe? 
E20 Are electric powered tools double-insulated or properly grounded? 
E21 Are de-energization tests or other appropriate methods or means applied so that the electric 
equipment and lines are considered de-energized 
E22 Do workers not wear metal objects (rings, watches…) when working with electrical devices? 
 
E23 
Are the measures taken so that electrodes removed and electrode holders placed or protected 
cannot make electrical contact with employees when the holders are left unattended? 
E24 Are all disconnecting devices legibly marked to indicate purpose unless located so that purpose 
is evident? 
E25 Are metal ladders not used when working on or near electrical equipment (such as changing light 
bulbs or fluorescent tubes)? 
E26 Is electric power operation tools equipment with proper ground or double insulated? 
E27 Is sufficient working space provided to permit safe operation and maintenance of electrical 
equipment? 
E28 Was the electrical energy of the machines or the equipment’s (including hand tools) turned off 
when work was being performed on it (for instance, during maintenance work or failure 
repairs)? 
E29 Are workers aware of the dangers when they are working in the immediate vicinity of voltage 
transmission lines? 
E30 Are workers aware of the dangers of bypassing the electrical protection devices (e. g. residual-
current device or ground fault circuit interrupter)? 
E31 Are workers aware of the dangers of using tools that were not suitable for electrical works (e.g. 
using non-insulated screwdrivers) or using it incorrectly (e. g. using low voltage detectors for 
high voltage)? 
E32 Do all electricians wear cotton clothes and use protective equipment’s (such as rubber shoes and 
gloves and mats)? 
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Annex I.13 - Questions to assess Possibility factors affecting Struck by moving 
vehicle 
Possibility factors affecting Struck by moving vehicle 
General  
To what extent: 
S1 Is ensured that all drivers had (before starting to drive) a special training in order to drive the 
specific vehicles? 
S2 Is ensured that all visiting drivers report to site management before entering the site (to assure 
that drivers had received proper safety training)? 
S3 Is there (where vehicles have to reverse) a trained signaler to assist the vehicle driver? 
S4 Are passengers prevented from riding in dangerous positions? 
 
S5 
Are flagmen and other workers at risk of being struck by moving vehicle do they wear noticeable 
garments (red or orange warning garments, reflectorized for working at night)? 
S6 Are there proper warning vests made of reflectorized or of high visibility material and to what 
extent are they being used by employees exposed to vehicular traffic? 
 
S7 
Are the necessary measures taken to prevent the parked vehicles from inadvertently moving 
(using the hand brake, removing the ignition key, putting blocks behind the wheels when this 
was in fact necessary, etc.)? 
S8 Do all vehicles with an obstructed view to the rear have a backup alarm or are they always used 
with an observer? 
S9 Are drivers aware of the dangers (for themselves and for pedestrians) of exit of the vehicle while 
it had not yet stopped and been properly locked? 
S10 Are drivers aware of the dangers of the vehicles with high center of gravity resulting in an 
increased risk of tipping over? 
S11 Are drivers aware of the dangers (for themselves and for pedestrians) of doing other things 
whilst driving (talking on the telephone, talking with others, adjusting the radio, larking about, 
etc.) or of being distracted by things in his surroundings (by or loud noise)? 
S12 Are drivers aware of the dangers (for themselves and for pedestrians) of reduced visibility by 
load obstruction, poor weather conditions or insufficient lighting? 
 
S13 
Are drivers aware of the dangers (for themselves and for pedestrians) when they are in poor 
physical condition (sick, weak, nauseous, disabled to some extent, dizzy, vertigo, fatigued, tense 
or under the influence of drugs, alcohol or medicine, etc.) whilst driving? 
S14 Are workers at noisy locations (or when using ear protection, MP3 players or talking on the 
mobile phone…) aware of the increasing danger of being struck by moving vehicle? 
 
S15 
Are workers aware of the dangers of being just in front of or behind a vehicle (for instance, by 
crossing behind a vehicle to do something with the load or because of being talking with the 
driver)? 
S16 Are workers aware of the dangers of walking in a hurried or stressed manner, tripping or losing 
their footing at locations where vehicles are driven? 
S17 Are workers aware of the dangers of leaving or entering the vehicle, while it was not yet 
(entirely) brought to a standstill by the driver? 
S18 Are workers aware of the dangers of being transported in a vehicle that is not intended for 
persons (e. g. catching a lift on forklift trucks or running boards of a vehicle)? 
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Possibility factors affecting Struck by moving vehicle (continuation) 
Roads 
To what extent: 
 
S19 
Is a traffic plan for the site established (with lines separating vehicles and pedestrian routes, 
vehicle access points and warning signs, traffic signs and traffic lights in dangerous situations like 
pedestrian crossings)? 
 
S20 
Are vehicle traffic routes suitable for the types and quantity of vehicles that use them (ensure 
they are wide enough and that floor and road surfaces are kept in good condition) and 
periodically checked? 
S21 Are one-way systems or turning points provided to minimize the need for reversing (to avoid 
manoeuvre the vehicle within the site)? 
S22 Is there space enough to manoeuvrer the vehicles safely (avoiding the vehicle to enter 
pedestrian zones when being maneuverer)? 
 
S23 
Are obstructions (sharp bends, pillars, other vehicles, stacks of material, etc.) removed where 
possible or otherwise is it make sure they are clearly visible (e.g. providing suitable fixed mirrors 
at blind corners)? 
S24 Is the road surface clean of slippery (due to mud, spilled oil, freezing, snow or because the 
structure of the road surface is itself slippery)? 
S25 Does the speed limit assure that the vehicles could be stopped in time (that depends on both the 
vehicle (weight…) and the situation (presence of pedestrians, the visibility…)? 
S26 Are physical speed restrictions such as speed bumps taken (if necessary)? 
S27 Are traffic or warning signs satisfactory? 
S28 Is the road surface properly stable to avoid that the vehicle could sink or tip over? 
S29 Are supportive structures provided where necessary to prevent collapse and to prevent vehicles 
from running out of the roadway? 
 
S30 
Are roads, runways and manoeuvring areas correctly illuminated (functioning and position of 
lights to ensure that all surfaces are evenly lit and all potential hazards, e.g. obstructions and 
spills can be clearly seen)? 
S31 Is delimitation and signalization made with retro reflective material? 
Vehicles 
To what extent: 
S32 Are vehicles maintained (steering, handbrake and footbrake works properly and tires tread are 
deep enough) to assure that it is possible to brake on time and steer properly? 
S33 Are the vehicles equipped with safety belts? 
S34 The vehicles have suitable safety features (lights, acoustic signals, side-turn signal lights, etc.) 
periodically checked (by a competent worker)? 
S35 Are vehicles inspected (by the drivers) at the beginning of each shift to assure that all parts, 
equipment, and accessories affecting safety operation are free of defects? 
S36 Are vehicles securely loaded (the load is properly distributed and does not obstruct or interfere 
with the ability to see) and without overload (an overloaded vehicle can be difficult to handle)? 
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Annex I.14 - Questions to assess Possibility factors affecting injured by 
falling/swinging objects 
Possibility factors affecting injured by falling/swinging objects 
General  
To what extent: 
 
Fo1 
Is it ensured that the work was properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried out in a 
safe way as it is reasonably practicable (e.g. with letting objects fall in an intentional and a 
controlled manner such as rubble or debris, into a chute/container)? 
Fo2 Was simultaneous activities at the same location properly plan to be carried out in a safe way 
and are appropriately supervised? 
Fo3 Are materials which are stored in tiers stacked, racked, blocked, interlocked, or otherwise, 
properly secured to prevent sliding, falling or collapsing? 
 
Fo4 
Is the storage of materials properly done (are materials stored more than 1,80 m from any hoist 
way or inside floor opening and more than 3 m from any exterior walls that do not extend above 
the top of the stored materials)? 
Fo5 Is the weight of the loads to move known (if it is not known, it is estimated by multiplying the 
load volume by the material specific weight)? 
Fo6 Are the cranes, lifts and other lift equipment’s load bearing capacity correctly posted? 
Fo7 Have proper guards been provided to protect employees from falling materials where conveyors 
pass over areas or aisles? 
Fo8 Are all floor openings not used as material drops equipped with a properly secured cover that 
will support any load which may be imposed? 
Fo9 Is any area where material is dropped outside the exterior walls of the structure effectively and 
properly protected? 
Fo10 Is a limited access zone established securely when constructing a masonry wall? 
Fo11 Are proper conditions satisfied for all masonry walls over eight feet high (are they braced or 
supported properly to prevent collapse)? 
Fo12 Are inspections made by a competent person as work progresses to detect hazards from 
weakened or deteriorated floors or walls or loosened materials? 
Fo13 Are accessible areas within the swing radius of the rotating superstructure of the crane properly 
barricaded or protected? 
Fo14 Are there (on site) objects poorly maintained, damaged or not properly secured so that parts 
can break off or release at high wind speeds and be blown away? 
Fo15 Is there (on site) objects placed in such a way that they easily could have been taken/were 
actually taken by the strong winds? 
 
Fo16 
Are scaffolders whose height exceeded 30 meters, have an irregular shape or scaffolding 
whereby more than one working platform was loaded with diagrams for erection? 
Fo17 Are workers aware of the dangers of the use of incorrect tools or aids (e.g. decide to lift 
something manually, whilst it would be better to do so mechanically)? 
Fo18 Have all scaffolds footers? 
Fo19 Are the danger zones of swinging/hanging loads or in the vicinity of rotating arms or 
counterweights clearly indicated by means of marking and/or signalling? 
Formwork and concreting 
To what extent: 
 
Fo20 
Are all formworks for cast-in-place concrete designed, fabricated, erected, supported, braced, 
and maintained so that it will support without failure all loads that may be anticipated? 
F021 Is inspection of the erected shoring equipment performed (it is inspected immediately, prior to, 
during and immediately after concrete placement properly satisfied)? 
 
Fo22 
Is the inspection of the forms and shores performed properly, considering that the forms and 
shores are left in place until the employer determines that the concrete can support its weight 
and superimposed loads? 
Fo23 Are precast concrete wall units, structural framing, and tilt up wall panels supported properly to 
prevent overturning and collapse until permanent connections are made? 
Fo24 Do designs and plans include prescribed methods of erection? 
Fo25 Are the jacking operations performed properly (for example, are jacking operations 
synchronized to insure even and uniform lifting)? 
Fo26 Are there only those workers required for jacking and to secure slabs permitted under slab 
during jacking? 
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Possibility factors affecting Struck by moving vehicle (continuation) 
Mechanical lifting 
To what extent: 
 
Fo27 
Are accessible areas within the swing radius of the rotating superstructure of the crane properly 
barricaded or protected (by measures - for instance, roofs - which prevent objects from falling in 
a safety zone)? 
Fo28 Are danger zones of hanging loads indicated by means of marking and/or signalling? 
Fo29 Are workers prohibited to stay in the lifting danger zone while this is not necessary for attaching 
or loosening loads? 
 
Fo30 
Is strictly prohibited to overload (it means that the load is heavier than the equipment's capacity 
indicated in the load chart) the hoisting equipment (crane, hoist, gantry crane, forklift truck 
etc.)? 
 
Fo31 
Are hoisting equipment’s maintained (hoisting cable, cable guides, winch, drive, operating 
panel, the levers, switches, instruments/sensors, limiters or indicators/gauges, hoisting arm, 
loading arm, stabilizers/props, etc.) to assure its good condition (not damaged, worn and 
properly assembled)? 
 
Fo32 
Are the “hoisting gear” (lifting straps, lashing straps, slings, hoisting chains, hoisting hooks, 
swivels, lifting beams, lifting clamps, hoisting eyes, lifting magnets, cargo slings, latches, etc.) 
periodically checked (by a competent worker)? 
 
Fo33 
Are hoisting equipment’s inspected (by the operators) at the beginning of each shift to assure 
that all equipment parts and accessories affecting safety operation are free of defects? 
Fo34 Do any hooks, rings, oblong links, pear shaped links, coupling links, and other attachments have 
a rated capacity at least that of the chain? 
Fo35 Is assured that the “hoisting gear” is correctly used (it means used in the way that it was 
made/intended for)? 
Fo36 Is assured that cranes and lifts are fixed on solid foundations? 
 
Fo37 
Is assured that hoisting equipment was placed on ground that is stable and sufficiently able to 
support the weight (it means that the surface is strong enough to bear the weight of the 
equipment’s and expected loads)? 
Fo38 Is assured that hoisting equipment that was affixed to a fixed construction (ceiling or another 
fixed construction) is properly attached to the fixed construction and/or rails? 
 
Fo39 
Is assured that props and stabilizers are properly used and placed (i.e. during the lifting the 
props were not properly used and the stabilizers placed were not properly placed or deployed)? 
 
Fo40 
Is assured that loads are correctly stowed and attached (correctly fastened to avoid load 
instability and/or fall) and correctly disconnected (only when it is in a stable position on the 
floor or on another surface)? 
Fo41 Is assured that bulk and/or small loads are fastened in appropriate devices (e.g. wire mesh 
containers or pallets)? 
Fo42 Is assured that loads are moved at an appropriate speed (not quickly or too suddenly)? 
Fo43 Is raised loads kept as close to the ground as possible to prevent tipping and bumping against 
objects or buildings while travelling? 
 
Fo44 
Are Mobile Elevating Working Platforms (MEWP’S) provided with overload blocked devices, 
guard rails, toe-boards, stability devices (e.g. outriggers, locking-out controls (other than those 
in the basket) to prevent any inadvertent operation? 
 
Fo45 
Are MEWP’S used on firm ground which is free from slopes / holes and the work area checked 
for localized features, e.g. manholes, service ducts, potholes, etc. (e.g. a hole 75 mm deep 
caused an overturn), overhead crushing or contact hazards? 
Fo46 Are stabilizers and outriggers provided with suitable soleplates for use on soft ground? 
Fo47 Are there systems of communication (working properly) between lifting operators and banks 
men? 
Fo48 Is it forbidden to hang loads with winds exceeding 40 km/h, heavy rain or fog (or other weather 
conditions that can hinder vision or difficult the load control)? 
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Annex I.15 - Questions to assess Possibility factors affecting Cave-ins 
Possibility factors affecting Cave-ins 
To what extent: 
Ci1 Is it ensured that the work was properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried out in a 
safe way as it is reasonably practicable? 
Ci2 Is the excavation area properly demarcated and signalized? 
Ci3 Do all excavation slopes respect at least the angle of response except for areas where solid rock 
allows line drilling or presplitting? 
 
Ci4 
Are workers aware of the dangers of working in the immediate vicinity of slopes of excavations 
that have the possibility of becoming unstable due to previous activities/processing work? 
Ci5 Is there proper drainage in the bulk mass? 
Ci6 Are there (on site) walls tilting (it means a slope of > 90° and can occur, for instance, if 
excavation is being conducted at the foot of the mass but not above it)? 
Ci7 Did all structures become unstable by excavation works (walls, trees, poles…) were they properly 
anchored? 
Ci8 Are all surface encumbrances that may create a hazard removed or supported? 
Ci9 Is proper warning system such as barricades, hand or mechanical signals or stop logs used when 
mobile equipment approaches the edge of the excavation? 
Ci10 Are excavation materials kept at least 1 m from the edge of the excavations? 
Ci11 Are daily inspections made to the excavation to determine the possibility of cave-ins and are 
they necessary measures taken to protect employees? 
Ci12 Are excavations inspected after any hazard increasing occurrence (e. g. storms)? 
Ci13 Are shoring or sloping systems used to support the walls and faces of the excavations sufficient 
to ensure against cave-ins? 
Ci14 Are there ladders properly placed in the excavation? 
Ci15 Is vehicle speed properly reduced in roads near excavations (to reduce vibration)? 
Ci16 Is pedestrians’ safety on the sidewalks assured by outlining the obstacles and/or forcing 
pedestrians to walk in the opposite side? 
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Annex I.16 - Questions to assess Possibility factors affecting hit by 
rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden movement) 
Possibility factors affecting Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden 
movement) 
To what extent: 
H1 Was the work properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried out in a safe way (e.g. the 
demolition or assembly of prefabricated structures)? 
H2 Simultaneous activities at the same location are properly planned to be carried out in a safe way 
and appropriately supervised? 
H3 Are abrasive wheel grinders provided with safety guards which cover the spindle ends, nut and 
flange projections? 
 
 
 
H4 
Are workers working in the vicinity of running machinery from which material or items could fly 
around, or in the vicinity of persons who use hand tools whereby material could fly around, 
properly protected (such as eye protection, facial protection or a helmet) for activities with a 
cutting action (sawing, drilling, planning, turning, honing, etc.) or for other activities whereby 
there is a risk that objects/parts can fly off (for instance, hammering, the treatment of objects on 
a lathe, with a drill or saw, whereby the object or the fastener can fly around during the 
treatment…)? 
 
 
 
 
H5 
Are workers aware of the dangers of the use of wrong tools or machine operated incorrectly or 
tools used in the wrong way (e. g. using metal hammers, whereas a plastic hammer should have 
been used for that material; using grinding discs that are not suitable for the material to be 
treated or for the rotational speeds of the machine; using the wrong pliers for holding something 
firmly; or using a screwdriver as a chisel and vice versa; when a force that is too great is exerted 
with the tool or if the machine is used for treating something with the wrong setting - speed, 
angle, direction, force, aid, etc.; wood drill instead of stone drill (for drilling into stone), a hand 
tool with the wrong size (spanners, pliers))? 
 
H6 
Are workers aware of the dangers of outlet valves, hoses or pipes that become clogged and 
whereby the material that causes the clogging can suddenly release outwards due to pressure 
build-up? 
 
H7 
Are workers aware of the dangers if some material is poorly maintained or damaged, hoses, 
chains, wires, ropes, cables under tension can suddenly break so that the loose ends could fly 
around? 
 
H8 
Are workers aware of the dangers of wires, cables or ropes that could get caught on something 
or become entangled getting under pressure or under (mechanical) tension (if these items then 
suddenly came loose, they could fly around)? 
 
H9 
Are workers aware of the dangers of the use of tools or machines in the wrong way (for instance, 
using a forklift truck to move vehicles; not using tensioners properly, the wrong timing when 
releasing something under tension or pressure)? 
 
H10 
Are objects that could be under pressure or under (mechanical) tension, properly secured (for 
instance, objects such as flexible hoses, cables, tackles, tail-lifts, binding wire, lashing straps, 
tensioners, steel wire or springs)? 
 
H11 
Are workers aware of the dangers of the use of incorrect tools or aids or hold hand tools 
incorrectly (e.g. use of the wrong tools, not holding tools in a safe direction; not safely placing 
tool leads and tubes so that the tool could suddenly shoot out in another direction; not properly 
holding tools that are being carried, etc.)? 
H12 Is ensured that workers receive adequate information on the weight of a load, the centre of 
gravity or the heaviest side when a package is unevenly loaded? 
H13 Are material and equipment that might fall or roll into an excavation kept at least 2 meters from 
the edge? 
H14 Are parked vehicles properly locked? 
H15 Are objects and structures near roads protected against collisions or crashes? 
H16 Are work areas well lit, dry and clean (especially where loads are moving manually)? 
 
H17 
Are objects/materials correctly stacked (including stacks of dissimilar objects) to avoid collapse, 
topple over and objects falling (e. g stack should not be higher than 3x the width, heavy objects 
could be stacked on the lower parts of the stack, objects should not exceed the edge of the 
shelves)? 
H18 Are there (on site) objects/materials that could be dragged by the wind? 
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Possibility factors affecting Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden 
movement) (continuation) 
To what extent: 
H19 Are the surfaces adequate to support the load (e.g. strong enough to bear the weight of the 
objects, without vibrations caused by passing lorries)? 
H20 Are observers kept at a safe distance from work equipment’s? 
 
H21 
Are all vehicles which are left unattended at night, adjacent to a highway in normal use or a 
construction site where work is in progress, equipped with lights, reflectors, or barricades to 
identify the location of the equipment? 
H22 Are vehicles securely loaded (ensuring that the cargo is stowed and not beyond the loading box 
(it is not sticking out) and is not distributed unevenly and it is not too high)? 
 
H23 
Are loads in vehicles securely fastened (e.g. tensioning the ratchet strap and the correct lashing 
angle) by correct devices (for instance not using a drum clamp or using rope with little elasticity 
instead of a lashing strap)? 
H24 Are machines and tools kept in good conditions (to avoid that with normal use parts, such as saw 
blades, chisels or bits, could have broken or flown around)? 
H25 Are the machines and tools inspected (by the users) at the beginning of each shift to assure that 
they are free of defects? 
H26 Are the fastening devices kept in good conditions? 
H27 Are the fastening devices inspected (by the users) at the beginning of each shift to assure that 
they are free of defects? 
 
H28 
Are stowing material, connections or couplings that could slip off with normal use inspected (by 
the users) at the beginning of each shift to assure that they are free of defects (for instance, 
defective tensioners, cables, lifting straps, hoisting eyes, bolts/screws/nails or tackles)? 
 
H29 
Are loads/objects suitable to be moved manually (e.g objects that are too large to be carried, 
objects with a surface that is too slippery and/or sharp, objects that are too heavy – with more 
than 27 kg)? 
H30 Are there handles (adequate and sufficient) for helping the manual handling tasks? 
H31 Are there (on site) objects poorly maintained, damaged or not properly secured so that parts can 
break off or release at high wind speeds and be blown away? 
H32 Are there (on site) objects placed in such a way that they easily could have been taken/were 
actually taken by the strong winds? 
H33 Is strictly forbidden to throw tools or other objects? 
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Annex I.17 - Questions to assess Possibility factors affecting contact with 
machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between objects) 
Possibility factors affecting Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped 
between objects) 
General  
To what extent: 
M1 Do equipment’s and machinery comply with the applicable use specifications and safety 
regulations (i. e. bears a CE marking)? 
M2 Were equipment’s and machinery not modified after purchase? 
M3 Have equipment’s and machinery emergency stop devices within reach and properly 
functioning? 
M4 Do all circular saws have an exhaust hood or a guard to prevent accidental contact with the saw 
blade? 
M5 Are rotating or moving parts of equipment properly guarded (i. e contact with the moving parts 
could not still occur) to prevent contact with worker’s body parts? 
M6 Are machinery guards kept in place and in working order? 
M7 Are saw guards checked to assure they are not wedged up thereby leaving an unguarded lower 
portion of the blade? 
M8 Are work rests and tongue guards properly set? 
M9 Are hand tools and other equipment regularly inspected for safe condition (including visual 
inspection each day for defects or obstructions prior to use)? 
M10 Are handles wedged tightly in the heads of all tools? 
M11 Are impact tools free of mushroomed heads? 
M12 Are welding and cutting operations shielded by non-combustible or flameproof screen 
whenever practicable? 
M13 Are all employees who are performing any type of welding, cutting, or heating protected by 
suitable eye protective equipment? 
M14 Are power tools, belts, gears, shaft, pulleys, sprockets, spindles, drums, fly wheels, and chains 
properly guarded? 
M15 Are portable circular saws equipped with guards above and below the base or shoe? 
M16 Are power saws and similar equipment provided with safety guards? 
M17 Are tools used with the correct shield, guard, or attachments recommended by the 
manufacturer? 
M18 Are power actuated tools left unloaded until they are ready for immediate use? 
M19 Are tools stored in a dry, secure location where they won't be tampered with? 
M20 Are gears on the hoisting machine well-guarded? 
M21 Are machines moving parts still moving (e. g. continuing to turn) after the machine had been 
switched off? 
 
M22 
Are workers aware of the dangers of bypass the physical safeguard (physical safeguard' refers to 
equipment that prevents people from touching the moving parts such as screens, hoods, optical 
screens, etc.)? 
 
M23 
Are workers aware of the dangers of intentionally come within reach of a machine's moving 
parts (for instance, in order to straighten something out, remove something, clean something, 
etc.)? 
 
M24 
Are workers aware of the dangers of wearing something or holding something so that the 
machine could 'grab' (e. g. loose-fitting clothing, long hair or wearing gloves near rotating 
parts)? 
M25 Are (machine/equipment moving parts) danger zones clearly indicated by means of signs? 
 
M26 
Was the electrical energy, pressure and (mechanical) tension of the machines or the 
equipment’s (including hand tools) turned off when work was being performed on it (for 
instance, during maintenance work or failure repairs)? 
 
M27 
Are technical measures taken against unintentional start-up of the machine (such as: removing 
fuses, locking/blocking handles and switches, etc.) whilst cleaning, maintaining or repairing? 
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Possibility factors affecting Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped 
between objects) (continuation) 
Hand Tools 
To what extent: 
 
M28 
Are hand tools properly protected (safeguards, locks against unintentional start-up, locks 
against continued turning after switching off and other accessories for the safe use of the tool)? 
 
M29 
Are hand tools equipped with the appropriate and properly mounted handles (with a shape able 
to provide sufficient grip) and kept in good condition (not soiled, worn or damaged)? 
 
M30 
Do all portable circular saws have a guard above the base plate and a guard below the base 
plate that will automatically and instantly return to the covering position when the saw is 
withdrawn from the work? 
M31 Are tool handles free of splits and cracks? 
M32 Could or did the hand tool and/or the cords/tube of the hand tool get caught somewhere? 
M33 Are hand tools correctly adjusted (e. g. correct rotational speed)? 
M34 Are the heads of chisels or punches grounded periodically to prevent mushrooming? 
M35 Are frames of all arc welding and cutting machines grounded properly? 
M36 Are electric, pneumatic or hydraulic hand tools not immediately stopped moving when the 
operating button is released? 
 
M37 
Are workers aware of the dangers of working materials (of the object/work piece) insufficiently 
suited for working with the hand tool (material too hard, material with defects - e.g. knots in 
wood, presence of objects in the material that do not belong to it - nails in a piece of wood)? 
M38 Are workers aware of the dangers of using the hand tool in an unsafe position (e. g. at a wrong 
angle so that the tool kicks back - when sawing, honing or milling)? 
Hand Tools (cont.) 
To what extent: 
 
 
M39 
Are workers aware of the dangers of the use of electric, pneumatic and/or hydraulic hand tools 
(including high-pressure sprayers), hand tools under mechanical or other tension not properly 
protected against unintentional start-up or activation of the tool (e. g. situations in which locks 
are not used, switches are not blocked, the tool's power has not been shut off)? 
 
M40 
Are workers aware of the dangers of the use of hand tool not in a good condition (e. g. hand 
tools whose safety features - such as self-braking grinding discs, safeguards, etc. - are missing or 
not functioning properly or if the grips/handles are slippery)? 
 
M41 
Are workers aware of the dangers of working with hand tools whilst doing something else at the 
same time (e. g. carrying or putting away another object/tool, using another hand tool, using a 
telephone, drinking coffee, etc.)? 
 
M42 
Are workers aware of the dangers of working with hand tools in workplaces not orderly (i.e. 
insufficient visibility/lighting, very noisy, extreme temperatures or slippery and/or messy 
floors)? 
Trapped between objects 
To what extent: 
 
M43 
Are locations where objects, machines or obstacles were placed too closely to each other so 
that workers could be trapped if the objects or machines started moving clearly indicated by 
means of marking and/or signalling? 
M44 Are locations that could become unsafe if objects or machines inadvertently started moving 
clearly indicated by means of marking and/or signalling? 
M45 Are there (on site) poorly designed handles/grips (of machines, doors, lids, etc.) so that when in 
use a hand/fingers could become trapped? 
 
M46 
Are hinged objects (such as doors, manhole covers or engine covers) that were not properly 
secured (e. g. by mechanisms for preventing the object from closing/opening suddenly or too 
quickly)? 
 
M47 
Are there (on site) work with machines or vehicles with which loads are moved and was 
operators view of the road obstructed (by, for instance, the load on the vehicle) or insufficient 
due to poor weather, insufficient lighting, obstacles or because the vehicle has many blind 
spots? 
M48 Are loads properly fastened so to avoid that it started inadvertently to move? 
M49 Are workers aware of the dangers of body parts (such as heads, arms or legs) of passengers or of 
the driver were partially or fully protruding from the vehicle? 
M50 Are workers aware of the dangers of being transported in a vehicle that is not intended for 
persons (e. g. in a cargo space)? 
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Annex I.18 - Questions to assess Possibility factors Lost buoyancy in water due to 
the activity  
Possibility factors Lost buoyancy in water due to the activity  
To what extent: 
Lw1 Was the work in the vicinity of water properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried 
out in a safe way? 
Lw2 Are the falling gradients near the water (near the banks of rivers, canals, along ditches or 
ponds) edges properly protected (e. g. fences)? 
Lw3 Are roads in the vicinity of water properly protected? 
Lw4 Are workers aware of the dangers when they are in poor physical condition (sick, weak, 
nauseous, disabled to some extent, dizzy, vertigo, fatigued, tense or under the influence of 
drugs, alcohol or medicine, etc.) whilst working in the vicinity of water? 
Lw5 Are workers aware of the dangers of reduced visibility due to fog, downpours or darkness whilst 
working in the vicinity of water? 
Lw6 Are workers aware of the dangers of the circumstances (wind, waves, current, etc.) that could 
make the floating object capsize or sink as a result? 
Lw7 Are workers aware of the dangers of standing on a slippery surface and/or one with obstacles 
whilst working in the vicinity of water? 
 
Lw8 
Are workers in the vicinity of water or other fluids within reach of objects that could start 
moving, rolling or swinging against them (e. g. hanging and/or swinging loads or lashing cables, 
ropes, anchor chains or banging booms)? 
Lw9 In the vicinity of water or other fluids are workers working in floating objects that were not 
suitable for floating (e. g. due to poor physical condition)? 
Lw10 Floating objects are properly loaded (load correctly distribution and not overloading)? 
Lw11 Workers working in floating objects are sufficiently experienced (e. g. ability to move on a 
strong current)? 
Lw12 Are there cables, structures, nets or other objects (such as other floating objects) present on 
water that could trap/entangle floating objects? 
Lw13 Are workers working in the vicinity of water able to swim competently? 
 
158 
 
Annex I.19 - Questions to assess Possibility factors affecting fire or explosion 
(including confined spaces) 
Possibility factors affecting Fire or explosion (including confined spaces) 
General  
To what extent: 
FE1 Was the work properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried out in a safe way (e.g. 
work in confined spaces)? 
FE2 Are all flammable and combustible liquids stored and handled in approved and proper 
containers and portable tanks? 
FE3 Are flammable, combustible and explosives stored in appropriated conditions? 
FE4 Are explosives not in use kept in a locked magazine? 
FE5 Are necessary safety conditions satisfied for motor vehicles transporting explosives (are they 
always attended)? 
 
FE6 
Are smoking matches, open flame lamps and other fires, flames or heat producing devices, and 
sparks prohibited in or near flammables and explosive magazines while flammables or 
explosives are being handled, transported, or used? 
 
FE7 
Is equipment (other tools or aids such as rubber shoes or textile cloths) used in flammable or 
combustible atmospheres sufficiently conductive or earthed to avoid created static electricity? 
FE8 Are oxygen cylinders and fittings kept away from oil and grease? 
FE9 Are cylinders secured (and caps in place) when transporting or storing compressed gas 
cylinders? 
FE10 Are all compressed gas cylinders secured in an upright position at all times (including when 
transported by power vehicles)? 
FE11 Is insured that cylinders, full or empty, are never used as rollers or supports? 
FE12 Are torches inspected for leaking shut off valves, hose couplings, and tip connections at the 
beginning of each shift? 
FE13 Has mechanical ventilation system sufficient capacity to keep the concentration of flammable 
vapours within safe limits? 
FE14 Are drums, containers, or hollow structures which have contained explosive or flammable 
substances not outdate, poorly maintained, damaged or left open? 
 
FE15 
Are drums, containers, or hollow structures which have contained explosive or flammable 
substances either filled with water or thoroughly cleaned of such substances, ventilated and 
tested before welding, cutting, or heating? 
FE16 Are workers aware of the dangers of smoking in the immediate vicinity of flammable or 
combustible atmospheres? 
FE17 Are workers aware of the dangers of hot surfaces that have not been sufficiently cooled, 
present in the immediate vicinity of flammable substances? 
FE18 Are workers aware of the dangers of wearing clothes soiled with grease, oil or another 
flammable substance when in the vicinity of oxygen and heat sources? 
Confined spaces 
To what extent: 
 
FE19 
Are measurements (of substances, such as oxygen, toxic or flammable gases) in confined spaces 
taken before workers entered the space and regularly taken during a longer stay (30 minutes or 
more)? 
 
FE20 
Are measurements (of substances, such as oxygen, toxic or flammable gases) in confined spaces 
regularly taken (30 minutes or more) when activities (such as using solvents, working with 
combustion engines or burners, or carrying out welding activities) being carried out, could 
create hazardous vapours? 
FE21 Are all hazardous substances removed from confined space when work stops (even in meal 
breaks)? 
FE22 Are workers aware of the dangers of working in confined spaces? 
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Annex II 
Annex II.1 – Questionnaire for elicitate expert opinions  
 
Dear madam/sir 
 
I am a doctoral student in safety risk assessment in the New University of Lisbon (Portugal).  
An appropriate Risk analysis RA is an essential component of the safety risk management process in 
organizations. If the framework for RA is inadequate and/or not applied effectively, it impacts on the 
wider process and results in an ineffective use of resources. 
Estimate the possible severity consequences of a work accident are done by safety experts perceptions 
causing discrepancies between assessments made by different safety experts. 
This work aims to develop severity functions (on the safety risk assessment scope), based on 
biomechanical knowledge for injury criteria and on predictors that can be elicited by observable or 
existing data on site, to allow determining the severity of occupational accidents on construction industry, 
and consequently improve occupational risks assessment quality. 
In order to address the project goals, I have developed the attached questionnaire, which I would be 
grateful if you complete. The survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. 
I believe the topic of my PhD research brings an important contribution to enhancing the quality of safety 
risk assessment and management, in both theory and practice. Your responses form an essential part of 
my research and hence will contribute to advances in safety risk assessment and management. 
All survey information will be kept strictly confidential and I will assume all responsibilities for any 
conclusions derived from the analysis of the survey data. 
 
 
Thank you for your valuable assistance 
 
Abel Pinto 
PhD student, New University of Lisbon 
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Questionnaire  
 
This questionnaire, are inserted in the investigation for my doctorate thesis entitled Development of a 
Fuzzy Qualitative Risk Assessment Model applied to construction industry. It aims 
understand the way by that companies analyzed risk factors related to Safety and evaluate the new 
developed model QRAM. 
FOR SAMPLE WAS SELECTED A GROUP OF SAFETY EXPERTS WITH 10 OR MORE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ON 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY IN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY. 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. WILL NOT RESULT REFERENCES TO ANY 
COMPANIES OU INDIVIDUALS. PLEASE REPLY CORRECT AND STRICT. 
For any additional clarification, please contact ABEL PINTO by abel.fnpinto@gmail.com. 
 
YOUR RESPONSE IS VERY IMPORTANT THANKS. 
 
Q1 – EXPERT DATA 
1. Occupation: _____________________________________________________________  
2. Experience in the current position: _____ years 
3. Experience in the industry: _____ years 
4. Are you involved with:  
 Developing RA 
 Implementing RA 
 Evaluating RA 
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Q2 – COMPANY DATA 
1. DIMENSION:  
Micro (<=  10 workers) □       Small (11 A 50 workers) □         Average (51 A 200 workers) □        
Big (> 200 workers) □ 
2. Type of building works:  (In this issue you can choose multiple answers) 
 Buildings (residences, factories…) □           Infrastructures (including roads) □          Bridges, Viaducts…□  
Sea or Rail Works □               Other □Which?_____________________ 
Q3 – SAFETY CLIMATE ON CONSTRUCTION OCCUPATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS 
1. Usually take into account Safety Climate factors on ORA (Occupational Risk Analysis):   
                YES □                             NO □                                 SOMETIMES □              
2. If your answer was YES, what type of factors you usually include:  
    Safety Rules and Procedures □              Workers’ Involvement □                 Personal Appreciation of Risk □      
       Workers’ Competence □                          Safe Work Behavior □                        Management Commitment □ 
        Leadership and Supervisory Environment □                       Communication and Participation □ 
     Supportive Environment □              Safety planning □         Work Pressure □           Safety management □ 
Other □Which?____________________________________________________________ 
 3. If your answer was NO, why you usually don’t include this type of factors:  
               Are not determinants □            Information is not reliable □           There are no information □ 
             Is very time consuming □         I don’t know any methodology that including these kind of factors □ 
Methodologies (that include this kind of factors) are not reliable □ 
Other □Which?____________________________________________________________ 
4. If your answer was SOMETIMES, why you usually don’t include this type of factors in ORA:  
    Only after an accident □            Information is not always available □          Sometimes there is no time □ 
Other □Which?____________________________________________________________      
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Q4 – SAFETY CLIMATE ON QRAM 
1. You agree that the presented set of factors allows to characterize properly Safety  
Climate on Construction Sites:  
 Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
1.2 Could you, please, explain your answer:_______________________________________ 
2. How considers the set of safety climate factors usability, in terms of:  
2.1 Effectiveness (the ability of users to complete a ORA using the method, and the expected  
quality of the output) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.2 Efficiency (the level of resources consumed) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.3 Satisfaction (users’ subjective reactions) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.4  Could you, please, explain your answer:_______________________________________ 
3. How considers the usability, about time spent: 
                Quick to apply (a pair of hours) □               Slow to apply (one or more days) □   
3.1 Could you, please, explain your answer:_____________________________________ 
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Q5 – SEVERITY ON QRAM 
1. You agree that the presented set of functions allows to characterize properly Severity  
on Construction Sites:  
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
1.2 Could you, please, explain your answer:_______________________________________ 
2. How considers the severity functions usability, in terms of:  
2.1 Effectiveness (the ability of users to complete a ORA using the method, and the expected  
quality of the output) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.2 Efficiency (the level of resources consumed) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.3 Satisfaction (users’ subjective reactions) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.4  Could you, please, explain your answer:_______________________________________           
3. How considers the usability, about time spent: 
                    Quick to apply (a pair of hours) □                 Slow to apply (one or more days) □   
3.2 Could you, please, explain your answer:_____________________________________ 
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Q6 – POSSIBILITY ON QRAM 
1. You agree that the presented set of factors allows to characterize properly work accidents  
possibility on Construction Sites:  
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
1.2 Could you, please, explain your answer:_______________________________________ 
2. How considers the set of possibility factors usability, in terms of:  
2.1 Effectiveness (the ability of users to complete a ORA using the method, and the expected  
quality of the output) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.2 Efficiency (the level of resources consumed) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.3 Satisfaction (users’ subjective reactions) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.4  Could you, please, explain your answer:_______________________________________          
3. How considers the usability, about time spent: 
                   Quick to apply (a pair of hours) □                     Slow to apply (one or more days) □   
3.3 Could you, please, explain your answer:_____________________________________ 
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Q7 – SAFETY BARRIERS ON QRAM 
1. You agree that the presented set of factors allows to characterize properly the effectiveness  
of safety barriers on Construction Sites:  
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
1.2 Could you, please, explain your answer:_______________________________________ 
2. How considers the set of safety barriers usability, in terms of:  
2.1 Effectiveness (the ability of users to complete a ORA using the method, and the expected  
quality of the output) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.2 Efficiency (the level of resources consumed) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.3 Satisfaction (users’ subjective reactions) 
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
2.4  Could you, please, explain your answer:_______________________________________ 
3. How considers the usability, about time spent: 
                         Quick to apply (a pair of hours) □                     Slow to apply (one or more days) □   
3.4 Could you, please, explain your answer:_____________________________________ 
Q8 – QRAM RESULTS 
1. You agree that the QRAM results  characterize properly the risk level on Construction Sites:  
Strongly Approved □         Approved □         Undecided □        Disapproved □        Strongly Disapproved □ 
1.2 Could you, please, explain your answer:_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. 
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Annex II.2 – Results from case 1 safety climate assess  
Safety Climate Factors 
Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Related to workers  
Safety Rules and Procedures  
Written work procedures match the way tasks are done in practice Inadequate 
Written work procedures are technically accurate and adequate sources of safety 
information 
Inadequate 
Written work procedures are complete and easy to read and understand Inadequate 
Written work procedures are always available whenever needed be consulted Inadequate 
Workers can easily identify the applied procedure for each job Inadequate 
Rules enforce the use of personal protective equipment whenever necessary Inadequate 
Rules require detailed work plans from subcontractors or self-employed individuals Inadequate 
The definition of responsibilities and accountabilities is quite adequate Inadequate 
Workers’ Competence  
In this site:  
Workers received adequate training to perform theirs jobs safely Low Adequate 
Workers use, keep, inspect and test the appropriate personal protective equipment 
as indicated 
Inadequate 
Workers know and correctly use relevant safety procedures Inadequate 
Workers appropriately report incidents and accidents Low Adequate 
Workers take general precautions to avoiding the dangers of workplace hazards Inadequate 
Workers identify and communicate potentially hazardous situations Low Adequate 
Workers apply appropriate work practices to reduce exposures to hazards Inadequate 
Safe Work Behavior  
In this site:  
Safety plays an effective role in preventing accidents Low Adequate 
Safety makes it possible to get the job done Low Adequate 
Safety is not restrictive and superficial Low Adequate 
Safety helps to increase workers productivity Adequate 
Safety contributes to workers work satisfaction Adequate 
Safety inspires workers to work more safely Low Adequate 
Safety has a positive influence on morale Adequate 
Workers have proud to take part of it Adequate 
Workers are proactive behavior in removing workplace safety hazards Adequate 
RELATED TO MANAGEMENT  
Management Commitment  
Management:  
clearly considers safety to be equally as important as production Low Adequate 
expresses concern if safety procedures are not adhered to Low Adequate 
acts decisively when a safety concern is raised Low Adequate 
acts quickly to correct safety problems Adequate 
commitment to safety is visible (e.g. by usage of  PPEs) Low Adequate 
praises site employees for working safely Low Adequate 
disciplines site employees for working unsafely Low Adequate 
considers a person’s safety behavior when moving/promoting people Low Adequate 
requires each manager to help improve safety in his/her department Low Adequate 
uses any available information to improve existing safety rules Adequate 
gives safety personnel the power they need to do their job correctly Almost Adequate 
clearly communicates and continues to bring safety information to site employees’ 
attention at all levels within the site 
Low Adequate 
operates an open-door policy on safety issues Low Adequate 
encourages feedback from site employees on safety issues Low Adequate 
undertakes campaigns to promote safe working practices Inadequate 
provides a sufficient budget for safety on site Inadequate 
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Safety Climate Factors (continuation) Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Supervisory Action Towards Safety  
Supervisors:  
have positive safety behavior Very Adequate 
usually engages in regular safety talks Low Adequate 
welcome reporting safety hazards/incidents Adequate 
are a good resource for solving safety problems Adequate 
not allow working around safety procedures even to meet important deadlines Low Adequate 
value workers ideas about improving safety even when significant changes to 
working practices are suggested 
Low Adequate 
say a “good word” to workers that pay special attention to safety Low Adequate 
make sure that workers receive all the equipment needed to do the job safely Low Adequate 
discusses how to improve safety with workers Low Adequate 
listen to and acts upon feedback from site employees Low Adequate 
communicate lessons from accidents to improve safety performance Inadequate 
appropriately reports incidents, accidents, and/or illnesses Low Adequate 
wear the personal protective equipment even if it is uncomfortable Very Adequate 
RELATED TO SAFETY ENVIRONMENT  
Communication and Participation  
Site safety policy and objectives are clearly communicate to site employees’ at all 
levels within the site 
Inadequate 
Workers participate in hazard identification, risk assessment, determination of risk 
controls (safety barriers) and personal protective equipment’s choice 
Inadequate 
Workers and subcontractors are consulted and involved in the ongoing review of 
safety 
Inadequate 
Workers and subcontractors are consulted and involved in accident investigation Low Adequate 
Workers and subcontractors participate in work planning Inadequate 
Communication with the supervisors regarding safety matters is easy Low Adequate 
There is a fluent communication embodied in periodic and frequent meetings, 
campaigns or oral presentations to transmit principles and rules of action 
Inadequate 
Information systems made available to affected workers prior to modifications and 
changes in production processes or job positions 
Inadequate 
When starting in new job position worker provided written information about 
procedures and correct way of doing tasks 
Inadequate 
Written circulars elaborated and meetings organised to inform workers about risks 
associated with their work and how to prevent accidents 
Inadequate 
Information flow (e.g. policy, procedures, vertical andhorizontal channels, 
scheduled and unscheduledmeetings) are used in support of various types 
ofdecision-making processes 
Inadequate 
Supportive Environment  
Subcontractors safety records are inspected before awarding contracts Inadequate 
Coworkers adopt a no-blame approach to highlight unsafe work behavior Low Adequate 
Coworkers often remind each other on how to work safely Low Adequate 
Coworkers believe it is their business to maintain a safe workplace environment Low Adequate 
Coworkers always offer help when needed to perform the job safely Low Adequate 
Coworkers endeavor to ensure that individuals are not working by themselves 
under risky or hazardous conditions 
Low Adequate 
Coworkers maintain good working relationships Adequate 
Coworkers ensure that the workload is reasonably balanced among their selves Low Adequate 
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Safety Climate Factors (continuation) Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Safety planning  
Does safety started at design stage Inadequate 
Construction schedule is reasonable Adequate 
Safety is a primary consideration when determining site layout Low Adequate 
Chances of being involved in a site accident are quite large, due to unsafe 
conditions 
Adequate 
Operating site conditions may hinder one’s ability to work safely Almost Adequate 
Detecting potential hazards is not a major aim of the site planning exercise Low Adequate 
Working with defective equipment is not allowed under any circumstances Low Adequate 
Potential risks and consequences are identified prior to execution Low Adequate 
Weather (and soil conditions) are considered in work planning Low Adequate 
Training includes effective skills practice for normal work and skill practices for 
emergencies 
Inadequate 
Work Pressure over Safety  
There are sufficient “thinking time” to enable workers to plan and carry out their 
work to an adequate standard 
Adequate 
There are enough workers to carry out the required work Adequate 
Workers consider that is necessary depart from safety requirements for production’s 
sake 
Low Adequate 
Workers perceive that operational targets conflict with some safety measures Low Adequate 
Workers consider that is normal to take shortcuts at the expense of safety Low Adequate 
Workers tolerate minor unsafe behaviors performed by coworkers Adequate 
Workers consider that is not acceptable to delay periodic inspection of plant and 
equipment 
Low Adequate 
Management is strict about working safely when work falls behind schedule Low Adequate 
Supervisors refuse to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule Low Adequate 
Safety Management System  
Periodic checks are conducted on execution of prevention plans and compliance 
level of regulations 
Inadequate 
Systematic inspections conducted periodically to ensure effective functioning of the 
whole system 
Inadequate 
Accidents and incidents are reported, investigated, analysed and recorded Low Adequate 
External evaluations (audits) are periodically conducted of validity and reliability of 
prevention management system 
Inadequate 
Personal protective equipment use is monitored to identify problem areas Inadequate 
Are ensure daily housekeeping at all workplaces Adequate 
After using, tools and small machinery are stored in a correct place Almost Adequate 
Safety devices on machines are maintained in good operating Almost Adequate 
Marking and sign-posting of all risks and relevant safety information Inadequate 
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Annex II.3 – Results from case 1 falls work accidents possibility assess  
 
Work accidents Possibility Factors 
Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Falls  
General  
To what extent the work (at height) was properly planned to be carried out in a safe 
way (especially work on or near fragile roof surfaces, on a roofs and store floors being 
built or demolished or erecting/dismantling/altering scaffolding) and properly 
supervised? 
Adequate 
To what extent were simultaneous activities at the same location properly planned to be 
carried out in a safe way and appropriately supervised? 
Adequate 
To what extent are floor openings and storey floor edges properly protected? Adequate 
To what extent are the wall openings with 1.20 m or more above ground properly 
protected? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent the means to access to workplaces at height are adequate and properly 
protected? 
Adequate 
To what extent the working surfaces provide sufficient grip (refers to surfaces that were 
not made or designed to climb onto, walk on or provide support)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are form and scrap lumber with protruding nails and all other debris 
kept clear from work areas, passageways, and stairs? 
Adequate 
To what extent are work platforms adequate and robust enough (to resist to wind and to 
forces exerted by falling objects or by workers when using hand-operated tools) and 
protected by guardrails (top railings at least 1 meter above the working platform, foot 
rails at no less than 15 cm and intermediate rails so that no openings are greater than 47 
cm, around the perimeter)? 
Adequate 
To what extent is assured that working platforms are not overloaded and the loads 
correctly distributed? 
Adequate 
To what extent proper measures are taken so that employees working at a height greater 
than 1.20 m are protected from falling? 
Adequate 
To what extent are lighting levels adequate (functioning and position of lights to ensure 
that all floor areas and wall opening areas are evenly lit and all potential hazards, e.g. 
obstructions, stairways, runways and spills can be clearly seen)? 
Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent are the workplaces maintained clean and tidy, with floors and access 
routes kept clear of slippery (due to mud, wetness, moisture, oil, grease, powder, 
insufficient drainage, freezing, snow or ice…) and obstacles were workers could slip or 
trip? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent the working floors are not uneven and/or unstable (it means that the 
surface was on level, there were not loose or unstable floor parts, wrinkled carpets, etc) 
or have dangerous thresholds or steps? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent is strictly prohibited to stay at height while this was not necessary for 
carrying out tasks? 
Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent is strictly prohibited to talking on the telephone during work at height? Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of lose their balance when using hand 
tools (e. g. lipping, tripping, taking a wrong step, being bumped by someone and 
consequently losing the balance)? 
Inadequate 
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Work accidents Possibility Factors 
Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Falls (continuation)  
Portable (or moveable) ladders  
To what extent are portable ladders large enough to workers to be able to reach their 
workplaces? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are ladders with broken or missing rungs or split side rails, tagged and 
taken out of service? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are metal ladders inspected for damage or signs of corrosion? Low Adequate 
To what extent are portable ladders used only in short-term jobs (not exceeding 30 
min and do not require the worker side loads)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent do workers assume a correct position on the ladder (not standing on 
the side of the ladder, feet in the middle, face toward the rungs, using both hands for 
support, not standing on the ladder whilst shifting or extending, not slipping off the 
ladder without using the rungs and not hanging onto the side)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are areas around the top and bottom of the portable ladder kept clear? Adequate 
To what extent are portable ladders prohibited from being used in a horizontal 
position as platforms, runways, or scaffolds? 
Adequate 
To what extent is the distance at the base of the open portable ladders 15 cm by each 
30 cm high? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are there warning signs indicating that work was being performed on a 
ladder? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers when they are in poor physical 
condition (sick, weak, nauseous, disabled to some extent, dizzy, vertigo, fatigued, 
tense or under the influence of drugs, alcohol or medicine, etc.) whilst standing on the 
ladder? 
Inadequate 
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Annex II.4 – Results from case 1 contact with electricity work accidents possibility 
assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors 
Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Contact with electricity  
To what extent is it ensured that the work was properly planned, appropriately 
supervised, and carried out in a safe way as it is reasonably practicable? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent are electrical equipments (cables, frames, accessories) revised before 
being reassembled in a new site? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent does electrical equipment meet all the legal or normative requirements? Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are all electrical cords or cables taken out of service when worn or 
frayed? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent is all electrical equipment free from recognized hazards (insulation 
defects, eg) that may cause death or serious harm? 
Adequate 
To what extent are live electrical parts properly guarded against accidental contact? Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are leakage circuit breakers properly used to protect the workers? Very Adequate 
To what extent are all outlet devices correctly and properly matched with load being 
served? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent is the path to ground from circuits, equipment, and enclosures satisfied 
so that they are permanent and continuous? 
Adequate 
To what extent are there (on site) measures in place to prevent unauthorised persons 
from working on installations under tension (e. g. locker keys, supervision and key 
procedures)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are all the electrical extension cords of the three wire types (with 
ground wire, green wire and yellow wire)? 
Adequate 
To what extent is the protection of the lamps for general illumination against breakage 
proper and satisfactory? 
Low adequate 
To what extent are the protection measures against damage for flexible cords and 
cables satisfactory? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are all cabinets, cut out boxes, fittings, boxes, panel board enclosures, 
switches, circuit breakers, through doorways or windows, attached to building 
surfaces, or concealed behind walls, ceilings, or floors? 
Low adequate 
To what extent are electric powered tools and equipment’s double-insulated or 
properly grounded? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are tests or other appropriate methods or means applied to assure that 
the electric equipment and lines are considered de-energized? 
Inadequate 
To what extent do workers not wear metal objects (rings, watches…) when working 
with electrical devices? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are all disconnecting devices legibly marked to indicate purpose unless 
located so that purpose is evident? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are metal ladders not used when working on or near electrical 
equipment (such as changing light bulbs or fluorescent tubes)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent is sufficient working space provided to permit safe operation and 
maintenance of electrical equipment? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent was the electrical energy of the machines or the equipment’s (including 
hand tools) turned off when work was being performed on it (for instance, during 
maintenance work or failure repairs)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of bypass the electrical protection 
devices (e. g. residual-current device or ground fault circuit interrupter)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of using tools that were not suitable 
for electrical works (e.g. using non-insulated screwdrivers) or using it incorrectly (e. g. 
using low voltage detectors for high voltage)? 
Inadequate 
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Annex II.5 – Results from case 1 injured by falling/swinging objects work 
accidents possibility assess  
 
Work accidents Possibility Factors 
Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Injured by falling/swinging objects  
To what extent is it ensured that the work was properly planned, appropriately 
supervised, and carried out in a safe way as it is reasonably practicable (e.g. with 
letting objects fall in an intentional and a controlled manner such as rubble or debris, 
into a chute/container)? 
Low  Adequate 
To what extent was simultaneous activities at the same location properly plan to be 
carried out in a safe way and are appropriately supervised? 
Low  Adequate 
To what extent are materials which are stored in tiers either stacked, racked, blocked, 
interlocked, or otherwise, properly secured to prevent sliding, falling, or collapsing? 
Low  Adequate 
To what extent is the storage of materials properly done (are materials stored more 
than 1,80 m from any hoist way or inside floor opening and more than 3 m from any 
exterior walls that do not extend above the top of the stored materials)? 
Adequate 
To what extent is the weight of the loads to move known (if it is not known, it is 
estimated by multiplying the load volume by the material specific weight)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are the cranes, lifts and other lift equipment’s load bearing capacity 
correctly posted? 
Adequate 
To what extent is any area where material is dropped outside the exterior walls of the 
structure effectively and properly protected? 
Very  Adequate 
To what extent are inspections made by a competent person as work progresses to 
detect hazards from weakened or deteriorated floors or walls or loosened materials? 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of incorrect tools or aids 
(e.g decide to lift something manually, whilst it would be better to do so 
mechanically)? 
Inadequate 
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Annex II.6 – Results from case 1 hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including 
awkward or sudden movement) work accidents possibility assess  
 
Work accidents Possibility Factors 
Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden 
movement) 
 
To what extent was the work properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried out 
in a safe way (e.g the demolition or assembly of prefabricated structures)? 
Low 
Adequate 
To what extent were simultaneous activities at the same location properly planned to be 
carried out in a safe way and appropriately supervised? 
Adequate 
To what extent are abrasive wheel grinders provided with safety guards which cover the 
spindle ends, nut and flange projections? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers working in the vicinity of running machinery from which 
material or items could fly around, or in the vicinity of persons who use hand tools 
whereby material could fly around, properly protected (such as eye protection, facial 
protection or a helmet) for activities with a cutting action (sawing, drilling, smoothing, 
turning, honing, etc.) or for other activities whereby there is a risk that objects/parts can 
fly off (for instance, hammering, the treatment of objects on a lathe, with a drill or saw, 
whereby the object or the fastener can fly around during the treatment…)? 
 
 
 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of wrong tools or machine 
operated incorrectly or tools used in the wrong way (e. g. using metal hammers, whereas 
a plastic hammer should have been used for that material; using grinding discs that are 
not suitable for the material to be treated or for the rotational speeds of the machine; 
using the wrong pliers for holding something firmly; or using a screwdriver as a chisel 
and vice versa; when a force that is too great is exerted with the tool or if the machine is 
used for treating something with the wrong setting - speed, angle, direction, force, aid, 
etc; wood drill instead of stone drill (for drilling into stone), a hand tool with the wrong 
size (spanners, pliers))? 
 
 
 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of incorrect tools or aids or 
hold hand tools incorrectly (e.g use of the wrong tools, not holding tools in a safe 
direction; not safely placing tool leads and tubes so that the tool could suddenly shoot 
out in another direction; not properly holding tools that are being carried, etc.)? 
 
Inadequate 
To what extent are work areas well lit, dry and clean (especially where loads are moving 
manually)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are objects/materials correctly stacked (including stacks of dissimilar 
objects) to avoid collapse, topple over and objects falling (e. g stack should not be 
higher than 3x the width, heavy objects could be stacked on the lower parts of the stack, 
objects should not exceed the edge of the shelves)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are the surfaces adequate to support the load (e.g strong enough to bear 
the weight of the objects, without vibrations caused by passing lorries)? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are observers kept at a safe distance from work equipment’s? Low 
Adequate 
To what extent are machines and tools kept in good conditions (to avoid that with 
normal use parts, such as saw blades, chisels or bits, could have broken or flown 
around)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are the machines and tools inspected (by the users) at the beginning of 
each shift to assure that they are free of defects? 
Low 
Adequate 
To what extent are loads/objects suitable to be moved manually (e.g objects that are not 
too large to be carried, objects with a surface that is not slippery and/or sharp or objects 
that nor exceed 27 kg)? 
Very 
Adequate 
To what extent are there handles (adequate and sufficient) for helping the manual 
handling tasks? 
Inadequate 
To what extent is strictly forbidden to throw tools or other objects? Low 
Adequate 
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Annex II.7 – Results from case 1 contact with machinery/equipment moving parts 
(including trapped between objects) work accidents possibility assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped 
between objects) 
 
General  
To what extentequipments and machinery comply with the applicable use specifications 
and safety regulations (i. e. bear a CE marking)? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent were equipments and machinery not modified after purchase? Very 
Adequate 
To what extent have equipments and machinery emergency stop devices within reach and 
properly functioning? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are machinery guards kept in place and in working order? Very 
Adequate 
To what extent are hand tools and other equipment regularly inspected for safe condition 
(including visual inspection each day for defects or obstructions prior to use)? 
Low 
Adequate 
To what extent are impact tools free of mushroomed heads? Very 
Adequate 
To what extent are power tools, belts, gears, shaft, pulleys, sprockets, spindles, drums, fly 
wheels, and chains properly guarded? 
Very 
Adequate 
To what extent are tools used with the correct shield, guard, or attachments recommended 
by the manufacturer? 
Low 
Adequate 
To what extent are power actuated tools left unloaded until they are ready for immediate 
use? 
Low 
Adequate 
To what extent are tools stored in a dry, secure location where they won't be tampered 
with? 
Low 
Adequate 
Hand Tools  
To what extent are hand tools equipped with the appropriate and properly mounted 
handles (with a shape able to provide sufficient grip) and kept in good condition (not 
soiled, worn or damaged)? 
Very 
Adequate 
To what extent are tool handles free of splits and cracks? Very 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of working materials (of the 
object/workpiece) insufficiently suited for working with the hand tool (material too hard, 
material with defects - e.g. knots in wood, presence of objects in the material that do not 
belong to it - nails in a piece of wood)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of using the hand tool in an unsafe 
position (e. g. at a wrong angle so that the tool kicks back - when sawing, honing or 
milling)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of electric, pneumatic and/or 
hydraulic hand tools (including high-pressure sprayers), hand tools under mechanical or 
other tension not properly protected against unintentional start-up or activation of the tool 
(e. g. situations in which locks are not used, switches are not blocked, the tool's power has 
not been shut off)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of hand tool not in a good 
condition (e. g. hand tools whose safety features - such as self-braking grinding discs, 
safeguards, etc - are missing or not functioning properly or if the grips/handles are 
slippery)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of working with hand tools whilst doing 
something else at the same time (e. g. carrying or putting away another object/tool, using 
another hand tool, using a telephone, drinking coffee, etc.)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of working with hand tools in 
workplaces not orderly (i. e. insufficient visibility/lighting, very noisy, extreme 
temperatures or slippery and/or messy floors)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are there (on site) poorly designed handles/grips (of machines, doors, lids, 
etc.) so that when in use a hand/fingers could become trapped? 
Low 
Adequate 
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Annex II.8 – Results from case 1 fire or explosion work accidents possibility assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors 
Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Fire or explosion   
To what extent was the work properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried out 
in a safe way (e.g. work in confined spaces)? 
Low 
Adequate 
To what extent are all flammable and combustible liquids stored and handled in approved 
and proper containers and portable tanks? 
Adequate 
To what extent are flammable, combustible and explosives stored in appropriated 
conditions? 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of smoking in the immediate vicinity of 
flammable or combustible atmospheres? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of hot surfaces that have not been 
sufficiently cooled, present in the immediate vicinity of flammable substances? 
Inadequate 
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Annex II.9 – Results from case 2 safety climate assess  
Safety Climate Factors Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Related to workers  
Safety Rules and Procedures  
Written work procedures match the way tasks are done in practice Adequate 
Written work procedures are technically accurate and adequate sources of safety 
information 
Adequate 
Written work procedures are complete and easy to read and understand Adequate 
Written work procedures are always available whenever needed be consulted Almost Adequate 
Workers can easily identify the applied procedure for each job Adequate 
Rules enforce the use of personal protective equipment whenever necessary Strongly 
Adequate 
Rules require detailed work plans from subcontractors or self-employed individuals Strongly 
Adequate 
The definition of responsibilities and accountabilities is quite adequate Adequate 
Workers’ Competence  
In this site:  
Workers received adequate training to perform theirs jobs safely Very Adequate 
Workers use, keep, inspect and test the appropriate personal protective equipment as 
indicated 
Adequate 
Workers know and correctly use relevant safety procedures Adequate 
Workers appropriately report incidents and accidents Very Adequate 
Workers take general precautions to avoiding the dangers of workplace hazards Very Adequate 
Workers identify and communicate potentially hazardous situations Adequate 
Workers apply appropriate work practices to reduce exposures to hazards Adequate 
Safe Work Behavior  
In this site:  
Safety plays an effective role in preventing accidents Adequate 
Safety makes it possible to get the job done Very Adequate 
Safety is not restrictive and superficial Very Adequate 
Safety helps to increase workers’ productivity Very Adequate 
Safety contributes to workers work satisfaction Very Adequate 
Safety inspires workers to work more safely Very Adequate 
Safety has a positive influence on morale Very Adequate 
Workers have proud to take part of it Very Adequate 
Workers are proactive behavior in removing workplace safety hazards Very Adequate 
Related to management  
Management Commitment  
Management:  
clearly considers safety to be equally as important as production Adequate 
expresses concern if safety procedures are not adhered to Very Adequate 
acts decisively when a safety concern is raised Very Adequate 
acts quickly to correct safety problems Very Adequate 
commitment to safety is visible (e.g. by usage of  PPEs) Very Adequate 
praises site employees for working safely Strongly 
Adequate 
disciplines site employees for working unsafely Very Adequate 
considers a person’s safety behavior when moving/promoting people Very Adequate 
requires each manager to help improve safety in his/her department Strongly 
Adequate 
uses any available information to improve existing safety rules Adequate 
gives safety personnel the power they need to do their job correctly Low Adequate 
clearly communicates and continues to bring safety information to site employees’ 
attention at all levels within the site 
Very Adequate 
177 
 
Safety Climate Factors (continuation) 
Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Management Commitment (continuation)  
operates an open-door policy on safety issues Adequate 
encourages feedback from site employees on safety issues Adequate 
undertakes campaigns to promote safe working practices Low Adequate 
provides a sufficient budget for safety on site Very Adequate 
Supervisory Action Towards Safety  
Supervisors:  
have positive safety behavior Very Adequate 
usually engages in regular safety talks Very Adequate 
welcome reporting safety hazards/incidents Adequate 
are a good resource for solving safety problems Very Adequate 
not allow working around safety procedures even to meet important deadlines Adequate 
value workers ideas about improving safety even when significant changes to 
working practices are suggested 
Adequate 
say a “good word” to workers that pay special attention to safety Adequate 
make sure that workers receive all the equipment needed to do the job safely Very Adequate 
discusses how to improve safety with workers Adequate 
listen to and acts upon feedback from site employees Low Adequate 
communicate lessons from accidents to improve safety performance Adequate 
appropriately reports incidents, accidents, and/or illnesses Adequate 
wear the personal protective equipment even if it is uncomfortable Very Adequate 
Related to safety environment  
Communication and Participation  
Site safety policy and objectives are clearly communicate to site employees’ at all 
levels within the site 
Very Adequate 
Workers participate in hazard identification, risk assessment, determination of risk 
controls (safety barriers) and personal protective equipment’s choice 
Adequate 
Workers and subcontractors are consulted and involved in the ongoing review of 
safety 
Very Adequate 
Workers and subcontractors are consulted and involved in accident investigation Very Adequate 
Workers and subcontractors participate in work planning Low Adequate 
Communication with the supervisors regarding safety matters is easy Adequate 
There is a fluent communication embodied in periodic and frequent meetings, 
campaigns or oral presentations to transmit principles and rules of action 
Adequate 
Information systems made available to affected workers prior to modifications and 
changes in production processes or job positions 
Adequate 
Written circulars elaborated and meetings organised to inform workers about risks 
associated with their work and how to prevent accidents 
Strongly 
Adequate 
Information flow (e.g. policy, procedures, vertical andhorizontal channels, 
scheduled and unscheduledmeetings) are used in support of various types 
ofdecision-making processes 
Very Adequate 
Supportive Environment  
Subcontractors safety records are inspected before awarding contracts Very Adequate 
Coworkers adopt a no-blame approach to highlight unsafe work behavior Very Adequate 
Coworkers often remind each other on how to work safely Adequate 
Coworkers believe it is their business to maintain a safe workplace environment Very Adequate 
Coworkers always offer help when needed to perform the job safely Very Adequate 
Coworkers endeavor to ensure that individuals are not working by themselves under 
risky or hazardous conditions 
Very Adequate 
Coworkers maintain good working relationships Very Adequate 
Coworkers ensure that the workload is reasonably balanced among their selves Very Adequate 
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Safety Climate Factors (continuation) Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Safety planning  
Does safety started at design stage Strongly 
Adequate 
Construction schedule is reasonable Very Adequate 
Safety is a primary consideration when determining site layout Very Adequate 
Chances of being involved in a site accident are quite large, due to unsafe conditions Very Adequate 
Operating site conditions may hinder one’s ability to work safely Almost Adequate 
Detecting potential hazards is not a major aim of the site planning exercise Very Adequate 
Working with defective equipment is not allowed under any circumstances Very Adequate 
Potential risks and consequences are identified prior to execution Very Adequate 
Weather (and soil conditions) are considered in work planning Strongly 
Adequate 
Training includes effective skills practice for normal work and skill practices for 
emergencies 
Strongly 
Adequate 
Work Pressure over Safety  
There are sufficient “thinking time” to enable workers to plan and carry out their 
work to an adequate standard 
Adequate 
There are enough workers to carry out the required work Strongly 
Adequate 
Workers consider that is necessary depart from safety requirements for production’s 
sake 
Very Adequate 
Workers perceive that operational targets conflict with some safety measures Very Adequate 
Workers consider that is normal to take shortcuts at the expense of safety Adequate 
Workers tolerate minor unsafe behaviors performed by coworkers Very Adequate 
Workers consider that is not acceptable to delay periodic inspection of plant and 
equipment 
Very Adequate 
Management is strict about working safely when work falls behind schedule Adequate 
Supervisors refuse to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule Adequate 
Safety Management System  
Periodic checks are conducted on execution of prevention plans and compliance 
level of regulations 
Adequate 
Systematic inspections conducted periodically to ensure effective functioning of the 
whole system 
Very Adequate 
Accidents and incidents are reported, investigated, analyzed and recorded Very Adequate 
External evaluations (audits) are periodically conducted of validity and reliability of 
prevention management system 
Very Adequate 
Personal protective equipment use is monitored to identify problem areas Adequate 
Are ensure daily housekeeping at all workplaces Adequate 
After using, tools and small machinery are stored in a correct place Strongly 
Adequate 
Safety devices on machines are maintained in good operating Strongly 
Adequate 
Marking and sign-posting of all risks and relevant safety information Very Adequate 
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Annex II.10 – Results from case 2 falls work accidents possibility assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Falls  
General  
To what extent the work (at height) was properly planned to be carried out in a safe 
way (especially work on or near fragile roof surfaces, on a roofs and storey floors 
being built or demolished or erecting/dismantling/altering scaffolding) and properly 
supervised? 
Adequate 
To what extent were simultaneous activities at the same location properly planned to 
be carried out in a safe way and appropriately supervised? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are the means to access to workplaces at height are adequate and 
properly protected? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent the working surfaces provide sufficient grip (refers to surfaces that 
were not made or designed to climb onto, walk on or provide support)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are form and scrap lumber with protruding nails and all other debris 
kept clear from work areas, passageways, and stairs? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are work platforms adequate and robust enough (to resist to wind and 
to forces exerted by falling objects or by workers when using hand-operated tools) 
and protected by guardrails (top railings at least 1 metre above the working platform, 
foot rails at no less than 15 cm and intermediate rails so that no openings are greater 
than 47 cm, around the perimeter)? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent is assured that working platforms are not overloaded and the loads 
correctly distributed? 
Adequate 
To what extent proper measures are taken so that employees working at a height 
greater than 1.20 m are protected from falling? 
Adequate 
To what extent are lighting levels adequate (functioning and position of lights to 
ensure that all floor areas and wall opening areas are evenly lit and all potential 
hazards, e.g. obstructions, stairways, runways and spills can be clearly seen)? 
Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent are the workplaces maintained clean and tidy, with floors and access 
routes kept clear of slippery (due to mud, wetness, moisture, oil, grease, powder, 
insufficient drainage, freezing, snow or ice…) and obstacles were workers could slip 
or trip? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent the working floors are not uneven and/or unstable (it means that the 
surface was on level, there were not loose or unstable floor parts, wrinkled carpets, 
etc) or have dangerous thresholds or steps? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent is strictly prohibited to stay at height while this was not necessary for 
carrying out tasks? 
Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent is strictly prohibited to talking on the telephone during work at 
height? 
Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of lose their balance when using 
hand tools (e. g. lipping, tripping, taking a wrong step, being bumped by someone 
and consequently losing the balance)? 
Very Adequate 
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Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Falls (continuation)  
Ladders  
To what extent are fixed ladders safely designed and constructed (i.e. not too steep 
and not too narrow, without: slippery floors, worn floor, not uniform floor, steps with 
not uniform heights, handrails loose or weak, the distance between the permanent 
floor and the first rung was greater than the space between two consecutive rungs, 
rungs slippery by itself and/or landing platforms were missing if the ladder was 
higher than 3 m)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are fixed ladders provided with protection against falling from either 
side (e.g. robust handrails)? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are fixed ladders robust enough for the planned efforts? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are fixed ladders properly fixed to the upper or lower floor? Adequate 
To what extent are the rungs (of all kinds of ladders) kept clear of soiling (such as 
mud, oil, paint, snow or ice or other slippery material)? Adequate 
To what extent are conditions such as: wearing shoes with slippery soles, the 
presence of objects on the ladder, hastily ascending or descending, being distracted or 
preoccupied with something at the same time, or poor vision, under which workers 
can lose their balance, be mantained under control? Very Adequate 
To what extent are ladders inspected and kept in safe conditions (without weak, 
broken or missing steps and weak, broken or missing handrails)? Very Adequate 
Portable (or moveable) ladders  
To what extent are portable ladders placed correctly, at an angle of one in four, (one 
unit of measurement out for every four units up), on and against a material that has a 
reasonable coefficient of friction and strength and was the step ladder placed on a 
surface that was not level and/or stable? 
Very adequate 
To what extent are portable ladders large enough to workers to be able to reach their 
workplaces? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent is strictly prohibited to place portable ladders on incline or sloping 
surfaces? 
Adequate 
To what extent are ladders with broken or missing rungs or split side rails, tagged and 
taken out of service? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are metal ladders inspected for damage or signs of corrosion? Very Adequate 
To what extent are portable ladders used only in short-term jobs (not exceeding 30 
min and do not require the worker side loads)? 
Adequate 
To what extent do workers assume a correct position on the ladder (not standing on 
the side of the ladder, feet in the middle, face toward the rungs, using both hands for 
support, not standing on the ladder whilst shifting or extending, not slipping off the 
ladder without using the rungs and not hanging onto the side)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are areas around the top and bottom of the portable ladder kept clear? Adequate 
To what extent are portable ladders prohibited from being used in a horizontal 
position as platforms, runways, or scaffolds? 
Adequate 
To what extent is the distance at the base of the open portable ladders 15 cm by each 
30 cm high? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are there warning signs indicating that work was being performed on 
a ladder? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers when they are in poor physical 
condition (sick, weak, nauseous, disabled to some extent, dizzy, vertigo, fatigued, 
tense or under the influence of drugs, alcohol or medicine, etc.) whilst standing on the 
ladder? 
Very Adequate 
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Annex II.11 – Results from case 2 contact with electricity work accidents 
possibility assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Contact with electricity  
To what extent is it ensured that the work was properly planned, appropriately 
supervised, and carried out in a safe way as it is reasonably practicable? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are electrical equipments (cables, frames, accessories) revised before 
being reassembled in a new site? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent does electrical equipment meet all the legal or normative 
requirements? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are all electrical cords or cables taken out of service when worn or 
frayed? 
Adequate 
To what extent is all electrical equipment free from recognized hazards (insulation 
defects, eg) that may cause death or serious harm? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are live electrical parts properly guarded against accidental contact? Adequate 
To what extent are leakage circuit breakers properly used to protect the workers? Very Adequate 
To what extent are all outlet devices correctly and properly matched with load being 
served? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent is the path to ground from circuits, equipment, and enclosures satisfied 
so that they are permanent and continuous? 
Adequate 
To what extent are there (on site) measures in place to prevent unauthorised persons 
from working on installations under tension (e. g. locker keys, supervision and key 
procedures)? 
Almost Adequate 
To what extent are all the electrical extension cords of the three wire types (with 
ground wire, green wire and yellow wire)? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent is the protection of the lamps for general illumination against breakage 
proper and satisfactory? 
Adequate 
To what extent are the protection measures against damage for flexible cords and 
cables satisfactory? 
Adequate 
To what extent are all cabinets, cut out boxes, fittings, boxes, panel board enclosures, 
switches, circuit breakers, through doorways or windows, attached to building 
surfaces, or concealed behind walls, ceilings, or floors? 
Low adequate 
To what extent are electric powered tools and equipment’s double-insulated or 
properly grounded? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are tests or other appropriate methods or means applied to assure that 
the electric equipment and lines are considered de-energized? 
Adequate 
To what extent do workers not wear metal objects (rings, watches…) when working 
with electrical devices? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are all disconnecting devices legibly marked to indicate purpose unless 
located so that purpose is evident? 
Inadequate 
To what extent are metal ladders not used when working on or near electrical 
equipment (such as changing light bulbs or fluorescent tubes)? 
Inadequate 
To what extent is sufficient working space provided to permit safe operation and 
maintenance of electrical equipment? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent was the electrical energy of the machines or the equipment’s (including 
hand tools) turned off when work was being performed on it (for instance, during 
maintenance work or failure repairs)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of bypass the electrical protection 
devices (e. g. residual-current device or ground fault circuit interrupter)? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of using tools that were not suitable 
for electrical works (e.g. using non-insulated screwdrivers) or using it incorrectly (e. g. 
using low voltage detectors for high voltage)? 
Very Adequate 
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Annex II.12 – Results from case 2 struck by moving vehicle work accidents 
possibility assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Struck by moving vehicle  
General  
To what extent is ensured that all drivers had (before starting to drive) a special 
training in order to drive the specific vehicles? 
Adequate 
To what extent is ensured that all visiting drivers report to site management before 
entering the site (to assure that drivers had received proper safety training)? 
Adequate 
To what extent is there (where vehicles have to reverse) a trained signaler to assist the 
vehicle driver? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent are passengers prevented from riding in dangerous positions? Very Adequate 
To what extent are flagmen and other workers at risk of being struck by moving 
vehicle do they wear noticeable garments (red or orange warning garments, 
reflectorized for working at night)? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are there proper warning vests made of reflectorized or of high 
visibility material and to what extent are they being used by employees exposed to 
vehicular traffic? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are the necessary measures taken to prevent the parked vehicles from 
inadvertently moving ( (using the hand brake, removing the ignition key, putting 
blocks behind the wheels when this was in fact necessary, etc)?  
Very Adequate 
To what extent do all vehicles with an obstructed view to the rear have a back up alarm 
or are they always used with an observer? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are drivers aware of the dangers (for themselves and for pedestrians) of 
exit of the vehicle while it had not yet stopped and been properly locked? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are drivers aware of the dangers of the vehicles with high center of 
gravity resulting in an increased risk of tipping over? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are drivers aware of the dangers (for themselves and for pedestrians) of 
doing other things whilst driving (talking on the telephone, talking with others, 
adjusting the radio, larking about, etc.) or of being distracted by things in his 
surroundings (by or loud noise)? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are drivers aware of the dangers (for themselves and for pedestrians) of 
reduced visibility by load obstruction, poor weather conditions or insufficient lighting? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are drivers aware of the dangers (for themselves and for pedestrians) 
when they are in poor physical condition (sick, weak, nauseous, disabled to some 
extent, dizzy, vertigo, fatigued, tense or under the influence of drugs, alcohol or 
medicine, etc.) whilst driving? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers at noisy locations (or when using ear protection, MP3 
players or talking on the mobile phone…) aware of the increasing danger of being 
struck by moving vehicle? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of being just in front of or behind a 
vehicle (for instance, by crossing behind a vehicle to do something with the load or 
because of being talking with the driver)? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of walking in a hurried or stressed 
manner, tripping or losing their footing at locations where vehicles are driven? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of leaving or entering the vehicle, 
while it was not yet (entirely) stopped? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of being transported in a vehicle that 
is not intended for persons (e. g. catching a lift on forklift trucks or running boards of a 
vehicle)? Very Adequate 
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Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Struck by moving vehicle (continuation)  
Roads  
To what extent is a traffic plan for the site established (with lines separating vehicles 
and pedestrian routes, vehicle access points and warning signs, traffic signs and traffic 
lights in dangerous situations like pedestrian crossings)? Low Adequate 
To what extent are vehicle traffic routes suitable for the types and quantity of vehicles 
that use them (ensure they are wide enough and that floor and road surfaces are kept in 
good condition) and periodically checked? Adequate 
To what extent are one-way systems or turning points provided to minimize the need 
for reversing (to avoid maneuver the vehicle within the site)? Adequate 
To what extent is there space enough to maneuver the vehicles safely (avoiding the 
vehicle to enter pedestrian zones when being maneuvered)? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent are obstructions (sharp bends, pillars, other vehicles, stacks of material, 
etc) removed where possible or otherwise is it make sure they are clearly visible (e.g 
providing suitable fixed mirrors at blind corners)? 
Low adequate 
To what extent is the road surface clean of slippery (due to mud, spilled oil, freezing, 
snow or because the structure of the road surface is itself slippery)? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent does the speed limit assure that the vehicles could be stopped in time 
(that depends on both the vehicle (weight…) and the situation (presence of pedestrians, 
the visibility…)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are physical speed restrictions such as speed bumps taken (if 
necessary)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are traffic or warning signs satisfactory? Low Adequate 
To what extent is the road surface properly stable to avoid that the vehicle could sink 
or tip over? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are supportive structures provided where necessary to prevent collapse 
and to prevent vehicles from running out of the roadway? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are roads, runways and maneuvering areas correctly illuminated 
(functioning and position of lights to ensure that all surfaces are evenly lit and all 
potential hazards, e.g. obstructions and spills can be clearly seen)? 
Adequate 
To what extent is delimitation and signalization made with retro reflective material? Adequate 
Vehicles  
To what extent are vehicles maintained (steering, handbrake and footbrake works 
properly and tyres tread are deep enough) to assure that it is possible to brake on time 
and steer properly? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are the vehicles equipped with safety belts? Very Adequate 
To what extent the vehicles have suitable safety features (lights, acoustic signals, side-
turn signal lights, etc) periodically checked (by a competent worker)? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are vehicles inspected (by the drivers) at the beginning of each shift to 
assure that all parts, equipment, and accessories affecting safety operation are free of 
defects? 
Adequate 
To what extent are vehicles securely loaded (the load is properly distributed and does 
not obstruct or interfere with the ability to see) and without overload (an overloaded 
vehicle can be difficult to handle)? 
Very Adequate 
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Annex II.13 – Results from case 2 injured by falling/swinging objects work 
accidents possibility assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Injured by falling/swinging objects  
General  
To what extent is it ensured that the work was properly planned, appropriately 
supervised, and carried out in a safe way as it is reasonably practicable (e.g with letting 
objects fall in an intentional and a controlled manner such as rubble or debris, into a 
chute/container)? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent was simultaneous activities at the same location properly plan to be 
carried out in a safe way and are appropriately supervised? 
Very  Adequate 
To what extent are materials which are stored in tiers stacked, racked, blocked, 
interlocked, or otherwise, properly secured to prevent sliding, falling, or collapsing? 
Adequate 
To what extent is the storage of materials properly done (are materials stored more than 
1,80 m from any hoist way or inside floor opening and more than 3 m from any exterior 
walls that do not extend above the top of the stored materials)? 
Adequate 
To what extent is the weight of the loads to move known (if it is not known, it is 
estimated by multiplying the load volume by the material specific weight)? 
Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent have proper guards been provided to protect employees from falling 
materials where conveyors pass over areas or aisles? 
Inadequate 
To what extent arethe cranes, lifts and other lift equipment’s load bearing capacity 
correctly posted? 
Adequate 
To what extent are inspections made by a competent person as work progresses to 
detect hazards from weakened or deteriorated floors or walls or loosened materials? 
Adequate 
To what extent are accessible areas within the swing radius of the rotating 
superstructure of the crane properly barricaded or protected? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent are there (on site) objects poorly maintained, damaged or not properly 
secured so that parts can break off or release at high wind speeds and be blown away? 
Adequate 
To what extent are there (on site) objects placed in such a way that they easily could 
have been taken/were actually taken by the strong winds? 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of incorrect tools or aids 
(e.g decide to lift something manually, whilst it would be better to do so mechanically)? 
Adequate 
To what extent have all scaffolds footers and the shoring devices exceed the ground 
level in at least 15 cm? 
Adequate 
To what extent are the danger zones of swinging/hanging loads or in the vicinity of 
rotating arms or counterweights clearly indicated by means of marking and/or 
signaling? 
Low Adequate 
Formwork and concreting  
To what extent are all formworks for cast-in-place concrete designed, fabricated, 
erected, supported, braced, and maintained so that it will support without failure all 
loads that may be anticipated? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent is inspection of the erected shoring equipment performed (it is inspected 
immediately, prior to, during and immediately after concrete placement properly 
satisfied)? 
Adequate 
To what extent is the inspection of the forms and shores performed properly, 
considering that the forms and shores are left in place until the employer determines that 
the concrete can support its weight and superimposed loads? 
Adequate 
To what extent are precast concrete wall units, structural framing, and tilt-up wall 
panels supported properly to prevent overturning and collapse until permanent 
connections are made? 
Adequate 
To what extent do designs and plans include prescribed methods of erection? Adequate 
To what extent are the jacking operations performed properly (for example, are jacking 
operations synchronized to insure even and uniform lifting)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are there only those workers required for jacking and to secure slabs 
permitted under slab during jacking? 
Adequate 
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Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Injured by falling/swinging objects (continuation)  
Mechanical lifting  
To what extent are accessible areas within the swing radius of the rotating 
superstructure of the crane properly barricaded or protected (by measures - for 
instance, roofs - which prevent objects from falling in a safety zone)? Low Adequate 
To what extent are danger zones of hanging loads indicated by means of marking 
and/or signaling? Inadequate 
To what extent are workers prohibited to stay in the lifting danger zone while this is 
not necessary for attaching or loosening loads? Low Adequate 
To what extent is strictly prohibited to overload (it means that the load is heavier than 
the equipment's capacity indicated in the load chart) the hoisting equipment (crane, 
hoist, gantry crane, forklift truck etc.)? Adequate 
To what extent are hoisting equipment’s maintained (hoisting cable, cable guides, 
winch, drive, operating panel, the levers, switches, instruments/sensors, limiters or 
indicators/gauges, hoisting arm, loading arm, stabilizers/props, etc) to assure its good 
condition (not damaged, worn and properly assembled)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are the “hoisting gear” (lifting straps, lashing straps, slings, hoisting 
chains, hoisting hooks, swivels, lifting beams, lifting clamps, hoisting eyes, lifting 
magnets, cargo slings, latches, etc) periodically checked (by a competent worker)? Adequate 
To what extent are hoisting equipment’s inspected (by the operators) at the beginning 
of each shift to assure that all equipment parts and accessories affecting safety 
operation are free of defects? Adequate 
To what extent do any hooks, rings, oblong links, pear-shaped links, coupling links, 
and other attachments have a rated capacity at least that of the chain? Adequate 
To what extent is assured that the “hoisting gear” is correctly used (it means used in 
the way that it was made/intended for)? Very Adequate 
To what extent is assured that cranes and lifts are fixed on solid foundations? Very Adequate 
To what extent is assured that hoisting equipment was placed on ground that is stable 
and sufficiently able to support the weight (it means that the surface is strong enough 
to bear the weight of the equipment’s and expected loads)? Adequate 
To what extent is assured that loads are correctly stowed and attached (correctly 
fastened to avoid load instability and/or fall) and correctly disconnected (only when it 
is in a stable position on the floor or on another surface)? Adequate 
To what extent is assured that bulk and/or small loads are fastened in appropriate 
devices (e.g. wire mesh containers or pallets)? Almost Adequate 
To what extent is assured that loads are moved at an appropriate speed (not quickly or 
too suddenly)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are raised loads kept as close to the ground as possible to prevent 
tipping and bumping against objects or buildings while travelling? Almost Adequate 
To what extent are there systems of communication (working properly) between 
lifting operators and banks men? Almost Adequate 
To what extent is it forbidden to hang loads with winds exceeding 40 km/h, heavy rain 
or fog (or other weather conditions that can hinder vision or difficult the load control)? Very Adequate 
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Annex II.14 – Results from case 2 cave-ins work accidents possibility assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Cave-ins  
To what extent is it ensured that the work was properly planned, appropriately 
supervised, and carried out in a safe way as it is reasonably practicable? Very Adequate 
To what extent is the excavation area properly demarcated and signalized? Adequate 
To what extent do all excavation slopes respect at least the angle of response except 
for areas where solid rock allows line drilling or presplitting? Adequate 
To what extent are all electrical cords or cables taken out of service when worn or 
frayed? 
Adequate 
To what extent is there proper drainage in the bulk mass? Very Adequate 
To what extent are all surface encumbrances that may create a hazard removed or 
supported? Very Adequate 
To what extent is proper warning system such as barricades, hand or mechanical 
signals or stop logs used when mobile equipment approaches the edge of the 
excavation? Low Adequate 
To what extent are excavation materials kept at least 1 m from the edge of the 
excavations? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are daily inspections made to the excavation to determine the 
possibility of cave-ins and are they necessary measures taken to protect workers? Very Adequate 
To what extent are excavations inspected after any hazard increasing occurrence (e. g. 
storms)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are shoring or sloping systems used to support the walls and faces of 
the excavations sufficient to ensure against cave-ins? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are there ladders properly placed in the excavation? Adequate 
To what extent is vehicle speed properly reduced in roads near excavations (to reduce 
vibration)? Low Adequate 
To what extent is pedestrians’ safety on the sidewalks assured by outlining the 
obstacles and/or forcing pedestrians to walk in the opposite side? Almost Adequate 
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Annex II.15 – Results from case 2 hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including 
awkward or sudden movement) work accidents possibility assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden movement)  
To what extent was the work properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried out 
in a safe way (e.g the demolition or assembly of prefabricated structures)? Very Adequate 
To what extent were simultaneous activities at the same location properly planned to be 
carried out in a safe way and appropriately supervised? Adequate 
To what extent are abrasive wheel grinders provided with safety guards which cover the 
spindle ends, nut and flange projections? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are workers working in the vicinity of running machinery from which 
material or items could fly around, or in the vicinity of persons who use hand tools 
whereby material could fly around, properly protected (such as eye protection, facial 
protection or a helmet) for activities with a cutting action (sawing, drilling, smoothing, 
turning, honing, etc.) or for other activities whereby there is a risk that objects/parts can 
fly off (for instance, hammering, the treatment of objects on a lathe, with a drill or saw, 
whereby the object or the fastener can fly around during the treatment…)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of wrong tools or machine 
operated incorrectly or tools used in the wrong way (e. g. using metal hammers, whereas 
a plastic hammer should have been used for that material; using grinding discs that are 
not suitable for the material to be treated or for the rotational speeds of the machine; 
using the wrong pliers for holding something firmly; or using a screwdriver as a chisel 
and vice versa; when a force that is too great is exerted with the tool or if the machine is 
used for treating something with the wrong setting - speed, angle, direction, force, aid, 
etc; wood drill instead of stone drill (for drilling into stone), a hand tool with the wrong 
size (spanners, pliers)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers if some material is poorly maintained 
or damaged, hoses, chains, wires, ropes, cables under tension can suddenly break so that 
the loose ends could fly around? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of wires, cables or ropes that could get 
caught on something or become entangled getting under pressure or under (mechanical) 
tension (if these items then suddenly came loose, they could fly around)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of tools or machines in the 
wrong way (for instance, using a forklift truck to move vehicles; not using tensioners 
properly, the wrong timing when releasing something under tension or pressure)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are objects that could be under pressure or under (mechanical) tension, 
properly secured (for instance, objects such as flexible hoses, cables, tackles, tail-lifts, 
binding wire, lashing straps, tensioners, steel wire or springs)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of incorrect tools or aids or 
hold hand tools incorrectly (e.g use of the wrong tools, not holding tools in a safe 
direction; not safely placing tool leads and tubes so that the tool could suddenly shoot 
out in another direction; not properly holding tools that are being carried, etc)? Adequate 
To what extent is ensured that workers receive adequate information on the weight of a 
load, the center of gravity or the heaviest side when a package is unevenly loaded? 
Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent are material and equipment that might fall or roll into an excavation kept 
at least 2 meters from the edge? Adequate 
To what extent are parked vehicles properly locked? Very Adequate 
To what extent are objects and structures near roads protected against collisions or 
crashes? Low Adequate 
To what extent are work areas well lit, dry and clean (especially where loads are moving 
manually)? Adequate 
To what extent are work areas well lit, dry and clean (especially where loads are moving 
manually)? Adequate 
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Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Hit by rolling/sliding/flying object (including awkward or sudden movement) 
(continuation) 
 
To what extent are objects/materials correctly stacked (including stacks of dissimilar 
objects) to avoid collapse, topple over and objects falling (e. g stack should not be 
higher than 3x the width, heavy objects could be stacked on the lower parts of the stack, 
objects should not exceed the edge of the shelves)? Adequate 
To what extent are the (on site) objects/materials that could be dragged by the wind 
properly tied? Very Adequate 
To what extent are the surfaces adequate to support the load (e.g. strong enough to bear 
the weight of the objects, without vibrations caused by passing lorries)? Adequate 
To what extent are observers kept at a safe distance from work equipment’s? Low Adequate 
To what extent are vehicles safely loaded (ensuring that the cargo is stowed and not 
beyond the loading box (it is not sticking out) and is not distributed unevenly and it is 
not too high)? Adequate 
To what extent are loads in vehicles safely fastened (e.g. tensioning the ratchet strap and 
the correct lashing angle) by correct devices (for instance not using a drum clamp or 
using rope with little elasticity instead of a lashing strap)? Adequate 
To what extent are machines and tools kept in good conditions (to avoid that with 
normal use parts, such as saw blades, chisels or bits, could have broken or flown 
around)? Adequate 
To what extent are the machines and tools inspected (by the users) at the beginning of 
each shift to assure that they are free of defects? Adequate 
To what extent are the fastening devices kept in good conditions? Adequate 
To what extent are the fastening devices inspected (by the users) at the beginning of 
each shift to assure that they are free of defects? Adequate 
To what extent are stowing material, connections or couplings that could slip off with 
normal use inspected (by the users) at the beginning of each shift to assure that they are 
free of defects (for instance, defective tensioners, cables, lifting straps, hoisting eyes, 
bolts/screws/nails or tackles)? Adequate 
To what extent are loads/objects suitable to be moved manually (e.g. objects that are not 
too large to be carried, objects with a surface that is not slippery and/or sharp or objects 
that nor exceed 27 kg)? Adequate 
To what extent are there handles (adequate and sufficient) for helping the manual 
handling tasks? Adequate 
To what extent are there (on site) objects poorly maintained, damaged or not properly 
secured so that parts can break off or release at high wind speeds and be blown away? Adequate 
To what extent are there (on site) objects placed in such a way that they easily could 
have been taken/were actually taken by the strong winds? Adequate 
To what extent is strictly forbidden to throw tools or other objects? Adequate 
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Annex II.16 – Results from case 2 contact with machinery/equipment moving parts 
(including trapped between objects) work accidents possibility assess  
Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between 
objects) 
 
General  
To what extent equipment’s and machinery comply with the applicable use 
specifications and safety regulations (i. e. bears a CE marking)? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent were equipment’s and machinery not modified after purchase? Very Adequate 
To what extent have equipment’s and machinery emergency stop devices within reach 
and properly functioning? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are machinery guards kept in place and in working order? Very Adequate 
To what extent are hand tools and other equipment regularly inspected for safe 
condition (including visual inspection each day for defects or obstructions prior to 
use)? 
Adequate 
To what extent are impact tools free of mushroomed heads? Very Adequate 
To what extent are welding and cutting operations shielded by no combustible or 
flameproof screen whenever practicable? Adequate 
To what extent are all employees who are performing any type of welding, cutting, or 
heating protected by suitable eye protective equipment? Very Adequate 
To what extent are power tools, belts, gears, shaft, pulleys, sprockets, spindles, drums, 
fly wheels, and chains properly guarded? 
Very Adequate 
To what extent are tools used with the correct shield, guard, or attachments 
recommended by the manufacturer? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent is power actuated tools left unloaded until they are ready for immediate 
use? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent are tools stored in a dry, secure location where they won't be tampered 
with? 
Low Adequate 
To what extent is power actuated tools left unloaded until they are ready for immediate 
use? Low Adequate 
To what extent are tools stored in a dry, secure location where they won't be tampered 
with? Low Adequate 
To what extent are gears on the hoisting machine well guarded? Adequate 
To what extent are machines moving parts still moving (e. g. continuing to turn) after 
the machine had been switched off? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of bypass the physical safeguard 
(physical safeguard' refers to equipment that prevents people from touching the 
moving parts such as screens, hoods, optical screens, etc.)? Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of intentionally come within reach of 
a machine's moving parts (for instance, in order to straighten something out, remove 
something, clean something, etc.)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of wearing something or holding 
something so that the machine could 'grab' (e. g. loose-fitting clothing, long hair or 
wearing gloves near rotating parts)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are (machine/equipment moving parts) danger zones clearly indicated 
by means of signs? Very Adequate 
To what extent was the electrical energy, pressure and (mechanical) tension of the 
machines or the equipments (including hand tools) turned off when work was being 
performed on it (for instance, during maintenance work or failure repairs)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are technical measures taken against unintentional start-up of the 
machine (such as: removing fuses, locking/blocking handles and switches, etc) whilst 
cleaning, maintaining or repairing? 
Almost 
Adequate 
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Work accidents Possibility Factors Analyst 
assessment 
(Semantic term) 
Contact with machinery/equipment moving parts (including trapped between 
objects) (continuation) 
 
Hand Tools  
To what extent are hand tools properly protected (safeguards, locks against 
unintentional start-up, locks against continued turning after switching off and other 
accessories for the safe use of the tool)? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are hand tools equipped with the appropriate and properly mounted 
handles (with a shape able to provide sufficient grip) and kept in good condition (not 
soiled, worn or damaged)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are tool handles free of splits and cracks? Very Adequate 
To what extent could or did the hand tool and/or the cords/tube of the hand tool get 
caught somewhere? 
Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent are hand tools correctly adjusted (e. g. correct rotational speed)? Adequate 
To what extent are the heads of chisels or punches grounded periodically to prevent 
mushrooming? Adequate 
To what extent are frames of all arc welding and cutting machines grounded properly? Very Adequate 
To what extent are electric, pneumatic or hydraulic hand tools not immediately 
stopped moving when the operating button is released? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of working materials (of the 
object/workpiece) insufficiently suited for working with the hand tool (material too 
hard, material with defects - e.g. knots in wood, presence of objects in the material that 
do not belong to it - nails in a piece of wood)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of using the hand tool in an unsafe 
position (e. g. at a wrong angle so that the tool kicks back - when sawing, honing or 
milling)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of electric, pneumatic 
and/or hydraulic hand tools (including high-pressure sprayers), hand tools under 
mechanical or other tension not properly protected against unintentional start-up or 
activation of the tool (e. g. situations in which locks are not used, switches are not 
blocked, the tool's power has notbeen shut off)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of the use of hand tool not in a good 
condition (e. g. hand tools whose safety features - such as self-braking grinding discs, 
safeguards, etc - are missing or not functioning properly or if the grips/handles are 
slippery)? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of working with hand tools whilst 
doing something else at the same time (e. g. carrying or putting away another 
object/tool, using another hand tool, using a telephone, drinking coffee, etc.)? Very Adequate 
Trapped between objects  
To what extent are locations where objects, machines or obstacles were placed too 
closely to each other so that workers could be trapped if the objects or machines 
started moving clearly indicated by means of marking and/or signaling? 
Almost 
Adequate 
To what extent are there (on site) poorly designed handles/grips (of machines, doors, 
lids, etc.) so that when in use a hand/fingers could become trapped? Low Adequate 
To what extent are hinged objects (such as doors, manhole covers or engine covers) 
that were not properly secured (e. g. by mechanisms for preventing the object from 
closing/opening suddenly or too quickly)? 
Strongly 
Adequate 
To what extent are there (on site) work with machines or vehicles with which loads are 
moved and was operators view of the road obstructed (by, for instance, the load on the 
vehicle) or insufficient due to poor weather, insufficient lighting, obstacles or because 
the vehicle has many blind spots? Very Adequate 
To what extent are loads properly fastened so to avoid that it started inadvertently to 
move? Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of body parts (such as heads, arms or 
legs) of passengers or of the driver were partially or fully protruding from the vehicle? Very Adequate 
To what extent are workers aware of the dangers of being transported in a vehicle that 
is not intended for persons (e. g. in a cargo space)? Adequate 
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